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ABSTRACT 
 
In the security spectrum, there is a blurring line between defence and development. In both 
traditional and non-traditional security situations, such as counterinsurgency and natural 
disasters, the armed forces has been called to respond in ways other than their mandate of 
physical protection in order to attend to human development needs. How and when this 
transition of roles happens has been studied and debated.  As the main security institution 
of a country, militaries around the world have performed duties outside of their 
defence functions. Their tasks have expanded from maintaining peace and order to 
including nation-building, economic development, the provision of disaster relief, and 
engaging in efforts to conserve natural resources. Looking at these extra functions, the 
Philippines armed forces are no different in performing non-traditional roles. The 
Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP) is one of the key institutions, which has been at the 
forefront of the campaign in tackling these domestic challenges. 
 
 
To a certain extent, the mixture of economic activities with combat operations has 
characterised the military’s different campaigns such as counter-terrorism and counter-
insurgency. Involvement in economic functions has been justified on the grounds that it 
is critical to ‘winning the hearts and minds’ of those living on the front lines, supporting 
the military’s role in nation-building. The aim of this study is to employ pre-determined 
metrics to evaluate the contribution of the Philippine defence sector to national 
development, and, in turn, comprehensive security. Whilst the conventional view is that 
defence is a burden on development, the question this study poses is whether, by contrast, 
in the Philippine context, there is a positive relationship between defence and 
development; that is, that defence expenditure contributes to development outputs such 
as employment, skill-generation and even infrastructural investment. The study framework 
is anchored to the following policies: AFP Modernisation Act of 1995, and its subsequent 
revision, AFP Modernisation Act of 2010, the Internal Peace and Security Plan (IPSP), 
and the National Security Plan 2011-2016. The framework highlights the important 
security goals of defence industrialisation, internal security, and non-traditional security.  
These data were further substantiated and consolidated via archival sources, such as 
government and company reports, as well as secondary data (e.g. books, journals, etc.). 
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The mission thrusts of the AFP demonstrate the organisation’s multiple objectives to carry 
out a mandate to protect the state and the people. The Philippines has a very modest 
defence industry with few companies manufacturing small arms and ammunitions. 
Its goal is to be self-reliant, however, issues within the Procurement Law prevents this. 
Meanwhile, the conduct of counter-insurgency efforts through the IPSP allows the AFP 
unified commands and field units to support government units and agencies in their peace 
and development programmes.  
 
Furthermore, the geographic deployment of military personnel and equipment across the 
archipelago allows the armed forces to respond in times of disasters. Overall, the armed 
forces has contributes positively to the national development of the Philippines. To this 
end, and based on the research finding, a number of important policy recommendations 
are advanced to raise the effectiveness of the Philippines’ security policies. 
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Chapter 1 
Evaluating the Contribution of Defence to  
Philippine Security and Development 
 
 
1.1  Making the Case for the Study  
 
Chapter one seeks to make the case for a high-level study of the contribution of defence to 
the national development of the Philippines. Subsequent sections will outline the purpose, 
value, study pattern, and data-access strategy. However, at this initial stage, there is a need 
to sketch o u t  the study’s contextual backdrop. Issues that need to be addressed 
include, why study the Philippines? Why defence? Why security and development? Naturally, 
the starting point for such a discussion has to be the Philippines. Since the country’s 
independence in 1898, issues of defence and security have played a central role in the affairs 
of state. However, the subject has received scarce academic attention. This study attempts to 
address this shortcoming. 
 
 
1.2  Creation of a Philippine Defence 
 
In November 1935, the Philippine Commonwealth was established, albeit a semi-independent 
status, after three centuries of Spanish colonial rule and later, by the United States. That same 
year, the Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP) were created under the guidance of General 
Douglas MacArthur.  When the Japanese invaded the Philippines in December 1941 after the 
bombing of Pearl Harbour, the AFP forces were incorporated in the U.S. Army to fight the 
occupying force.  Given its military establishment and war experience under the American 
influence, the AFP borrowed heavily from the U.S. Army’s organisational character, ideology, 
and political attitudes.1 In terms of orientation, the AFP was the least politically oriented military 
in Asia and was placed under the control of civilian leaders, who were elected democratically. 
Furthermore, the 1935 Constitution did not allow active military personnel from engaging in 
partisan political activities.2 Since the establishment of the Philippine Commonwealth up until 
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the declaration of Martial Law in September 1972, the Philippines remained one of the most 
democratic countries in Asia.   
 
Following the independence of the Philippines from the United States, two sets of military 
agreements were signed to strengthen the relationship of both countries: the Military Bases 
Agreement (MBA) of 1947 and the Mutual Defence Treaty in 1951. Through the MBA, 
American air and naval bases were stationed in the country; meanwhile the defence treaty 
provided the Philippine government with various kinds of military assistance from the United 
States. As such, throughout the Cold War years, the United States essentially assumed 
responsibility for Philippine security.  But on 16 September 1991, the Philippine Senate decided 
not to ratify a new base treaty, resulting to the withdrawal of U.S. forces from the Philippines in 
November 1992.3 This event was seen as Manila’s pursuit of a more independent force 
capability rather than an alliance-based defence policy.  Around this time, the plan to modernise 
the armed forces was announced by the Philippine government through the purchase of modern 
aircrafts, fast-attack crafts, reconnaissance aircrafts, and corvettes, which prompted the passage 
of the AFP Modernisation Act of 1995. Initially, the Philippine government appeared determined 
to undertake a series of decisions and actions aimed at developing an autonomous defence 
posture; however, it later revealed a financially constrained military institution. The AFP could 
barely support its basic manpower and logistics requirements and, while the modernisation 
programme was at most modest, it had to be put on the back burner.  Thus, a few years after the 
withdrawal of American forces from the country, the Philippines began eyeing again the U.S. for 
its external defence needs.  In 1998, Manila formulated a visiting forces agreement with 
Washington, authorising the resumption of large-scale cooperative military activities between the 
two countries.  The terrorist attacks in New York and Washington on 11 September 2001 and the 
consequent decision of former President George W. Bush to form a global coalition against 
international terrorism have created further opportunities to revitalise the Republic of the 
Philippines-United States (RP-U.S.) alliance. While this alliance brought intense debates 
between and among policymakers and civil society groups, it is realised that politics and 
economics are directly linked to defence.4   
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In the Philippines, defence and development has as its core the question of the relationship 
between military and civil society in their efforts to define and pursue security.  It is founded on 
the principle that the process of defence and development is, essentially, a partnership between 
and among stakeholders – government agencies, the military, the private sector, non-government 
organisations, and the public.  The issue of security is found across all levels of social, economic, 
and political organisations and is directly related with the issues challenged by the forces 
experienced when managing development in the society.  Governance, either directly or 
indirectly as the control, management and allocation of public resources, is at the heart of the 
overarching challenges linking defence and development.   
 
The Peace and Security section of the Philippine Development Plan 2011-2016 published by the 
National Economic Development Authority (NEDA) states that “a stable national security 
environment is crucial to achieving development, human security and general welfare.”5  
However, many Filipinos still regard the state of economic and social progress as unfulfilled 
promises and disappointing for three reasons. First, the tempo of progress is slow compared to its 
immediate neighbours such as Singapore and Malaysia.6 Second, the benefits of any 
development have not been felt by the general public.7 Third, corruption issues are pervasive and 
run across the government system undermining the people’s sense of ownership of and control 
over public policy.8  Philippine growth has trailed behind neighbouring countries like Thailand 
and Malaysia, and any presence of development has failed to benefit the majority, who feel 
increasingly alienated because basic social services are not delivered. The Filipinos’ sense of 
security because of these concerns has continuously been challenged. In many rural areas, issues 
of poverty, injustice, and corruption are the rallying matters behind internal conflicts, noted as 
major security threats by the AFP. Hence, each Philippine President post-World War II has 
attempted to pursue an appropriate and adequate security programme to achieve national 
stability, so that the government may become a responsible partner in promoting peace and good 
relations in the region and beyond.   
 
In December 2010, the AFP released its new military campaign plan dubbed OPLAN: 
Bayanihan or the Internal Peace and Security Plan (IPSP) anchored through a ‘whole-of-nation’ 
approach, which strives to bring about a concerted effort towards national peace and security.9 
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This approach emphasises the creation of a consensus and understanding of security that is 
shared not just within government institutions, but also by civil society10. Both the government 
and civil society believe in the concept of human security, where the welfare and wellbeing of 
the people are at the core of its operations.   
 
This introduction poses the need to study and understand defence and development from the 
Philippine perspective. Using the comprehensive security framework encompassing political, 
economic, and socio-cultural factors, this thesis argues that defence is a force that facilitates 
development as opposed to the traditional view that defence is a burden to development.  In the 
case of the Philippines, this study will highlight the development output generated by defence 
expenditures. The succeeding sections will discuss the linkage between defence and 
development.  
 
 
1.3   From Defence to Development  
 
In the security spectrum, there is a blurring line between defence and development. How 
and when can the defence sector shift from mere affording physical protection to the long-term 
benefits of human security and development needs? What are the advantages and disadvantages 
of defence and development? Perhaps people should stop assessing activities in the defence and 
development space as unconnected events, but rather as a continuum where issues of 
human security, poverty reduction, and economic growth are concurrently being tackled. It 
has only been in recent years that ‘security’ has been used in a political sense. For example, in 
the field of international relations the term means defence from external aggression, a 
definition carried over after the First World War, also known as ‘traditional’.11  Generally, the 
term can be expressed in various ways, such as safety from violence, peace of mind, or free 
from financial burden in order to live a certain lifestyle.  
 
However, the political implication of the word is not solely limited to the “national” level, as 
shown by the use of the term at regional levels as Organisation for Security and Cooperation in 
Europe12 or the Council for Security Cooperation in the Asia Pacific.13 As such, military 
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measures and foreign policies are not exclusive components of the term “security.” In the field of 
international relations, the dominance of national security conversations (e.g. nationalism, 
democratisation) is a product of the realisation that the protection of the state (people and 
resources) is the main responsibility of the government.  
 
During the Cold War, the attention of national security by some countries such as the United 
States, Britain, and France was centred on the threat of the Soviet Union.  Security was regarded 
primarily by the world’s superpowers in terms of military security. The end of the Cold 
War has caused an evolution in the definition of security, where it transitioned from being 
coined in terms of military capability to something related to economic growth.14 The security 
concerns of governments have expanded and now comprise varying issues from safety, 
economic growth to environmental concerns.15 This expanded explanation of security 
highlights a focal question: what is the connection between defence and the broader non-
traditional elements of security? 
 
With the transformation of how ‘security’ was defined, the relationship of defence and 
economy has fostered new possibilities for cooperation between the two sectors. Furthermore, 
this transformation brought remarkable changes in both policy and attitudes – defence 
expenditures decreased globally and procurement of weaponry shrank. From the perspective 
of policy-makers of those major countries influencing international security, the world has 
experienced fundamental changes. Whilst security during the Cold War was expressed 
predominantly in terms of military security, in the post-Cold War security was described 
in economic terms.  
 
Additionally, when the Soviet Union fell, there was an increased pressure on governments to 
make new decisions about preserving national security, along with the social, political 
and economic demands that have been building in order to reduce public spending. In 
relation to the post-Cold War years, competition for resources revealed an enigma because major 
players in the international scene are unable (or unwilling) to deliver the goods, especially when 
economic and financial capacity are most important for determining the stability of the 
future security order.16 Most of these countries, like United States and United Kingdom, 
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are suffering from economic reverses. Sustaining and maintaining defence capability, while 
increasing a nation’s self-reliance, is expensive.  However, most states that find sustaining 
military capability expensive have reacted by cutting the cost of maintaining a domestic defence 
industry through privatisation, engaging in international arms trade, and building alliances and 
pooling resources with like-minded nations (see Figure 1.1).17  Furthermore, these exchanges in 
security strategies and policies can also make an impact towards defence and development. 
 
Figure 1.1: Trading Off National Security and Defence Spending Priorities 
 
 
Source: Pricewaterhouse Coopers. The defence industry in the 21st century 2005, p. 5.  
 
 
What emerged after the Cold War was an international security structure illustrated as a series of 
circles that integrate a collection of various security as well as economic arrangements (see 
Figure 1.2).18 The structure offers a practical framework for evaluating how defence industry 
and governments can work together to maximize the economic potential. It does so in a 
coordinated manner and clearly sets the security and economic environment. The framework 
comprises three concentric circles with the innermost loop representing the home market of the 
defence contractor. Like the first one, the two other circles have evolved since the framework 
was released in 1996.  The character of national security forces and their necessities have 
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been changed by joint force doctrine, as private companies became engaged in buying 
equipment, assuming jobs formerly are the responsibility of the military and supplying 
facilities that were earlier owned and maintained by the government.19   
 
Figure 1.2: The Post-Cold War International Security Framework 
 
 
Source: Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (1996). http://www.sipri.org/  
 
 
These shifts in the international security are a response to the structural and cultural 
changes evident in the global environment. However, security priorities differ from state to 
state. The United States, for example, has maintained a major presence in land, air and water 
environments with state of the art systems capabilities known as the Revolution in Military 
Affairs (RMA). Security scholars conclude that meaningful technological advances in 
capabilities instigate revolutions in military affairs. Matthews, for example, argues that “when 
the political, economic industrial, global, strategic, and military pressures partner with 
technology, it results to an RMA.”20  Another factor in an effective revolution is for the 
government to acquire some institutional features that allow them to direct technological 
advances that radically enhance military efficiency and efficacy.21 According to RMA advocate 
Andrew Marshall, it is: 
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[A] major change in the nature of warfare brought about by the 
innovative application of new technologies which, combined with 
dramatic changes in military doctrine and operational and 
organisational concepts, fundamentally alters the character and 
conduct of military operations.22 
 
Similarly, there are those who maintain that RMA is a revolutionary impact of technological 
change or geopolitical on the outcome of military conflicts.  Three basic conceptions can be 
derived from these points.  The first highlights the changes in the state affected by political and 
socio-economic factors.23  The second is the evolution of weapons, weapons technology, military 
organisations, and doctrine because of advancements in technology.24  The third idea 
underscores how evolution in weapons will endure and adapt to the rapidly changing security 
environment.25 In consideration of these facets, the efforts must be intensified to develop new 
methods for effective arms control and secure environment.  The next section talks about 
military operations other than war.  
 
 
1.4  Military Operations Other Than War and Peace Support Operations 
 
Taking from the cue above, what constitutes a secure environment in a world where threats could 
be as protracted and unyielding as an insurgency or as unpredictable and sudden as a natural 
calamity? To encompass the broad range of conditions threatening humanity’s survival, dignity 
and livelihoods, an expanded paradigm of security is needed. From tsunamis to entrenched 
poverty to disease outbreaks to domestic conflicts and revolutionary uprisings, the dramatic 
events of the 21st century have accentuated the vulnerability of developed and developing 
countries alike. The profile of threat has evolved throughout the years and a number of solutions 
have been attempted to mitigate it. 
 
After the fall of the Soviet Union, there is a rising realisation in the United States that 
confronting defence issues do not necessarily need to use war as a tactic. The Western Alliance 
has faced pressures to redirect limited resources from military expenditures to areas of social 
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welfare, such as education and health.26  Military doctrine and practice have often had to deal 
with the challenges of operations that do not necessarily include large scale use of offensive 
military force.27 Some examples include Hurricane Katrina in 2005, Typhoon Haiyan in the 
Philippines in 2013, as well as the Somalia and Haiti operations.28  In the 21st century, the term 
Stability Operations has been changed to Low Intensity Conflict to characterise just some of the 
operational possibilities.29  According to the United States Department of Defence’s doctrine, the 
Military Operations Other Than War (MOOTW) emphasises on preventing war and promoting 
peace.30  
 
Around the world, MOOTW has instituted a mounting stake of military commitments. For 
example in Iraq and Afghanistan, MOOTW activities are more often joint and/or combined 
operations with some level of involvement by civilian governmental, non-governmental (NGO), 
or private volunteer (PVO) organizations.31  In Afghanistan, military forces are conducting 
offensive operations against Taliban sanctuaries in the Eastern Mountains while building schools 
and wells in nearby villages, and supporting humanitarian relief agencies.  Security levels and 
development vary greatly throughout the country, and commanders must allocate their resources 
to best advantage.  
 
Table 1.1, below, shows the types of MOOTW operations embarked on by the United States 
military in Iraq when the First Gulf War ended in 2003. In the beginning of the 1970s, the British 
soldiers were engaged in missions that are now called “Peace Support Operations” (PSO).32  
Both MOOTW and PSO encompass peacekeeping, peace management, peace building, disaster 
relief, humanitarian aid, handling refugees, riot control, counterterrorism and conflict prevention, 
counter insurgency and amphibious warfare.33  The armed forces may also get into information 
campaigns intended to influence public opinion in areas where it operates. In a similar vein, post-
colonial states, such as those in Southeast Asia, embarked on the process of nation building by 
adopting the concept of comprehensive security whose principal security concerns transcended 
military nature.   
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Table 1.1: Types of MOOTW Operations in Iraq 
Arms Control  Combating Terrorism  DOD Support to  
Counter drug Operations  
Enforcement of Sanctions /  
Maritime Intercept 
Operations  
Enforcing Exclusion Zones  Ensuring Freedom of  
Navigation and Overflight  
Humanitarian Assistance  Military Support to Civil  
Authorities (MSCA)  
Nation Assistance /  
Support to Counterinsurgency  
Non-combatant Evacuation 
Operations (NEO)  
Peace Operations  Protection of Shipping  
Recovery Operations  Show of Force  Strikes and Raids  
Source: William Bender. (2002). ‘Strategic Implications for Policy in Iraq: What Now?’ U.S. Army War College 
 
 
1.5  Comprehensive Security 
 
The intellectual reasons for defence-development linkages were furthered by academic 
expediency.  The end of the Cold War left many international relations academics looking for a 
new purpose.  Not only was much of their expertise made redundant, but also the near total 
failure of international relations experts to foresee the fall of Berlin Wall threw the value of their 
previous endeavours into question. Many saw an expansion of the concept of military security to 
cover the spectrum of threats to human safety,34 and so the discourse evolved – “environmental 
security,” “water security,” “food security,” “economic security”.35  The new realisation of the 
limits of military endeavour to ensure human safety, and the nature of the new threats, was 
lucidly summed up in a statement from Gwyn Prins: “You can’t shoot an ozone hole” in his 
book, “Threats Without Enemies.”36 
 
The Indian army, for example, has formally become involved in environmental conservation. 
Not only does the army own vast areas of natural habitat, but it is the only entity with sufficient 
resources to repair major damage caused by land erosion and resultant landslides anywhere in the 
country.37  Satellites used during the Gulf conflict are now being used to make crop growing 
more environmentally friendly through better targeting of fertilisers and pesticides.38  In 2011, 
the head of the United Nations Environment Programme proposed the need for a force of United 
Nations (UN) “Green Helmets” to respond to environmental disasters.39 Furthermore, the UN 
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Secretary-General’s 2009 report identified sea-level rise as the “ultimate security threat for some 
small island states, leading to further disputes over maritime territories and access to exclusive 
economic zones.”40 Such an environ situation could have widespread effects such as forced 
migration, may create social and political tensions slowing down peacebuilding efforts and 
threatening international peace and security.41 
 
Yet, there have been two significant impediments to a broad acceptance of the global security 
concept.  First, the word “security” has negative connotations related to the repressive and 
oppressive behaviour of governments, and the commercial exploitation of public fears about 
crime.  Public perception needs to be developed to see the term in its original, straightforward 
sense as being synonymous with human safety - freedom from danger.  Second, the integrated 
paradigm might appear to question the need for contributory disciplinary areas.  But good 
interdisciplinary work requires strong disciplines.  The purpose of the global security approach is 
not to subsume its formative disciplines, but to create more effective understandings through 
linkages between and within them.  The concept of comprehensive security was introduced to 
incorporate development as a major component of security.  In this manner, development was 
defined within a state-centric security agenda.  The post-colonial states that emerged in Southeast 
Asia after the Second World War largely prioritized nation building and state-formation.  The 
eventual establishment of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) in 1967 was 
predicated on this concern for the security of those structures.42 
 
Over the years, ASEAN has progressively adopted an agenda emphasising broader security 
recognising the interlinked relationships of political, economic, socio-cultural and environmental 
dimensions of development.  When discussing ASEAN’s comprehensive approach to security, 
Lizée and Peou argue “that national security does not only reside in the absence of external 
military hostility but also in the presence of socio-economic development within national 
boundaries.”43 
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1.6  Comprehensive Security: The ASEAN Perspective 
 
Whilst the popularity of comprehensive security discourses worldwide grew after the Cold War, 
the concept already surfaced in many security platforms in Asia, particularly in Southeast Asian 
countries, even during the peak of the tension between the Eastern and Western Bloc powers.  
These security platforms include the Defence Ministers Meeting, where the defence secretaries 
of the ten ASEAN states convene annually to discuss regional security challenges of mutual 
interests.44  The countries involved accepted (in varying degrees of formality) the idea of 
comprehensive security that recognises the importance of ensuring the political, economic, and 
social well-being of society and the state within both a domestic and international context.  At 
least three states in the region – Indonesia, Malaysia and Singapore – have developed their own 
versions of comprehensive security.   
 
Indonesia has expressed the idea of Ketahanan national (national resilience), which also became 
its security doctrine starting from the Suharto era in the mid-1960s.  The Ketahanan national 
programme was portrayed as a comprehensive security that focused on political, economic, 
socio-cultural, and military aspects covering both the domestic and the international 
environment.45  At that time, communism and economic recession were being faced by the 
political regime, thus the Ketahanan concept was a resolute strategy for the survival of the 
administration. The centrality of domestic stability therefore – translated as national resilience 
led to the emphasis on non-military, multidimensional measures to achieve national and regional 
security, with particular attention given to economic development.46 Similarly, Malaysia 
developed an articulation of this notion of comprehensive security.  In 1986, Malaysian Prime 
Minister Mahathir Mohamad declared that one “cannot separate national security from political 
stability, economic success and social harmony.  Without these, all the guns in the world cannot 
prevent a country from being overcome by its enemies, whose ambitions can be fulfilled 
sometimes without firing a single shot.”47  Similar with Indonesia, Malaysia believes that 
regional stability can only be secured though national resilience. Moreover, Singapore pursues a 
comprehensive approach to security through the concept of “Total Defence,” which will be 
discussed in Chapter 2.  In addition, the other ASEAN countries like Brunei, Thailand, and the 
Philippines have also looked at defence through the lens of comprehensive security. From the 
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viewpoint of ASEAN, comprehensive security is conceptualised by giving importance to regime 
stability and economic development as both are essential elements in domestic stability. 
Alagappa notes that irrespective of the labels and the different interpretations, comprehensive 
security encompasses the political, economic, socio-cultural, and military dimension.48  Hence, 
while ASEAN states may have had an expanded notion of security beyond military concerns, its 
idea of comprehensive security was no different from the dominant state-centric approach of 
conceptualising security.  
 
Where ASEAN differs starkly from other political and economic organisations, however, is in its 
development of regional security strategies.  Instead of pursuing the usual deterrence, power-
balancing, and alliance building, ASEAN engaged a different course directed at norm-building, 
building trust and confidence, and developing cooperative approaches with like-minded and non-
like-minded states to address traditional and non-traditional threats.49  Contrary to Japan’s 
perception of resilience, the approach ASEAN preferred to adopt was inward-looking.50 The 
American Psychological Association describes resilience as “the process of adapting well in the 
face of adversity, trauma, tragedy, threats, or even significant sources of stress.”51 In a society’s 
context, resilience is the capacity for communities to absorb stress and recover quickly from 
difficulties. The strategy, in fact, was made a key strategic pillar of Obama's National Security 
Strategy (NSS) in 2010,52 subsequently, establishing a resilience directorate in the White House. 
In the same vein, resilience is at the core of Singapore's strategic response to national security 
threats53, being a small state surrounded by its territorially bigger neighbours.  
 
Not surprising, the ASEAN way of looking at security was often considered a deviation from the 
usual security discourse as it habitually emphasised non-interference of internal affairs, as well 
as building of informal institutions. Comprehensive security and cooperative security have been 
widely used, not only in ASEAN but even in the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF).54  Cooperative 
security in this regard has been interpreted around the concept of inclusiveness, which promotes 
dialogue and multilateral cooperation among state and non-state actors.  Together with other 
ASEAN countries, political stability and national security have been considered to be 
intrinsically linked with economic development by the Philippine government.55  In August 
1992, the National Security Council of the Philippines presented a definition of national security 
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which stressed the protection and enhancement of the well-being of people’s lives and welfare 
alongside the preservation of the country’s territorial integrity and sovereignty.56 In this sense, 
national security, economic development, and human rights were seen as mutually reinforcing 
concerns.   
 
 
1.7  The Philippines Attempts to Define Comprehensive Security 
 
For decades, the Philippines has been challenged with a number of internal and external security 
issues.  Much of the country’s internal security problems are rooted in the long history of socio-
economic inequalities in Philippine society, the inability of the state to govern effectively, and 
the continuing armed challenges from communist insurgents and Islamist secessionist groups.  
Notwithstanding the revitalised security alliance between Philippine and foreign governments 
since 9/11, the country is still vulnerable to internal and external security threats.   
 
The under-performance of the Philippine economy stands in marked contrast to most of its 
neighbours and helps to explain the many underlying problems that contribute to social 
discontent and instability. Within this environment, the military has employed a rather 
conflicting position, instigating the high profile coup attempts that have punctuated the recent 
history of the country, but also, on occasion, supporting democratic forces. In November 2010, 
potentially explosive corruption charges within the ranks of the military and threats from 
terrorist groups filled the pages of Manila’s independent press. Although these events have 
been given particular momentum by a number of recent political scandals, the 
situation is not unprecedented. On the contrary, the Philippine military has not always been a 
force for stability, despite a familiar Southeast Asian preoccupation with internal rather than 
external security. On occasion it has been a major source of domestic violence and instability. 
Moreover, some of the most fundamental relationships between coercive and political 
power remain fluid and unresolved in the Philippines, contributing to an overall sense of 
uncertainty and dysfunction. 
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That the Philippines should have become a byword for ineffective governance, corruption, 
under-achievement and instability is rather surprising, given its historical trajectory. The 
Philippines, more than any of Southeast Asia’s newly independent nations, seemed to have 
the most promise in the aftermath of the Second World War when it finally achieved 
independence. After all, as an English-speaking, ex-American colony, it seemed that the 
Philippines was uniquely placed to take advantage of the economic transformation that was 
about to gather pace throughout East Asia. And yet, despite some initial promise, the 
economic performance of the Philippines has fallen far short of that of Malaysia, Thailand, 
Singapore, and even Indonesia; its government has been conspicuously ineffective, and its 
military has been associated with political opportunism rather than the security of the nation. 
All these factors are interconnected and their origins can be traced to the pre-Independence 
period and the malign influence of American colonialism in particular. Indeed, the 
Philippines’ experience gives strong support to two of the main themes and arguments of this 
thesis: defence ‘and’ development. The dynamics and evolution of defence and development 
within the sphere of comprehensive security need to be placed in a wider context that goes 
beyond the narrow confines of military culture or even civil-military relations, to embrace the 
overarching, historically determined social, political, and economic setting in which such 
relationships are embedded. 
 
The definition of security which the Philippines adopted in the late 1960s was a matter of 
national security policy and required the Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP) to perform tasks 
that required tackling the domestic security challenges (e.g. insurgency and secessionism).  
Primarily, the traditional view of Philippine security sector refers to the mandate that AFP must 
protect the state against internal and external security threats.  It is noteworthy to mention that 
the AFP has participated in several international peacekeeping operations such as the Philippine 
Expeditionary Force to Korea (PEFTOK) in the 1950s, and the Philippine Air Force Contingent 
sent to Congo and the Philippine Civic Action Group (PHILCAG) to South Vietnam in the 
1960s.57  Also, the AFP sent humanitarian forces to East Timor in September 2000.58  
 
The 2010-15 Defence Planning Guidance (DPG) issued by the Department of National Defence 
of the Philippines on 12 January 2009 starts with an assessment of the current external and 
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internal security situation of the country.59  Externally, according to the report, the environment 
of peace, stability, and security particularly in the Asia Pacific region depends much on how the 
complicated problems of terrorism, globalisation, U.S.-China rivalry, competition for economic 
resources (e.g. energy), transnational crimes, climate and other environmental changes, and 
infectious pandemic diseases are to be addressed.  Also, there are potential flash points or critical 
areas which could spark a shooting war.  Among these are the South China Sea dispute, the 
China-Taiwan problem, and the North-South Korea stand-off. In recent years, the education and 
training programmes and equipment acquisitions of the Philippine armed forces have shifted 
towards modernisation and strengthening of capabilities that will allow Filipino soldiers to 
respond to different traditional and non-traditional security concerns including terrorism, 
transnational crimes, humanitarian operations, and disaster response.  One of the goals of the 
Philippine Modernisation Act is to make the AFP a relevant player in any regional or 
international security management.60  Thus, it is clear that over time, Philippine policy has 
moved from emphasising traditional security to one emphasising non-traditional security. 
 
 
1.8  Study Aim 
 
The aim of this study is to employ pre-determined metrics to evaluate the contribution of the 
Philippines defence sector to national development, and, in turn, comprehensive security. Whilst 
the conventional view is that defence is a burden on development, the question this study poses 
is whether, by contrast, in the Philippine context, there is a positive relationship between defence 
and development; that is, that defence expenditure contributes to development outputs such as 
employment, skill-generation, and even infrastructural investment.  
 
 
1.8.1  Research Question   
 
Based on the introduction above, the research question that this study wants to answer is: how 
effective are the contributions of defence to the development of the Philippines? Specifically, the 
study will look at the areas of defence industrialisation, internal security, and non-traditional 
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security. The experience of the Philippines in the field of defence paints a dreary picture despite 
it being the envy of its neighbours in the immediate years after World War II.  Through the 
years, the country saw the deterioration of its military capabilities amidst the continuing threat of 
insurgency and terrorism.  In recent times, the Philippine government has viewed defence as a 
way to boost the economy.  It has followed the trend of MOOTW and the AFP Modernisation 
Act of 1995, incorporating the inclusion of socio-economic aspects in its defence utility mandate. 
However, there the Philippine Armed Forces remain under-resourced.  The opportunity costs of 
defence are especially high for the poorer nations, and so a case study of the Philippines is 
particularly relevant, focusing on analysing the defence-development relation from the 
perspective of a developing country.  
 
 
1.8.2  Enabling Objectives 
 
The enabling objectives of the study are to: 
i. Evaluate the various defence frameworks, processes, and mechanisms by cross 
referencing with defence strategies of selected developed and developing 
countries. 
ii. Determine the factors that contribute towards an effective defence and 
development strategy by using pre-determined metrics. 
iii. Discuss and critically analyse the development of the Philippine defence policies 
and industry performance, and its contribution to national development. 
iv. Propose policy recommendations towards an effective development model 
enabling defence to play a more robust role in meeting Philippine security 
challenges.  
 
 
1.9 Study Value: Contribution to Knowledge 
 
One of the distinct facets of a PhD dissertation is its original contribution to knowledge. These 
components include the nature of the research question, the use of an effective research 
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methodology, and evidence of critical evaluation.61  To make a contribution to knowledge, the 
research is expected to work at the boundaries of knowledge, impacting on the conceptual or 
theoretical development of a research discipline.  The selected research methodology should 
arise from the evaluation of different approaches so that one chooses with justification the 
approach that maximises the validity, reliability and appropriateness.   
 
The study seeks to fill the gap of literature since not much has been written about Philippine 
defence and security. This case study on the Philippines will offer a fresh perspective in looking 
at how defence policies helped to accommodate the needs of the situation. The viewpoints to be 
shared will highlight the impact of non-traditional security as it moves from traditional security. 
One of the issues is the limited interest in studying Philippine defence outside, along with the 
broader relevance of security. This limited definition is deeply anchored in the realist school, 
where the concept of security is viewed in a purely military sense.62  Second, there is a difficulty 
in acquiring both qualitative and quantitative secondary data.  To overcome this, the study will 
seek primary data, and use a triangulation approach combining both qualitative and quantitative 
methods.  This will be further discussed in a later sub-section on research methodology.   
 
Second, the study aims to make an important contribution to the ongoing comprehensive security 
transformation in the Philippines. As mentioned above, the Aquino administration has attempted, 
through the IPSP, to expand the role of the armed forces and have the public participate in the 
security discourse for a broader understanding of the combat and non-combat scopes of military 
operations. This is a big leap for security discourse in the Philippines that last saw a publicly 
published Defence Paper in 1998.  A lot has happened in the 12 years in between. Although there 
were several efforts to publish one (from 1998 to 2003), they were never approved nor released 
for serious public scrutiny. Based on initial interviews with some military officers, it can be 
determined that the challenge in implementing a strong security plan is the differing priorities of 
the national government.63   
 
Third, the study hopes to deliver a contribution that is relevant to practitioners in developing an 
understanding of defence and development. In this case, practitioners refer to military officers 
and civilians who have a stake in implementing the security programme of the government.  
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Philippine democracy affords appropriate legal avenues that can urge the government to put forth 
a comprehensive security framework.  However, the high graft and corruption rate of the 
Philippines slows down the process.  A report released by Hong Kong-based Political and 
Economic Risk Consultancy (PERC) showed the Philippines as the 4th most corrupt country in 
Southeast Asia in 2010.64  The AFP is not spared from the statistics, where strong corruption 
assertions have plagued its logistics and procurement system.65  The plunder case against former 
AFP comptroller retired Major General Carlos Garcia, who was accused of amassing at least 
Php300 million (approximately USD6.3 million) in ill-gotten wealth while still in active service, 
showed the kind of corruption happening in the armed forces.66  In addition, the appointment of 
retired military officers to key positions in government agencies, especially during the 
presidency of Gloria Macapagal Arroyo, undermines the supremacy of civilian authority. 
Accordingly, the military still affects the security agenda of the country, and such agenda 
continues to remain confidential and restricted from public scrutiny. As a consequence, the 
limited information about the various security issues the country faces fails to nurture the 
knowledge of the general public.  The Philippines may possess a participative civil society, but it 
lacks the ability to communicate and make the people understand the essential contribution of 
defence to national development.  If truth be told, most Filipinos have a cynical view of the 
military establishment due to the historical baggage experience during the Martial Law, such as 
the human rights abuses committed by some men in uniform that has increased the gap between 
the public and the defence sector.  
 
 
1.10  Conceptual Framework 
 
The conceptual framework of the study is a key part of the research design.  It contains a system 
of concepts, assumptions, expectations, beliefs and theories that supports and informs the 
research.67  For Miles and Huberman, a conceptual framework “explains, either graphically or 
in narrative form, the main things to be studied – the key factors, concepts or variables – and the 
presumed relationships among them.”68  In the present study, the literature evaluation posits how 
defence can play an important role within the realm of development. In this context, to define 
defence contained in the traditional security structure is limiting.  Therefore the framework 
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below seeks to derive an improved understanding about two integrated concepts: defence ‘and’ 
development. In this case, the Philippines will be the major point of the present study.  
 
In the 21st century, development and security concepts have transformed to meet new strategic 
realities.  Within this broader understanding, the economic, social and political domains are 
entwined into a composite, providing the foundation for enhanced security.  Security is no longer 
defined simply as defending national territory by armed forces against external threats.  Today, 
security is about the community plus the individual, whereby those in authority are mandated to 
warrant the well-being and safety of everyone. Furthermore, it is also seen in a comprehensive, 
multidimensional, and holistic manner. For instance, believing that a nation’s security begins 
from within, Indonesia stressed the primacy of domestic security by solving internal sources of 
security threats, such as insurgency, ethnic tensions, economic malaise and social divisions 
within its far-flung archipelago, creating in the process a condition of national resilience.69  The 
Malaysian concept of comprehensive security, moreover, emphasises non-military sources of 
security threats seen as ‘inseparable from political stability, economic success and social 
harmony’.70  Likewise, from a broad-based perspective, Northeast Asian countries (South Korea, 
China and Japan) incorporate economic growth, development, technological capability, political 
stability, international diplomacy, and even foreign aid within the spectrum of defence and 
security.71 
 
The contemporary MOOTW era has shifted the role of the Armed Forces from a solely offensive 
military capability to a supplementary nuanced development partnership between and amongst 
stakeholders.  Several Asian countries like Singapore, Malaysia and Japan have for long 
positioned their defence sector as the central element within a broad-based comprehensive 
security model. The Philippines is now also stirring in this direction. With defence and 
development at its core, the conceptual framework (Figure 1.3) illustrates the policy, process and 
performance exercised by the Philippine security system to protect its citizens from any harm to 
their well-being. Among the policies emphasising development in the security approach, three 
have been highlighted: (1) Armed Forces of the Philippines Modernisation Act of 1995 and 
2010; (2) Internal Peace and Security Plan (2011-2016); and the (3) National Security Policy 
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(2011-2016). These three were chosen as central to the framework because of their strong 
defence and development bias involving non-traditional strategies.   
 
The AFP Modernisation Programme of 1995 and the revised version of 2010 in Figure 1.3 
encompass doctrinal approaches to development, education and training, equipment and force 
structuring designed to bring the Philippine Armed Forces to the same level of development as 
neighbouring countries. Since its passage, the Armed Forces have made the modernisation act 
the core of their initiatives to improve capabilities.  The objectives of the programmes are: (1) to 
uphold the sovereignty of and territorial integrity of the Republic; (2) to assist civilian agencies 
in the preservation of the national heritage within its territory and its Exclusive Economic zone; 
(3) to fulfil its mandate to protect the state and its people from armed threats, and natural and 
man-made disasters and calamities; (4) to assist other agencies in the enforcement of domestic 
and foreign policies; (5) to assist the Philippine National Police law enforcement and internal 
security operations; (6) to fulfil the country’s international commitments; and (7) to support 
national development.72 
 
The second Defence-Development policy, implemented in January 2011, is the Internal Peace 
and Security Plan (IPSP) or “Bayanihan” which calls for a multi-stakeholder approach in the 
pursuit of security and the protection of civil liberties.  The IPSP reflects Philippine President 
Benigno Aquino III’s security thrust, involving four elements: governance, delivery of basic 
services, economic reconstruction, and security sector reform.  IPSP was crafted to provide 
strategic guidance for the Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP) while performing its mandated 
functions.  To assure its success, IPSP will be anchored on two strategic approaches: The ‘Whole 
of Nation Approach’ and the ‘People-Centred Security/Human Security Approach’.  The former 
is the framework that will guide how the Armed Forces of the Philippines implement IPSP. 
Rather than simply defeating the enemy, ‘winning the peace’ provides the framework for the 
new IPSP approach.  This is a shift from a predominantly militaristic solution to a people-centred 
strategy based on broad-based consultations and strong partnerships with key stakeholders.   
 
The human security concept has several components: economic security, food security, health 
security, environmental security personal security, community security, and political security 
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requiring the entire government bureaucracy, private and public sectors, to implement 
collectively.73 State security complements human security.74  IPSP aims to concretise the idea of 
putting human security at the core of the AFP’s plan and this signifies the intent of placing the 
people at the centre of its activities.  These goals can be accomplished through (1) contributing to 
the success of the peace process; (2) maintaining a professional armed forces serving under 
democratic civilian control; (3) defeating the terrorist groups and their allies; (4) contributing to 
the resolution of conflict with the National People’s Army (NPA), Moro Islamic Liberation Front 
(MILF) and other armed threat groups; (5) assisting civil authorities in taking responsibility for 
the welfare and safety of their constituents; and (6) supporting developmental, environmental 
protection, disaster risk reduction and management, and law enforcement activities.75 
 
The third Defence-Development policy is the National Security Policy.  This aims to identify 
strategic priorities to establish the right balance in the “guns or butter” debate for the allocation 
of scarce resources; and to establish the prioritization between defence and development.  Like 
the IPSP, the National Security Policy (2011-2016) focuses on four key elements: governance; 
delivery of basic services; economic reconstruction and sustainable development; and security 
sector reform. Moreover, the policy is anchored in two security goals: (1) promote internal socio-
political stability, and (2) equip the Philippines to exercise full sovereignty over its territory and 
to provide protection to its maritime and other strategic interests.76   
 
Figure 1.3 identifies these three Defence-Development policies and then seeks to extract the 
key practices common to all policies. Practices may be defined as actual policy 
implementation, rather than simply rhetorical statements. These are civil-military 
integration, piracy and human/drug trafficking, natural disasters, and terrorism/insurgency. 
Civil-military integration is a component characterized by activities/operations that forge 
cooperation and commitment from both civilian and military forces. Another serious 
transnational crime is piracy and such a problem is being experienced by southern 
Philippines and ASEAN neighbouring countries. Furthermore, the proliferation of human 
and drug trafficking due to porous borders has contributed to a growth in transnational 
organized crimes; and warrants a collaborative approach to address it.  
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Figure 1.3: The Philippines National Security through the Prism of Comprehensive Security 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Performance 
Defence - Development 
Policy Practice 
AFP Modernisation 
Act of 1995 and 2010 
• Territorial defence 
• Modernisation of the 
Armed Forces 
• Defence Industry 
• Non-traditional 
security 
 
Defence Industrialisation 
• Improve collaboration to achieve a 
minimum credible defence 
• Enhance Public-private partnership 
• Enhance technological innovation 
• Self-Reliant Defence Posture (SRDP) 
 
Internal Peace and 
Security Plan 
(2011-2016) 
• Whole of Nation 
Approach 
• People-Centred 
Security/Human 
Security Approach 
National Security 
Policy 
2011-2016 
• Promote internal 
socio-political 
stability 
• Capacitate the 
Philippines to exercise 
full sovereignty over 
its territory and to 
provide protection to 
its maritime and other 
strategic interests 
 
Internal Security 
• Integration of rebels into mainstream 
society 
• Strengthening intelligence 
capabilities 
• Securing vulnerable targets 
• Enhance preparedness in the event of 
a terrorist attack 
• Use of force against armed threat 
groups 
• Ensure effective delivery of basic 
services 
 
Non-Traditional Security 
• Enhance response to calamities, 
including typhoons, earthquakes and 
volcanic eruptions 
• Reduce the risks of slow and rapid 
onset disasters 
• Improve capability to address piracy, 
smuggling, drug and human 
trafficking, and the transport of toxic 
and other ecologically harmful 
substances  
• Enhance maritime security 
• Increase cooperative security 
agreements with allies and 
neighbours 
 
Metrics 
• Strengthening Domestic 
Defence Capability 
• Employment and Skill 
Generation  
• Supply Chain and 
Infrastructure  
Development 
 
Metrics 
• Number of 
terrorists/insurgents re-
integrated into society 
• Community involvement 
case studies and 
development projects 
• Intelligence successes 
 
Metrics 
• Improve response time 
efficiency 
• Enhance coordination 
within command structure 
• Effectiveness of military 
response 
• Nature and extent of 
recovery, rehabilitation 
and reconstruction 
• Reported cases, incidents 
and responses 
• Prosecution and 
punishment of drug 
traffickers and those 
involved in piracy 
 
Source: Author 
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The Philippines is situated in the Ring of Fire, where volcanoes are located, and around 19 
typhoons visit the country each year, exposing it to disasters and emergencies. To make 
matters worse, the country lies in the midst of intersecting geologic fault lines, subjecting it to 
destructive earthquakes and tsunamis. Confronting these natural disasters causes significant 
exhaustion of limited government financial and material resources, resulting in the interruption 
of delivery of critical basic services. Insurgency is also active nationwide although its 
presence is felt mainly in remote areas. The Communist Party of the Philippines (CPP) aims 
“to overthrow the Philippine government and install a different socio-political-economic 
order in accordance with its political beliefs and ideology.”77 The country is also 
threatened by terrorism and as a staunch ally of the United States in its campaign against 
terrorism, has been a target of foreign and local-based terrorist groups such as Daesch, Jemaah 
Islamiyah (JI) and the Abu Sayyaf Group (ASG). 
 
Having identified these myriad of security issues, Figure 1.3 then aims to establish the progress 
that policies in practice have achieved in pursuing a defence and development approach. The 
performance part of the framework identifies the quantitative and qualitative metrics that will be 
employed to test whether policy implementation has been successful.  
 
 
1.11    Choosing an Appropriate Research Method 
 
Choosing the most appropriate research method is a critical element in doctoral study as it sets 
the tone in how the data will be gathered and analysed.   Before proceeding, it is important to 
dissect what is research and what is methodology to provide a clear understanding.  Commonly, 
research is the search for knowledge. Reidman and Mory describe research as a “systematised 
effort to gain new knowledge.”78  Usually, it attempts to answer the question ‘how’.  Sleisenger 
and Stephenson explain research as the manoeuvring of ideas or concepts in order to confirm, 
extend, or correct existing information with the help of scientific guidelines.79 Moreover, 
research methodology is the science and philosophy behind all research, while methods are the 
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way of doing research such as techniques, and tools used to collect, store, analyse, and present 
information as part of the research process.80   
 
The two main sphere of research are quantitative and qualitative. The departure point of 
quantitative research is numerical measurement of specific aspects of phenomena,81  widely 
applied in the areas of natural sciences and mathematics, as well as sociological and business 
research.82  Meanwhile, qualitative research uses structured or non-structured techniques and 
utilises analysis that are non-quantitative in nature, to gain understanding of social relations, and 
uncover issues and trends in views and opinions.83  
 
For the purpose of this research, the ‘onion’ process adapted from Saunders, Lewis and Thornhill 
will be used (Figure 1.4).84  In the following section, certain aspects influencing the choice of 
research methodology and research methods are addressed resulting to an appropriate research 
design that will evaluate the relationship of defence and development in the Philippines.   
 
 
Figure 1.4: Research Process ‘Onion’  
 
Source: Adapted from Saunders, Mark Lewis, Philip, Thornhill, Adrian (2003), Research methods for Business 
Students, Pearson Education, (2004), pp. 84-112.  
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1.11.1     Research Philosophy 
 
Developing a research philosophy requires the researcher to make assumptions about the way 
he/she views the world. These postulations will reinforce the research strategy and research 
methods selected as part of that strategy. The researcher, who is concerned with facts and 
figures, may have a different perspective with the researcher who is concerned with attitudes and 
perceptions.85  While there are various research philosophies, three major ways of thinking are 
examined here: philosophy-epistemology, ontology, and axiology.86   Epistemology deals with 
the sources and limitations of knowledge; ontology deals with the nature of reality; while 
axiology is concerned with judgments about value.87  There are three stands in epistemology 
research and these are positivism (looks at natural science or physical science based on scientific 
approach).88 realism (relates to scientific inquiry but also captures thoughts and beliefs),89  and 
interpretivism (relates to social science and advocates for the understanding of human behaviour 
using qualitative approaches).90 
 
 
1.11.2   Research Approaches 
 
There are two approaches with different styles that emerge in any research – inductivism and 
deductivism. Found by many to be a scientific method, the inductive approach relies on the 
empirical verification of a general conclusion derived from specific observations.91  Informally, 
inductivism is called “bottom up” approach and is more open-ended and exploratory.  A 
researcher looks at specific observations and measures, then identifies patterns and irregularities, 
comes up with some indefinite hypotheses to be investigated, then finally develops some general 
conclusions or theories.92  On the other hand, deductive reasoning works from the more general 
to the more specific.93  Sometimes this is informally called a “top-down” approach.  It starts with 
a theory on a certain topic, and then the researcher focuses to more specific hypotheses that can 
be tested. These hypotheses are reduced further by collecting observations.   
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1.11.3   Research Strategies 
 
In their research process ‘onion’, Saunders, et al identified six strategies to pursue the study.94  
 
1) Experiment  
The experiment strategy is usually associated with the natural sciences, but it is also used in 
social research since it demonstrates basic elements in the logic of explanatory research.95 In 
their seminal book, Campbell and Stanley discussed the steps of conducting ‘true experimental 
design’, which by definition is an “experiment where subjects are assigned to an experimental 
group that receives a treatment or manipulation and a comparison group that does not receive 
some treatment or manipulation.”96 These steps are: (1) obtaining a pool of participants; (2) pre-
testing participants on the dependent variable; (3) randomly assigning each participating to a 
control group; (4) carefully controlling for differences in the application of experimental 
treatment between the two groups; and (5) re-measuring both groups on the dependent variable at 
some time.97 Most of the time experiments are conducted in the laboratory as it allows the 
researcher to carefully regulate the setting in which controlled subjects/groups/variations are 
implemented and their effects observed.98 However, this very methodological rigour of control 
puts limitations on experimental techniques especially when studying human behaviour.  
 
2) Survey  
Survey is a commonly used technique in social science research, usually involving a collection 
of data from a careful sampling of a probable population by face-to-face questioning, telephone 
surveys or via questionnaires sent through post or email.99 The two parts of the survey – the 
question and the answer – may or may not be standardised, which gives rise to three different 
data gathering tools: the questionnaire (question and answer are standardised); the structured 
interview (only question is standardised and the answer expressed freely); and the unstructured 
interview (neither questions nor answers are standardised).100  While this method is the most 
popular and most convenient, the approach is over-used and respondents are weary of responding 
to questionnaires resulting to a poor response rate.101   
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3) Case Study  
According to Yin, the case study method is “an empirical inquiry that investigates a 
contemporary phenomenon set in a real-world context.”102 As far as the researcher is concerned, 
a case study may emphasise on an extensive understanding of a group/organisation, a 
community, a family, or even an individual.103 While case studies are generally identified with 
qualitative research, the strategy can be employed by both quantitative and qualitative 
research.104 It asks the questions ‘how’ and ‘why’ and these research questions may evolve as the 
research progresses.105  In many instances, researchers use a mixed data collection approach in 
case studies, utilizing a combination of observation, surveys and interviews.106  The case study 
strategy has its share of critics, who argue that a small number of cases do not represent a 
population, therefore, cannot provide claims for establishing reliability of findings.107 Yet, 
researchers continue to use the case study method with success in carefully planned and crafted 
studies of real-life situations, issues, and problems.  
 
4) Grounded Theory  
One of the most widely used strategy for analysing qualitative data is grounded theory, which is 
in essence an attempt to generate theories from patterns, themes, and categories.108 As such, data 
collection, analysis, and the eventual formulation of a theory stand in close relationship to one 
another.109 Grounded theory advocates, Strauss and Corbin, have indicated that the research 
strategy allows the researcher to be both scientific and creative as long as the researcher stick to 
the guidelines of thinking comparatively, obtaining multiple viewpoints, periodically stepping 
back, maintaining an attitude of scepticism, and following the research procedures.110 Although 
not easy to apply, grounded theory is a powerful method that underlines the importance of 
research inquiry especially about the area under study.111  
 
5) Ethnography  
As a discipline, ethnography is the study of a culture or cultures that a group of people share.112 
As a research method, ethnography refers to the process of immersion or participation, covertly 
or overtly, in people’s daily lives for a long period of time, observing how they live, asking 
questions, gradually establishing trust, and collecting data on the issues that are part of the 
study.113 Meanwhile, some scholars have criticised ethnography for failing to understand the 
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bigger picture by only documenting the surface of events. North argued that the value of 
ethnography is limited to an individual study, thus observations cannot be generalised.114 
However, proponents of this method maintain that ethnography is a useful approach to study 
parts of society that quantitative methods have difficulty accessing to.115 
 
6) Action Research  
According to Robson, action research is a special form of research that involves both action – 
refers to what one does in their personal, social, organisation and political contexts -, and 
research – refers to how one finds out what one does in their different contexts.116 As action 
research is rooted in practice, it is also referred to as ‘practice-based research’.117 
 
 
1.11.4     Time Horizons 
 
There are two basic types of study that researchers may undertake depending on the scale of time 
available and the desired output of the study.   
 
1) Cross-sectional studies  
Cross-sectional design involves the collection of data of more than one case at a single point in 
time, which are then analysed to reveal patterns of association.118 A researcher undertaking a 
cross-sectional study is concerned with choosing several cases on the basis of carefully thought 
variables.119 As the data is collected at one time point, there is no pre-test/post-test measure to 
compare in cross-sectional studies, therefore, the researcher has to conduct extensive literature 
review and use the knowledge acquired through experience in order to define the independent 
and dependent variables needed in the study.120    
 
2) Longitudinal studies  
In contrast, longitudinal design involves the collection of data from the same sample at two or 
more points in time.121 Since longitudinal studies tend to be more time consuming and 
expensive, it is not usually conducted by a single researcher.122 As a method of data collection, 
longitudinal studies normally use self-completion surveys or structured interviews.123  
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1.11.5  Data Collection Methods 
 
Data collection is an important aspect of any type of research study.  The ability to achieve the 
research aims and answer the research question depends on the effectiveness of data collection; 
therefore the selection of method/s is an important and crucial process.124    
 
1) Sampling  
Sampling is the process of selecting a set of individuals or other entities for the purpose of 
determining parameters or characteristics of the larger set.125  It is critical to pay attention to the 
sample size to be chosen, and whether it can statistically justify the parameters of the study to be 
conducted and that the selected sample is not biased meaning different sections are 
represented.126 Equally important, is the method of sampling to generate the set.127  Different 
sampling techniques can be categorised into two, probability samples and non-probability 
samples. In probability sampling, each case in the population has a fair chance of being selected, 
while in non-probability sampling are used when it is problematic to pinpoint all potential cases 
in the population.128 
 
2) Secondary Data  
This pertains to the collection of data publicly available, including books, articles, government 
reports and organizational documents.  As is the case in primary research, secondary data can be 
obtained through quantitative and qualitative research.  A clear benefit of using secondary data is 
that much of the background work needed has already been carried out, published texts and 
statistic could have already been used elsewhere.  However, the researcher needs to assess the 
quality of the data and the approach used in initial gathering of the data.129  Usually the analysis 
and measurement does not translate to reliability and validity. 
 
3) Observation  
Collecting data through observation is done by either covertly or overtly watching behaviour, 
events, or noting physical characteristics in their natural setting.  One benefit of conducting 
covert observation is the likelihood for individuals to behave normally and naturally if they do 
31 
 
not know they are being studied.  However, ethical problems may arise when doing this kind of 
study, thus overt observations are preferred.  
 
4) Interviews  
Used in both quantitative and qualitative researches, interview method offers a framework in 
which respondents can freely express their thoughts and opinions. In quantitative study, 
interviews entail the use of structured survey instrument, where questions are asked in the same 
order and the responses are amenable to a statistical analysis.130 On the other hand, in a 
qualitative study, interviews are more flexible and questions are open-ended.131 Oftentimes, 
interviews are combined or ‘triangulated’ with other methods ensuring the validity of the 
questionnaire used.132  Interviews may also be used as a follow-up to a questionnaire as this 
permits the respondent to express responses in a flexible way, thereby providing additional 
information relevant to the research.133 
 
5) Questionnaire  
The questionnaire is an important research instrument that involves of a series of questions for 
the purpose of gathering information from a sample of respondents. A researcher must be 
mindful especially when designing the questionnaire as it is used to obtain relevant, specific and 
original information, as well as aimed at answering the research question.134  The questionnaire 
may be administered through various means of communication such as postal, telephone, email, 
on-line, delivery and collection as well as through structured interviews which require the 
presence of the interviewer and the interviewee.   
 
 
1.11.6   Research Design  
 
A quality research design involves a careful planning process motivated by attention to detail135 
as it serves as the blueprint for realising the research objectives and answering the research 
questions.136 There are many types of research design and the choice of design usually reflects a 
particular researcher’s standpoint and the question desired to be answered. It is imperative that 
the researcher has a clear understanding about the sources of information, the design techniques, 
the sampling methods, the schedule, and the availability of resources.137  Research design of the 
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study is illustrated in Figure 1.6. Information for this study will be obtained from both primary 
and secondary sources.   
 
 
1.11.7   Selected Research Methodology 
 
In view of the above points, mixed research methods were selected for this study and were 
illustrated by adapting Figure 1.4, as shown in Figure 1.5. The selected research methodology 
was framed through a realism-interpretivist philosophical approach; an inductive approach; case 
study as the research strategy; time horizon that is longitudinal; and data collection methods that 
include secondary data, questionnaires and interviews. The pastel-shaded boxes indicate the 
research methodology chosen and the red lines indicate the direction and development thinking 
process this research has undergone.  
 
Figure 1.5: Selected Research Methodology 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: Adapted from Saunders, M. Lewis, P and Thornhill, A, ‘Deciding on the Research Approach and Choosing 
a Strategy’, in Research Methods for Business Students, Pearson Education; (2004), pp 84-112.  
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The interpretivism philosophy is adopted, where both the leadership and forces on the ground of 
the Armed Forces of the Philippines are interviewed, as well as other sectors in the field of 
defence and development. As an empirical research, inductive approach is used to gather data 
since the study wants to evaluate if defence contributes positively to national development. For 
this reason, case study is chosen as the research strategy that explored the areas of defence 
industrialisation, internal security, and non-traditional security. A mixed data collection approach 
was used utilising secondary data, questionnaire and interviews to exercise reliability and 
validity of the findings. Given the time element this research was carried out evaluating the 
policies of the administration of President Aquino as well as the other Philippine presidents post 
World War II, this study was longitudinal in nature.  
 
Research design is critical in this study because the ‘contribution to knowledge’ originated from 
the nine fieldwork trips to the Philippines. The scant data on Philippine defence and security 
indicate that empirical investigation was essential giving emphasis to both the adequacy and 
quality of information. With this intention in mind, the appropriate research strategy used was 
‘triangulation’ method (See Figure 1.6).  Advocates of triangulation method assert that the result 
of combining three approaches is a net gain to address bias and practice objectivity.138  In 
particular, survey/questionnaires and secondary data interviews were used in this study. 
 
Archival.  The initial research design in this study was archival based. Figure 1.6 illustrates in 
detail the subgroups and the components within each group in detail. Documentary written 
material concerned with organisational records, including the recipient firm’s personal 
production, notes, emails and letters and websites (See Appendix A for sample letter of request). 
Documents and statistics were obtained from government offices, government websites, national 
archive, and university libraries. Archival researches were done at the libraries of the Department 
of National Defence, National Defence College of the Philippines, University of the Philippines, 
De La Salle University, and Ateneo de Manila University. Non-governmental reports, including 
publications by the United Nations, World Bank, and the Asian Development Bank were used. 
Finally, information was also sourced from conferences such as the conference papers of 
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Shangri-La Dialogue, Centre for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS), S. Rajaratnam 
School of International Studies (RSIS), and other relevant internet sources. 
 
 
Figure 1.6: Triangulation Research Methodology Model 
 
 
Source: Author 
 
 
Secondary Data. Using this method, a thorough literature search was undertaken. This included 
books, journals, specialist publications, quality magazines, newspapers as well as verified web- 
based materials.  
 
Fieldwork, Interview and Questionnaire. This approach involved sampling and the sampling 
technique employed was a combination of snowball (network or chain) and quota.  The sampling 
frame contained the population of government staff and officers who are linked to formulating 
defence strategies and modernisation policies of the Philippines as well as security think tanks. 
These were the Department of National Defence, Armed Forces of the Philippines, National 
Defence College of the Philippines, Philippine Institute for Peace, Violence and Terrorism 
Research, and, defence firms. As the proponent works fulltime in Singapore, field work to the 
Philippines was done in three stages. The first stage of fieldwork was done between August 2012 
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to January 2013, where defence agencies, security personnel, research institutions, and university 
libraries were the primary sources of information. The second stage of the field research was 
scheduled between August 2013 to February 2014 to make a follow-up on issues that need 
clarification from institutions and individuals mentioned above. The third stage of the field 
research was done between July to October 2014 for further information gathering.  However, 
prior to these visits, initial communication and approval were already obtained from the sources. 
 
The trips were done in the Philippines – specifically in Manila, Negros Occidental, Tacloban 
City, Leyte, Davao City, Davao Oriental, and Compostela Valley – to interview relevant 
individuals for the study. At the meetings, every opportunity was taken to verify the information 
shared in the completed questionnaire, through directed, but nonetheless, open-ended 
conversation. This allows the respondents to feel relaxed and more flexible to explain their 
points, as well as develop more detailed responses to the questions posed. Furthermore, 
respondents often brought with them hard copy of reports to support the interviewer’s data 
collection efforts. Generally, respondents showed keenness to participate in the fieldwork as they 
deem the research topic to be very significant and beneficial in their line of work.  (Appendices F 
to I provide the list of participants interviewed in the Philippines.)  
 
 
1.11.8   Data Analysis 
 
Both qualitative and quantitative analyses were used in the study. For qualitative analysis, NVivo 
10 was chosen to organise data because the software is available at the National Institute of 
Education, where the researcher is working. The kinds of nodes generated in the software 
reflected the information to address the research question, as well as facilitated in the sorting and 
categorising process. These nodes were categorised based on the three areas identified in the 
conceptual framework: defence industrialisation, counterterrorism/counter-insurgency, and non-
traditional security. Relevant information from the interviews and government documents were 
categorised into the nodes identified. Most of the interviews were recorded but some were not 
due to the sensitive nature of the subject. Instead, these interviews were hand-written to make the 
interviewees more comfortable. Interview notes were immediately transcribed and keyed into the 
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computer. Research materials were imported in the Sources section of the software categorised 
into folders. Contents of the materials were coded in the nodes identified. Analysis was 
generated based on the data entered.   
 
Quantitative data were analysed employing the univariate analysis, where frequency tables were 
employed to compute percentages in each category of data.  Responses were calculated based on 
the numbers of respondents against the sample. Microsoft Excel was employed to generate the 
charts used to explain the results of the completed questionnaires. In view of the semi-structured 
interview questionnaire answers from the defence firms, personnel of the Armed Forces of the 
Philippines, government and non-government officials, the answers were grouped based on the 
questions and analysed independently to classify common themes and issues. 
 
 
1.11.9   Reliability and Validity 
 
The use of triangulation method increased data reliability and addressed any biases as different 
sources were utilised to verify research results and maintain objectivity. To avoid participant 
error, the proponent made appointments and interviewed the respondents during their less busy 
hours. Such a situation provides a more relaxed atmosphere for the interviewee, free from any 
interruption. In terms of subject or participant bias, organisation documents were obtained to 
counter-check the accuracy and reliability of the data or information provided.  Observer bias 
was minimised as the author was not attached to any of the organisations that were part of the 
study and she was the only person engaged in the conduct of the whole fieldwork study, which 
included distribution of questionnaires and interviews.  
 
The application of the triangulation method ascertained the validity of the data gathered.  
Information was cross-checked by asking experts in the field, particularly the practitioners both 
in the armed forces and other government agencies. In addition, staff members of non-
government agencies such as the private defence firms and universities were also interviewed to 
further validate the data.   
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1.11.10   Ethical Considerations 
 
In every study, research ethics must be followed at all times. In this study, the author ensured 
that the privacy of respondents was protected; that the time frame for the research was 
determined; and that interviews were conducted according to pre-arranged appointments. The 
author also avoided questions that would make the respondents uncomfortable, although in 
certain occasions information could not be shared due to the sensitivity of the topic, these were 
classified, or the interviewee was not authorised to speak about it. The researcher also agreed 
that anonymity and confidentiality were strictly observed. During the access to data, the author 
maintained the position that no pressure would be directed towards the respondents enabling data 
access, and all information was to be provided voluntarily. Moreover, the author strictly focused 
on the research project’s aims. In addition, interview and survey documents are stored in a safe 
place of which only the author has access.  These documents are solely used by the author and 
are not disseminated without approval from the respondent.  
 
 
1.11.11 Study Limitations 
 
Although the study has successfully answered its aims and objectives, there were some 
unavoidable limitations throughout the research process. First, scheduling the fieldwork in the 
Philippines was a challenge since the researcher was based and works full-time in Singapore. 
Interview appointments had to be pre-scheduled before the trip to maximise time and finding a 
common time can be challenging. Second, some respondents prefer to communicate via text 
message or short message service (SMS), rather than email correspondence, which is preferred 
by the author because it is cost-effective. To handle this, the author subscribed to free online 
instant messaging services such as Viber and Whatsapp, in order to set an appointment with 
prospective respondents.  Third, some interviewees refuse to answer certain questions due to the 
sensitivity of the subject. Fourth, there is shortage in related literature and reading sources since 
not much research has been done about the contribution of defence to development in the context 
of the Philippines. 
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1.12   Study Structure 
 
Chapter One sets the scene in respect to the research focus of the present study. Chapter Two 
will scrutinize the literature on defence economics and development as well as its theoretical 
and empirical aspects. It will also provide a critique on differing arguments pertaining to 
defence as a ‘drag’ on growth and development, as well as being a ‘force for good’ 
facilitating development. The chapter will also provide insights to the comprehensive security 
policies of countries such as Japan, Malaysia, China, South Korea, Singapore, and Indonesia. 
Chapter Three will provide an evaluation of the broad Philippine security environment, 
including the diverse military and non-military threats the country faces. Chapter Four will 
then discuss the principal components of the country’s defence economy focusing especially 
on the nature and extent of the defence ‘and’ development networks. Chapter five focuses on 
the empirical impact of the defence contribution to the development of the Philippines. In 
closing, Chapter Six will identify conclusions and provide policy recommendations that will 
draw together the different strands of the discussion and analysis presented in Chapter Five. The 
fundamental objective of this research is to contribute to knowledge and suggest ways to 
improve policy, inviting interested observers, scholars, and practitioners to share their own 
perspective to this important and relevant issue. 
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Chapter 2 
Conceptual Roots of Defence ‘and’ Development 
 
 
2.1  Introduction   
 
The purpose of this chapter is to provide a critical review of the literature analysing the key 
theories concerning defence and development as well as outlining the interrelations between 
these two concepts, as illustrated in the conceptual model in Figure 1.3 (Chapter 1, p.23).  This 
review of the literature is also an avenue to further improve the research question and objectives 
and evaluate the relevant literature about the subject matter being studied.1  To objectively 
review the literature, the first part of this chapter will critically evaluate how security evolved 
since the Cold War era. Throughout the years, analysts have debated whether defence has made a 
significant contribution to economic growth. Interestingly, there has been no settled consensus 
regarding this issue but it is important to look and evaluate the nature of the debate and how 
comprehensive security is playing a role within 21st century national security planning. 
Comprehensive security, as defined in the conceptual model, incorporates factors of both defence 
and development such as civil military integration, response to natural disasters, and ways of de-
escalating terrorism and insurgency.   
 
The second part of this chapter will evaluate the various developmental approaches crafted and 
debated over the last 50 years.  Whilst development has been equated with economic growth, 
prior to 1970 at least, it includes more than just a quantitative methodology. In its 1991 World 
Development Report, the World Bank stated that “the challenge of development is to improve 
the life of the people especially those living in poor countries with better education, higher 
standards of health and nutrition, a cleaner environment, greater freedom, and a richer cultural 
life.”2 The third part of the chapter will look at the comprehensive security framework of three 
countries, namely, Singapore, China and Japan.  These countries were chosen as an example of 
states which have adapted both defence and development in their model.  Later in the chapter, an 
understanding of how countries deal with the dynamics of the defence and security environment 
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will be provided.  It will try to answer the question; does defence make a contribution to 
development?   
 
 
2.2  Scope and Evolution of Security 
 
Up until the conclusion of the Cold War, security was traditionally defined as primarily focusing 
on military defence of the state – its population and resources – as well as the employment and 
control of military force.3  Hence the postulate, that if the state is able to maintain peace and 
order, the security of its citizen is also protected. As tension brought by the Cold War declined, it 
became obvious that the security of a nation was threatened by domestic challenges and external 
actors.  Increasingly common were civil wars in Africa, poverty in Southeast, disease, hunger, 
violence, calamities, and human rights abuses.  This revealed that when focus was on traditional 
security policies, basic human needs were neglected, failing to exercise the primary security 
objective of protecting and uplifting the lives of its citizens.  
 
More recently, traditional security has been confronted by comprehensive approaches in the 
study of security.4  In distinguishing between traditional, and recent broad conceptions, Stephen 
Walt, Mohammed Ayoob, and Barry Buzan, among others, have articulated very different views 
about how to define defence to adapt to the changing environment.5 Stephen Walt’s (1991) 
traditionalist perspective has initiated the greatest debate within the security studies community.  
As a realist, Walt associates security with peace and the prevention of conflict through military 
means (deterrence, non-offensive defence and the like).6  For Ayoob national security is a 
function of nation building that requires both “security hardware” (control of coercive force) and 
“security software” (integration and legitimacy).7  Meanwhile, Buzan framed comprehensive 
security through the interconnection of five concepts, namely, political, military, economic, 
societal, and environmental has specifically widened the definition of threat away from a purely 
military to a more general one.8  Professor David Baldwin also identified four recurrent themes 
of security: (1) viewed as one of the many goals of the state and not just the main objective; (2) 
used as both military and non-military technique; (3) stressed on judgment in line with defence 
policy; and (4) academic understanding of the relationship of defence and development issues.9  
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Broadly speaking, what is articulated here about security suggests the deepening definition of 
what is security as time goes by.  Among the proponents addressing a more holistic approach to 
security are paradigms that include comprehensive, collective and cooperative measures that aim 
to warrant that for each person to be protected.  In the international scene, cooperation between 
and among states are on the rise to help curb potential threats caused by terrorism and organised 
crime.  In sum, all these dimensions can be incorporated under comprehensive security.   
 
Comprehensive security emerged from the post-Cold War discourse over the connotations of 
security as a field of inquiry.10  One of the first who advocated the concept was the late Swedish 
Prime Minister Olaf Palme, who headed the Commission on Disarmament and Security Issues 
created in 1981.11  Former Japanese Prime Minister Masayoshi Ohira defined comprehensive 
security by listing the following requirements: (a) a vibrant industrial base, (2) a robust economy, 
(3) beneficial economic relationships, and (4) an active assistance programme.12 Hsiung noted 
that comprehensive security produced two diverse but interrelated changes that shifted the focus 
away from the state as the central unit of analysis.  The first change focused on the external 
community at large, where forces of the environment and the effects of globalisation have 
constrained the ability of governments to control them using own resources.13 Epidemics like 
SARS and H1N1 Bird Flu, Ebola, and AIDS are but a potent reminder that this reality exists and 
is happening around the world. Another reality is the series of financial crises that struck Europe 
in the early 1990s and 2000s, Latin America from 1990 to 1995, Asia Pacific from 1997 to 1999, 
and North America in 2009.14  The other trend is the transition to a human-centric security of 
which the United Nations defined in its 1994 Human Development Report as “safety from 
chronic threats such as hunger, disease, and repression, as well as protection from sudden and 
harmful disruptions in the patterns of daily life.”15 
 
The importance of comprehensive security to both developed and developing countries has led to 
a wealth of literature on defence and development. More than just a trendy catchphrase, 
comprehensive security has entered the consciousness of policymakers in Washington, D.C. and 
other national capitals in recent times. As a matter of fact, the Pentagon in its 1998 “United 
States Security Strategy for the East Asia-Pacific Region Report” has a section on “The Search 
for Comprehensive Security: Transnational Security Challenges for the 21st Century,” which 
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discussed how both traditional and non-traditional elements of security can still equally influence 
the political, economic and social structures of the society. 16   
 
From the discussion above, it is shown that comprehensive security is a rising topic within the 
academic sphere. In the subsequent sections, the issue of security is further linked with 
development to include: suppression of piracy, human and drug trafficking, other crimes at sea, 
smuggling of illegal immigrants, disaster, insurgency, terrorism, and defence economy. The shift 
from traditional to comprehensive security is reflected in the changing global security landscape 
as evident in the physical and economic issues surrounding the state, economy and the 
individual. This study aims to peel off the comprehensive security layers revealing the essential 
role of defence and development, in this case, the Philippines. 
 
 
2.3  Development 
 
2.3.1  The Development of ‘Development’ 
 
The study of development is multidisciplinary and multidimensional, covering the spectrum of 
socio-economic, political and cultural.  This field remains an interesting component for 
researchers due to the various political and social issues surrounding developed and developing 
countries.17  In addition, development normally contains institutional, social, and administrative 
fundamental changes in structures, attitudes and, customs, and beliefs.   
 
Before the Second World War, the economic and social development of third world countries 
was clearly not a policy objective of the colonizers, who emphasised division of labour and trade 
within and among colonial blocks.18 Todaro and Smith noted that development has traditionally 
been measured using the per capita gross national product (GNP) taking into consideration the 
ability of a nation to expand its output faster than the growth rate of its population.19  During this 
time also, economic gains would either “trickle down” to the general public through jobs and 
other opportunities or generate the needed circumstances for a broader distribution of economic 
and social welfare.20  As long as the economy is growing, other problems such as poverty and 
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unemployment come in second in terms of importance.21 This view shifted by end of World War 
II as less developed countries saw the evolution from being dependent to becoming independent. 
It also became a turning point for scholars and policymakers in taking a closer look to better 
understanding the development process as a foundation for designing appropriate development 
policies and strategies.  
 
 
2.3.2   Development Schools of Thought 
 
Four major schools of thought dominated the post-World War II economic development 
discourse: (1) the linear-stages-of-growth model, (2) theories and patterns of structural change, 
(3) the international-dependence revolution, and (4) neoclassical, free-market counterrevolution.   
In the 1950s and early 1960s, the development process was regarded as a series of successive 
stages of economic growth through which all countries must pass.22  All that was necessary for 
developing countries to shift towards the path of economic growth was the right mixture of 
investment, savings, and foreign aid.  This process is more popular with the developed countries, 
which distinguishes development with that of rapid growth.   
 
When the linear-stages growth model became popular in the 1970s, theories and patterns of 
structural change and international dependence revolution became the norm.  Using modern 
economic theory and statistical analysis, a developing country must undertake structural changes 
in order to experience rapid economic growth.23  Meanwhile, the international-dependence 
revolution regarded underdevelopment in terms of international and domestic power 
relationships, institutional and structural economic rigidities, and the resulting proliferation of 
dual economies and dual societies both within and among the nations of the world.24  There was 
weight put on the necessity for new policies to address the problems of poverty, unemployment, 
and inequalities.    The 1980s and early 1990s marked the spread of neoliberalism, which 
emphasised the beneficial role of free markets, open economies, and the privatisation of 
inefficient public enterprises.25  This theory notes that failure to develop cannot be blamed on 
manipulative internal and external elements, but on the high government interference and control 
of the economy.  In the following sections, theories by Adam Smith, Walt Rostow and other 
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development proponents will be discussed to give an in depth look at the defence and 
development relationship.   
 
 
2.3.3  Adam Smith: Champion of the Free Market 
 
In 1776, Adam Smith published “The Wealth of Nations” with the concept of economic 
growth as its main agenda.  It posits that the natural tendency of man towards self-interest 
results in prosperity with minimal contribution from the government through giving every 
person the freedom to produce, manufacture and barter goods as they liked and opening all 
markets to competition.26 Smith called this free-market force became known as the 
‘invisible hand.’27  Alongside a free-market economy, Smith believed that enlightened self-
interest, limited government, and a solid currency can produce universal prosperity.28  Smith 
saw the importance of thrift and savings, especially when the latter was used as capital for 
investment.  Through investment, more labour-saving machinery would be bought to 
encourage innovation, anticipating that advancement in technology would boost revenue on 
investments and build-up the standard of living.  For Smith the values of hard work and 
inherent were inherent in people, thus when things do not work as they should, government 
should step in to enforce the laws.  
 
For Smith, government’s responsibilities are restricted to the country’s defence, provide 
universal education, building of infrastructures, the enactment of the law, and the 
punishment of crime.29  In this second element, Smith warned against government 
bureaucracy, where he said that “there is no art which one government sooner learns of 
another, than that of draining money from the pockets of the people,”30 emphasising 
universal education to offset the dulling and negative consequences of the division of labour 
that was part and parcel of industrialisation.31  The third aspect advised by Smith was a 
strong currency,32  where the ability by the government to depreciate currency will be 
curtailed by using it as payment for wars or other wasteful expenditures by backing 
currency with hard metals33.  His free-market principles involved eliminating tariffs with 
hard currency acting as a check to spending to keep taxes low and allow free trade across 
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borders. For Smith, taxes and tariffs are repressing industry and trade overseas as well as 
making people’s lives more expensive.    
 
However, Smith’s seminal book, “The Wealth of Nations,” is not lacking in theoretical 
slips.  According to a critic, Smith failed to see the significance of the entrepreneur in 
stopping inefficiencies and establishing new markets.34   Furthermore, both advocates and 
detractors of Adam Smith’s free market capitalism have contributed to the framework set-up 
in “The Wealth of Nations.”35  Nevertheless, even with the criticisms, the free-market 
theory and its concepts have contributed to the discourse on economy and markets.   
 
 
2.3.4  Modernisation Theory 
 
Modernisation theory, which emerged in the early 1950s, notes that economic progress and 
industrialisation signifies a positive political and social change.  Its primary concept describes 
the transition from traditional to modern societies.36 Fuelled by Cold War politics s appeared the 
stages-of-growth model of development advocated by Walt W. Rostow, who described the 
evolution from underdevelopment to development in a series of steps or stages through which, he 
argued, all countries must undergo.37 As a proponent of economic progress, Rostow is a key 
figure in the study of modernisation theory. In the opening chapter of his book, The Stages of 
Economic Growth, Rostow presented the five categories which he identifies all societies: the 
traditional society, the pre-conditions for take-off, the take-off, the drive to maturity, and the 
edge of high mass consumption.38 
 
The traditional society is characterised by subsistence agriculture with limited technology and is 
feudalistic in nature with the political power concentrated amongst the elites.39 The pre-
condition stage is depicted by improved transport investment to expand market and production 
specialisation, the reform in agriculture, and the growth of imports.40  The take off stage is 
illustrated by a pivotal development transpiring over 20-30 years that fundamentally changes a 
nation’s economy because obstacles to stable advancement are surmounted, forces for making 
widespread economic progress dominate the society, and growth becomes a normal condition.41 
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In the drive to maturity stage, industrial base is diversified and modern technology is 
increasingly being utilised to cover sectors of the economy in order to achieve a self-sustaining 
growth.42  The age mass consumption stage is characterised by a high employment rate and high 
output levels.43 
 
Despite being widely acclaimed, Rostow’s pre-condition to take-of stage was also criticised for 
lack of supporting historical facts.  Nonetheless, it became useful to describe the necessary 
conditions for initiating self-sustained growth.  Rostow’s prerequisite for upward mobility in the 
development stage resonates with the Harrod Domar equation, which gives emphasis to capital 
accumulation and investment.  The system of development illustrated in the stages of growth 
theory did not always work because certain conditions are lacking or different.  In the context of 
developing countries, investments are translated into massive doses of foreign aid and capital, 
sometimes with a low rate of return.  The Marshall Plan worked for Europe because it possessed 
the necessary institutional conditions and infrastructures, unlike developing countries suffering 
from poverty and conflict.    
 
Another proponent of the modernisation theory is Seymour Martin Lipset, whose classic article 
in 1959 argued that democracy is a direct result of economic growth. 44  Lipset contended that 
the level of education and development in rich societies is higher, their means of communication 
is more sophisticated, have larger middle class, and their social equality is better.45  He claimed 
that these features are essential in order for democracy to flourish and function well.46 
 
By the late 1960s, following the theory’s rapid recognition, a backlash erupted within the circle 
of social scientists.  One major opposition came from Samuel Huntington through his book 
‘Political Order in Changing Societies’. Huntington contended that proponents of modernisation 
theory were correct in considering economic development as releasing profound social change 
but should not assume changes will lead to progress.47  However, others refute such criticisms 
saying living standards, education and economic opportunities, and infrastructures have 
improved. Furthermore, he noted that societies on the verge of dramatic social transformation 
have the tendency to be volatile and even violent.48  Only when there are healthy political 
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institutions adept to directing and reacting to such changes, can affirmative results likely 
materialise.   
 
Oftentimes, modernisation theorists see traditions as impediments to economic growth.  Critics 
maintain that traditional societies are usually wrecked without having experienced the 
advantages of modernisation. The theory is criticised for failing to consider the poor. In fact, the 
economic gap between progressive and poorer societies has increased.  According to a December 
2014 OECD report on inequality and growth, rich countries today earn 9.5 times more than the 
poorest 10%, compared to the 7:1 ratio in the 1980s.49 Whilst modernisation theorists see 
traditions as obstacles to the growth of the economy, its critics insist that some societies have 
shifted from a traditional poverty to a more modern misery.  Statistics from the World Bank 
reveal that over 3 billion people (almost half of the world’s population) live on less than $2.50 a 
day, almost a billion cannot read or sign their names by the start of the 21st century, a billion 
children live in poverty, 640 million live without adequate shelter, 400 million have no access to 
safe water, 270 million have no access to health services, and in 2003, 10.5 million died before 
reaching the age of 5 (or roughly 29,900 children per day).50 Also, dependency theorist André 
Gunder Frank criticised the trouble-free image that the modernisation theory adopts. Frank 
argued that developing countries were essentially fated to disaster because of their place in the 
international scene, which ensues to underdevelopment and dependence.51   
 
 
2.3.5  Dependency Theory 
 
In the 1950s, dependency theory emerged as a critical response to the economic development 
approaches that transpired after World War II.  Whilst the theory of modernisation understood 
that all societies go through similar stages of development, dependency theory argues that 
underdeveloped countries are not reflections of what developed countries were; rather they have 
characteristics of their own that are less imposed by external demands. The main proponents of 
this theory are André Gunder Frank, Raúl Prebisch, Hans Singer, Paul Baran Paul Sweezy, Samir 
Amin and Bill Warren. Many of these scholars focused their studies on Latin America, except 
for Amin being the leading dependency theorist in the Islamic world. The advocates of this 
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theory believe that the theories of Adam Smith, David Ricardo, and other classical economists 
are not suitable for an analysis of the dualistic dependent structure of many nations such as 
Brazil, India, and Mexico. Among other things, the theory assumes the absence of monopoly 
power and the spread of the benefits of technological progress across the whole trading 
process.52 
 
For dependency theorists, less developed countries are to be understood as a chunk of the global 
process.  The roles of these less developed nations are to provide inputs for advanced nations and 
provide low wage manufacturing under adverse terms of trade.  According to Prebisch, the world 
is divided in two: the centre and the periphery.  The centre consists of the industrial regions of 
the world, whilst the periphery comprises of mostly underdeveloped countries which specialise 
in agricultural and other primary production.53  Such division benefits both the centre and 
periphery areas that allow for maximising production, income, and consumption, and spreading 
the benefits of such maximisation to both areas.54  In particular, Prebisch counters the idea of 
free market, and examines how rewards from competition tend to shift toward the centre.55 
Prebisch specifically attacked the theory of comparative advantage, and noted that its precepts 
were repeatedly violated by the industrialised nations, whose economists nonetheless used 
classical trade theory as an ideological weapon.56  He also implied that industrial countries acted 
as monopolists against agricultural countries in the trading process.57   
 
The popularity of the dependency theory declined in the 1980s when rising economies like 
Singapore, South Korea, Hong Kong and Taiwan, also known as the Four Asian Tigers, have 
proven their strength in global production, finance, and services.58  At this point, the weakness of 
the theory was found and scholars were not pleased with the failures of classic dependency 
theory to address the economic performance of the newly industrialised countries (NICs).  
Moreover, one critic questions whether dependency theory’s message is still applicable at the 
present time, taking into account that it reflects the conditions and understanding of the 1960s.59 
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2.3.6  World-Systems Theory 
 
World-systems theory provides a holistic viewpoint in understanding human interaction within a 
global political economic framework. The theory argues that the world is contained in one 
system called capitalist world-economy as a ‘total social system’ rather than single societies.60  
The main argument lies on the premise that is that significant interaction networks such as 
alliances, trade, and information, have long contributed to the interconnection of societies and 
cultures.  In other words all human interaction, whether big or small, from the household to 
global market, comprise the world-system.  More than just the involvement of international 
institutions, world system is all about the people in the planet, their culture and traditions, the 
socio-economic and political institutions, and the relationships happening among them.61   
 
The theory is largely associated with Immanuel Wallerstein whose influential work, “The 
Modern World-System: Capitalist Agriculture and the origins on the European World-Economy 
in the Sixteen Century” published in 1974, views a ‘world economy’ that centres on the economy 
rather than a political one with two or more entities dependent on each other as regards to basic 
essentials like food, and safety.62  Furthermore, Wallerstein proposed a framework of system and 
relations, similar with that of the dependency theory, which indicated four different categories: 
core, semi-periphery, periphery, and external.63 The core countries benefit largely from having 
strong economies and powerful militaries owning and controlling the major and periphery are 
geographically and culturally different where one focuses on labour-intensive, whilst the other 
on capital-intensive production.64  Periphery societies are labour-intensive, do not have strong 
governments, and suffer unequal distribution of resources.65 Halfway between core and 
periphery, semi-peripheral states have moderately developed and diversified economies but are 
not influential in global trade.66 External nations are those that sustain socially required divisions 
of labour independent of the core.67 Critics of this theory note how world-systems put its 
emphasis largely on the economy and not much on culture.68  
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2.3.7  Globalisation Paradigm 
 
According to Appelbaum and Robinson, globalisation studies evolved from five sets of 
phenomena that intrigued researchers.69 These are the emergence of a globalised economy, the 
development of global cultural patterns and practices, the appearance of new multinational 
institutions, the multidirectional movement of people around the world, and the rise of new 
social hierarchies like inequality.70 By the end of the 20th century, the rate of social change and 
transformation accelerated.  There are a number of theoretical discourses that are identified with 
globalisation studies. One set of globalisation theories looks at the global school of capitalism. 
Leslie Sklair has put forward a theory with ‘transnational practices’ (TNPs) at the core that 
involves economics (transnational capital), political (transnational capitalist class), and the 
culture-ideological (cultural elites).71  Similar to Sklair, Robinson also analyses the emergence of 
transnational capitalist class as the group that manages these globalised circuits.72  However, 
unlike Sklair, Robinson theorises an emergent transnational state (TNS), which is a group 
consisting of political and economic institutions as well as government mechanism that have 
been affected by forces in the international scene.73 Globalisation also brought about the ‘age of 
information and the use of the network society through the rise of information and technology 
(IT) such as the Internet, and the emergence of information capitalism referred to as ‘new 
economy’.74  This new economy is illustrated as informational, global and networked.75 
 
It is not surprising that this theory has its share of critics, who argue that globalisation allows for 
the power and influence of capitalists and conglomerates to increase at the cost of human rights 
and civil liberties.76  Furthermore, they contend that understanding the place of globalisation in 
the sphere of defence needs more depth.77 However, Christopher Huges argues that there is an 
interconnection between globalisation and security involving both traditional and non-traditional 
security issues.78  According to Matthews, globalisation enhances civil-military integration, 
which reduces the burden of defence expenditure by promoting technological sharing, supply 
chains, spin-on and spin-off technologies, and dual-use technologies.79 As discussed below, 
these theories emphasise the strategic significance in studying comprehensive security in the 
context of Philippine security.  
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2.4  Armed Forces and Society: The Process of Civil-Military Relations 
 
Samuel Huntington and Morris Janowitz have led the research on civil-military relations for 
more than five decades. In 1957, Huntington published his book, which examined civil-military 
relations as a system of interconnected parts that included (1) formal structural position of 
military institution in government; (2) informal role and influence of military groups in politics 
and society; and (3) nature of military ethics and dominant ideologies of non-military groups, 
and neither of these alters without causing changes in other elements of the system.80 Based on 
these components, Huntington put forth the concept of ‘professionalism’ of which the spotlight 
lies on the soldier and the state. 81  The soldier’s behaviour within the structure of the military as 
an institution is guided by a series of regulations, norms, customs, and traditions.82 The basic 
understanding it seems is that the professional behaviour of a soldier outside the walls of the 
military has been approved by the state. Cottey et al also note that civilian authorities should take 
charge in developing a defence policy and the military should confine itself to executing their 
decision.83 In support, Janowitz perceives that as a civil servant, the professional soldier must 
remain neutral when dealing with public affairs.84 Meanwhile, Janowitz has also observed that 
study of civil-military relations in developing countries is scarce.  
 
The global security environment in early 1990s welcomed the idea of a reduced international 
arms competition as well as a review of the role of defence post-Cold War. During this time, the 
use of the military in non-combat role has been increasingly affecting government policies.85 The 
challenges of civil-military relations include paramilitaries, who often operate as auxiliary 
members of the military institution.86  In other parts of the globe, members of the army that once 
participated in conflict are reintegrated into mainstream.87 Additionally, part of the new civil-
military relations structure is the increasing number of peacekeepers, civilian police, and 
international monitors.88 However, Bland sees this as a flawed argument, instead suggests that 
civilian control must be grasped through the concept of ‘shared responsibility’ between the 
civilian leaders and military officers.89  Adding to the debate, Cottey et al reason that civil-
military relations has to be understood as part of the state’s governance and legitimate 
democracy.90  They explored five enhancements of this theory. First, civil-military relations 
should not dwell just on the threat, but also on the expanding role of the military.91 Second, civil-
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military relations should broaden the concept of democratic control to include foreign policies.92 
Third, civil-military relations need to find ways to balance the control of civilian authority over 
the military. Fourth, is to sensibly study the terms ‘military’ and ‘armed forces’.93 Fifth, is for 
civil-military relations to be comprehended holistically.94   
 
Over the years, the role of the military has broadened to include engagement in peacekeeping 
and humanitarian functions.  However, these extended functions confound the issue of civil-
military relations and might complicate during the execution because of the tough stance the 
military is known for.  Hence, obedience of the military to democratic control is crucial in civil-
military relations.95  In democratisation, it is important to carefully investigate the nuances of 
civil-military relations, and not plainly assume that the military is willing to step back and let the 
civilian authorities take the rein.96 The challenge then is how to develop interim actions to have 
the military transition, in a peaceful manner, from these broad roles and resume their role in 
external defence?  In the same way, deploying the military to confront internal threats must not 
be the long-term solution, since that is the responsibility of the national police and they can be 
trained to become a formidable force to protect domestic affairs.97 These two views will be 
further examined in the next two sections looking at the broader context of defence whether it 
hinders or facilitates development.  
 
 
2.5 Defence as a Drag on Growth and Development? 
 
 In the last few decades, literature exploring defence spending in developing countries has been 
on the rise.  Most of these researches have focused on whether or not defence spending has had a 
positive, a negative, or no impact whatsoever on the economy of these countries.  Some studies 
have also looked at other dimensions of military spending in developing countries such as the 
economic and non-economic causes of defence expenditures, the effect of changes in, and the 
reasons behind developing countries’ desire to produce weapons.98 According to Dabelko and 
McCormick, the “guns vs butter” debate is the classic image of opportunity costs for government 
spending over military and social welfare areas.99  They mention that as military expenditures of 
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a country increases, the social benefits are affected.100 Russett, Gottheil, and Pryor, amongst 
others, have empirically studied this process of trade-off in many developed nations.101 
 
One of the first scholars to suggest that defence spending might have a positive effect on 
economic growth was Emile Benoit.  In his major study of 44 countries, which included Mexico, 
Argentina, South Korea, Egypt, and the Philippines, Benoit suggested that defence spending 
could help economic growth by: 
 
(1) Feeding, clothing, and housing a number of people who would otherwise 
have to be fed, housed and clothes by the civilian economy…; (2) providing 
education and medical care as well as vocational and technical training…; (3) 
engaging in a variety of public works – roads, dams, river improvements, 
airports, communications networks, etc. – that may in part serve civilian uses; 
and (4) engaging in scientific and technical specialties… which would otherwise 
have to be performed by civilian personnel.102  
 
Benoit also recognised the possible negative effects of defence spending since, in a developing 
country, military spending represents an important opportunity cost, and, in addition, the 
government usually exhibits “negligible rates of measurable productivity increases.”103  Benoit 
discussed the causality issues between defence and growth by noting that “countries with rapid 
growth might feel better able to indulge themselves in the luxury of elaborate defence 
programmes”.104  However, Benoit has been criticised on two levels.  First, a number of scholars 
have issues with how Benoit described the variables used, as well as the way he interpreted the 
data derived from the statistical analyses,105 which neglected to acknowledge the likelihood of 
synchronicity between defence spending and economic growth.106  Second, Benoit’s belief that 
military expenditure has a positive effect on economic growth, did not rely on the results of the 
regression analyses, but on his evaluation of non-quantifiable contributions performed by 
military programmes to the civilian economy.107  Ball argues that most of the time, rapid 
increase in economic progress do not affect the allocation of resources, social equality, or 
contribute to sustainable growth.108  Meanwhile, employing a marginally dissimilar 
methodology, Lim repeated the study of Benoit, this time on a larger group of developing 
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countries for the period 1965-1973, and discovered that high military burdens is unfavourable to 
economic growth.109  More recently, the study of Faini, Arnez and Taylor, using regression 
estimates for 69 countries for the period 1952-1970, showed that an increase of 10 percentage 
points in military expenditure leads to a decline of annual growth by 0.13 per cent.110  Both Lim 
and Faini et al showed that a higher military burden has a direct negative impact on economic 
growth.111  
 
The defence burden has been denounced as a huge shift of the country’s resources from a social 
welfare function to something socially draining112  that does not contribute to uplift the lives of 
the poor.113  Growth suffers due to increasing levels of defence expenditures controlling 
resources that could otherwise have been spent on infrastructural investment benefitting the 
people, and hence contributed to growth.114 In addition, if military expenditures are financed by 
reductions in social welfare budget, visibly defence burden is heavier on basic services than on 
collective growth.115  Kaldor has summarised this distribution pattern saying that “money for 
defence comes from the excess products produced in the province, but spent in the cities.”116  
Furthermore, Frederiksen and Looney also stipulate why defence expenditures are a drag on 
development.  First, the “income shift” by Benoit, increased defence spending decreases civilian 
Gross Domestic Product (GDP), and thus reduces economic progress unfairly.117 Second, they 
contended that military expenditure unfavourably affects progress because the government 
generally, demonstrates small rise in noticeable efficiency.118   
 
Whilst the arguments stipulated make sense, a vital element in the defence and development 
debate is the financial resource limitation of the country.  A state with limited resources has a 
higher probability to experience budget reductions, more often than not; at the expense of 
development projects in order for defence plans can be upheld.  There are two reasons why 
governments tend to shift priority away from development projects to sustain defence 
programmes. One, policymakers find it more convenient to trim development investments such 
as infrastructure.119  Two, special interest groups that include high ranking officials, politicians, 
defence contractors, may realise that maintaining the status quo is economically and politically 
advantageous. 120 Thus, a negative relationship between defence and development would be 
expected in a resource constrained state.  On the other hand, nations that enjoy financial 
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resources can easily afford the responsibility and expense that comes with maintaining a strong 
military capability. By viewing the analysis through a resource constraints lens, it is not difficult 
to comprehend why two developing states with matching levels of defence spending may 
undergo strikingly different levels of development.  
 
 
2.6  Defence: A Force to Facilitate Development? 
 
In most defence economic studies, military expenditure is a critical topic because of its 
connection with supply and demand; output and input.  Many studies reveal an affirmative stand 
on defence spending vis-a-vis economic growth.121  Economists have it that growth slackens 
because resources that should have been for investment has been shifted to support defence. 
However, evidence on developed countries does not reveal the same conclusion.122  Wolf notes 
that defence spending establishes economic stability as well as accelerates technological progress 
and transfers, resulting to an inclusive growth.123 Some scholars claim that military spending 
help accelerate the growth of resource-rich less developed countries.124    Looney observes 
defence as a semi-luxury good and claims that defence is a semi-luxury good and increases the 
output by multiplier effect.125  Goel added that the impact of research development makes on 
defence sector surges the growth of the economy.126  Generally, nations with a heavy defence 
burden develop more, and those with the smallest defence burdens tend to display the least 
growth rates.127  Compared with other regions of the world, African arms imports had an upsurge 
in the 1970s, but fell back when they reached their height in 1982.128  In the same decade, heads 
turned towards the developing countries because of their expanding armed forces.  This was 
during post World War II, when the U.S. supported and financed the defence posture of some 
states.  Economists took an interest in how this growth would impact on the economy.  The study 
of Benoit indicated that higher growth rates were supplementary to higher defence burdens,129 
suggesting to a point that bilateral economic aid does have some effect.130  Countries like 
Indonesia and South Korea, which have had recent economic growth and have had wars or 
defence crises during a period, are starting to grow their defence expenditure again.  Money may 
be available and accessible, but always present are competing needs, and the defence sector, like 
others who wants a piece of the pie, must justify its claims.  Money cannot be spent on defence 
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unless it is justified, and in this sense, the rise of the country’s GDP sets a perimeter on how 
much defence burden it can afford.   
 
The direct contact between defence and development appears to flow mainly from defence to 
development rather than the other way around.  Defence programmes of most countries make 
tangible contributions to the civilian economies by ways suggested by Benoit in the previous 
section (Section 2.5).131  Other engagements of the defence sector with the general economy 
include research and development and financing of projects for joint civilian and military use.132 
David Schmidtz articulates a common assumption when he maintains that “a nation that defends 
itself from invasion will be defending those citizens who do nothing to help as well as those 
citizens who do help,” and that defence is thus a public good.133  William Mitchel and Randy 
Simmons characterise “defence” as “the classic public good.”134 Similarly, David Gauthier 
suggests that “if national defence… is supplied to one person, then…it is supplied to all.”135 
 
As a part of the government, the military institution has constantly been viewed as a positive 
force in fostering economic growth.136 This prospect lies on the revolutionising effect that 
defence brings to the state both at the national and international levels.137  At the individual level, 
transition occurs through military training, which gives emphasis to discipline, efficiency, 
respect, and integrity.138 Benoit supports by adding that soldiers must equip themselves with 
skills such as “following and transmitting precise instructions; living and working by the clock; 
noticing and reading signs; and spending and saving money”.139  According to Weede, soldiers 
share the economic burden because the practice of discipline and obedience are instilled in both 
the working and management spheres.140  Taking these points into consideration, it can be 
expected that military training is essentially an investment in human capital that is projected to 
produce profits through the efficient utilisation of resources.141  
 
At a broader level, the military fosters nation-building by promoting social mobility, mobilising 
economic resources, and breaking down regional, ethnic, and religious divisions.142 More 
importantly, certain aspects of these processes would seem to carry implications for inequality 
and service delivery to the poorest elements of society.  Many times the military has been called 
to construct public infrastructures like school buildings health centres. Taking into account these 
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viewpoints, it can be expected that the scope of military participation in society would encourage 
the provision of basic human needs, even relative to the level of economic development.143  
Work by Leontif and Duchin, using an input-output model of the world economy, indicates that 
global disarmament and increased development aid would have had positive effects on growth in 
all regions of the world.144  
 
Generally, underdeveloped countries are described as having high unemployment with low 
consumption, and some analysts have rationalised the increases in defence spending in these 
countries as a way to stimulate economic growth and development.145   The notion that military 
is an engine of growth also illustrates the transformation of the military, where defence 
expenditure in social infrastructures such as roads, schools, and bridges more often, than not, 
benefits the civilian sector directly, arguably performing a non-traditional role in nation 
building.146  Furthermore, it may benefit the civilians if military professionalism and 
organisational management expertise flow into the public sector. In addition, Lebovic also argues 
that preserving military balance neighbouring countries places the fear of being invaded in 
check, eludes reductions in investments, and prevents brain-drain.147 Others consider the military 
to be the defender of the middle class, where they oppose the traditional political players by 
upholding social and economic reforms and people’s participation.148 Such is the case in some 
countries in Asia Pacific, where the increase in defence spending is reflected in positive 
economic growth at the same time adopting a comprehensive security framework. 
 
 
2.7 Comprehensive Security in Asia Pacific  
 
In the late 1980s, the Asia Pacific started to pick up as an economic powerhouse, when its 
growth rate rocketed from 6 to 9 per cent stretching over the next 20 years without a sign of 
slowing down.149  This caught the attention of the wider world. A World Bank study showed that 
between 1960 and 1990, Asia Pacific’s eight high performing economies (Japan, Korea, Taiwan, 
Hong Kong, Singapore, China, Indonesia, Malaysia and Thailand) flourished more than twice as 
fast as the rest of East Asia surpassing even the oil-rich region of the Middle East.150 With an 
annual growth rate of 7 per cent, twice that of the older industrial economies, like the United 
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States, Asia Pacific region’s remarkable growth record, extended from the original eight to other 
nations, dubbing the 21st century as the “Pacific Century.”151   
 
Along with these economic changes, the outlook of developing countries towards security also 
shifted. Gone was the sole reliance on hard strategies when dealing with security threats, rather 
there was compromise that to face 21st century threats, a 21st century solution was needed. Thus, 
comprehensive security became an essential element in the policies and approaches of nations. 
The following sections will underscore how some Asian countries, like Singapore, Japan and 
China, were able to incorporate comprehensive security into their agenda. 
 
 
2.7.1  Singapore’s Total Defence 
 
Given its limited natural resources and growing economic interdependence with other countries, 
Singapore recognises the importance of diplomacy and deterrence as the twin pillars of its 
defence policy.152  From the viewpoint of diplomacy, Singapore sees itself as non-partisan and 
an active participant in international organisations like ASEAN, the World Trade Organisation, 
and the United Nations (UN).153  As part of its responsibility in UN peacekeeping, Singapore has 
sent personnel, aircraft, and naval vessels to Iraq, Afghanistan, and the Gulf of Aden though on a 
limited scale.154   In the event that diplomacy does not work, deterrence is applied.155  
Articulated in 1984, deterrence strategy is harnessed through ‘Total Defence’, which is intended 
‘to unite all sectors of society in defence of Singapore.156  The framework is made up of five 
pillars identified as: 
• Military Defence. The Singapore Armed Forces (SAF) is a strong defence force that aims 
to deter anyone from thinking of attacking the country. Its military strength is built up 
through National Service. SAF also ensures that all equipment is in good working 
condition all the time and keeps up with the latest advancements in technology to meet 
21st century threats including non-conventional dangers such as terrorism.157  
• Civil Defence. The Singapore Civil Defence Force (SCDF) trains civilian volunteers in 
first aid, rescue and evacuation procedures, and shelter management.  To further orient 
the public about likely emergencies, the SCDF regularly conducts talks and emergency 
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workshops. Civil defence is aimed at instilling confidence and resilience in times of 
national crisis.158  
• Economic Defence. A strong economic foundation, built upon sound policies and 
practices encourages the country to be more competitive as well as enable it to withstand 
financial shocks. It also recognises that military power depends on economic strength, 
and possible vice versa. Consequently, Singapore gives high priority to national defence, 
keeping its budget to no more than 6 per cent of its national gross domestic product.159 
• Social Defence. The Singapore government has often stressed that maintaining racial and 
religious harmony and treating other ethnic groups fairly is not just the morally correct 
thing to do; it is also a political, economic and foreign policy imperative for the city-
state’s continued prosperity and survival.160  
• Psychological Defence. This is aimed to create a collective will and commitment among 
Singaporeans to protect its independence as a nation.161  
 
Considered as a ‘small state,’ Singapore’s success in overcoming economic and security 
challenges can be deemed a major achievement in the contemporary era.  Several factors can be 
attributed to this. First, under the strong and stable leadership of former Prime Minister Lee 
Kuan Yew (1959 to 1990), long-term planning, especially in the fields of education, economic 
fields and technological advancement, was highly encouraged. From the onset, Singapore faced 
enormous challenges: lack of natural resources, inter-ethnic conflict, a small land mass, and a 
relatively small population.  Virtually, these challenges pushed Singapore to invest into human 
capital, reinforcing the continuous pursuit for sustainable competitive advantage. Singapore also 
has the geographical advantage to be located at an international economic crossroads where 
trading, shipping, banking, and tourism flourish.162  The development model of Singapore 
acknowledges that the synthesis of political stability, social cohesion, and economic 
development lead to mutual reinforcement.163   
 
Second, the way Singapore government has managed the economy has demonstrated both 
progressive and farsighted adopting an interventionist strategy. The country’s strategic policies 
are successful because they were planned and implemented to support the attainment of 
sustainable growth.164 Although it experienced a decline during the 1998 financial crisis, the 
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interventionist strategy it exercised was used to manage its economy.  Meanwhile, the growing 
economic success of two of its largest neighbours – China and India – has created opportunities 
as well as challenges for Singapore.  In response, higher valued-added initiatives such as the 
development of local capabilities, for example in the areas of biotechnology and nanotechnology, 
are encouraged and supported by policies.165  In 2003, Singapore opened of an international 
research and development centre for biomedical sciences called Biopolis that costs almost 
US$300M.166  Whilst Singapore is far from being like China in terms of scale and cost, the 
island-state can measure up on technological innovation.  Ranked as one of the world’s top 10 
start-up ecosystem,167 Singapore’s persistent drive as an innovation and technology centre is 
constant with its development success and probably a major aspect for its success. 
 
Similar with the Philippines Internal Peace and Security Plan (IPSP) Singapore’s national 
security architecture comprises a “whole of government” approach encompassing a strong 
system that rallies other agencies to participate in its three key security pillars of policy, 
operational coordination, and capability development.168  Whilst other Southeast Asian countries 
view their militaries as the likely chief providers of comprehensive security, Singapore leaders 
consider the Armed Forces strictly as a hard-security deterrent that balanced other security 
deterrents.169 Apart from the Singapore Armed Forces (SAF), the Total Defence strategy also 
underscored the streamlining of police and emergency services, civil management and oversight 
agencies, judicial and law enforcement institutions, and other public services.170   
 
Known to have a modern military on one hand, Singapore also recognises the need to invest in 
soft power.   Singapore is able to capitalise and influence other countries through the different 
political, economic and socio-cultural strengths it possesses and although small in size, can 
‘punch above its weight’ globally.171  Seeing that Southeast Asia is known for its instability 
considering the various security challenges such as terrorism, transnational crime, and territorial 
disputes, there is no doubt Singapore will keep on investing in hard power, complemented with 
soft power.172  As a small state, hard power will persist to be Singapore’s backbone and core 
resource in defending its territory with soft power being employed when and where vital. To 
promote its Total Defence posture abroad, Singapore declared it will intensify dialogues, 
confidence-building and cooperation with other militaries of nations within and outside the 
65 
 
region173  Confronted with the need to appropriately and flexibly respond to security challenges 
including humanitarian affairs and disaster response, Singapore is acting on how to transform its 
3rd Generation Forces, placing emphasis on integration/networking, holistic advancements, and 
technological advancement to implement effective responses and enhance operational 
capabilities.174  
 
 
2.7.2  China’s Security Posture 
 
In recent years, the rise of China has been exceptional with an average annual economic growth 
of around 7.8 per cent.175  Such development has led to a tremendous increase in the standard of 
living among many Chinese people and also fuelled a comprehensive military modernisation and 
expansion.  China has declared a “peaceful rise” and claims to pursue a defence policy that is 
defensive in nature,176 attempting to calm fears about its growing global strategic influence.  
Backed by the high and constant increase in defence budget, China has been modernising its 
military forces.  In keeping with the concerns on the security situation, China’s military 
expenditure for 2015 amounted to $215 billion, 7.4 per cent higher than 2014.177  With a vision 
to transform itself into an industrial capital and technological hub, technically-advanced 
weapons, aircrafts, warships and other sophisticated hardware are continuously coming out of 
China’s production lines.178 
 
According to Tai Ming Cheung, China is pursuing a two-pronged approach in the modernisation 
of its defence industry: internal re-engineering and realigning of civilian economy with defence 
industry.179  The purpose of internal re-engineering is to disrupt bureaucratic barriers in order to 
nurture a more competitive and entrepreneurial institution.180  Integrating the defence industry 
with the civilian market aims to form a dual-use technological and industrial base to highlight 
civilian military integration (CMI) so that common technologies, manufacturing processes and 
equipment, personnel, and facilities can be utilised by both private and public sectors.181  It was 
in the mid-1990s when China’s approach to CMI shifted to an active strategy of dual-use 
technology development and commercial-to-military spin-on especially in the areas of 
information technologies.182  In its defence industry plan (2001-2005), China emphasised the 
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dual importance of both the transfer of military technologies to commercial use and the transfer 
of commercial technology to military use, actively promoting joint civil-military technology 
cooperation.183 China actively promotes the Revolution in Military Affairs emphasising Chinese 
characteristics that comprise chiefly of the ‘mechanisation’ and ‘informatization’ of its military 
power, based on its military strategy.184  With the implementation of the Five Year Plan, defence 
enterprises established collaborations with Chinese education institutions and private research 
firms to embark on research and development on dual-use technologies.   
 
One of the industries that benefitted considerably from CMI efforts is the shipbuilding. In the 
late 1990s, Chinese shipbuilders entered into several technical cooperation agreements and joint 
ventures with overseas shipbuilding firms in Germany, Japan, and South Korea.185 It opened 
opportunities to gain access to advanced ship designs and manufacturing technologies like 
modular construction techniques, advance ship propulsion systems, computer-assisted design, 
and manufacturing and testing equipment.186  Through CMI, Chinese military was able to 
leverage in these infrastructure and software developments that permitted a significant expansion 
in its naval capability.  On 10 August 2011, the first Chinese aircraft carrier commenced its sea 
trials, putting China as the latest UN Security Council permanent member to possess such 
capability.187  Apart from shipbuilding, the satellite business was also affected by the success of 
CMI, where telecommunication satellites are used by the civilian sector and the military.188   
 
On 31 March 2011, China published its seventh White Paper since 1998 highlighting military 
confidence building, forging better relations, and lessening tensions with its neighbours through 
joint trust systems and participation in regional security mechanisms like the ASEAN Defence 
Minister’s Meeting.189  Also outline in the White Paper is use of the military in peace time 
including disaster relief and UN peacekeeping and joint military training.190 Over the last two 
decades, Chinese outlook on security has widened taking into account economic and other non-
traditional security concerns.  Where China’s comprehensive security is concerned, it has 
stepped up to a new stage underscoring both hard power (defence economics) and soft power 
(political and cultural).191   
 
 
67 
 
2.7.3  Japan’s Integrated Security Framework 
 
In March 2011, a 9.0 magnitude earthquake with over 15-meter high tsunami caused the largest 
natural disaster in Japan’s recent history.  To make matters worse, four nuclear reactors in the 
Fukushima Daiichi plant stopped functioning and released radiation with hydrogen explosion 
and cooling water leakages.  The whole tragedy raises several important questions related to 
national security. First, natural calamities, especially large-scale earthquakes and tsunamis are 
indeed a national security issue for Japan.  Second, the role of the armed forces is indispensable 
to cope with natural disasters.  Third is the dependence of Japan on nuclear energy.  Based on a 
premise that changes in a nation’s threat perception define the need for new defence policy 
guidelines, Japan has decided to adopt a new defence policy that aims to bolster more proactive, 
flexible and quick responses in the sea, land and air.  Officially called the National Defence 
Programme Guidelines (NDPG), the policy, announced in December 2010, outlines Japan’s 
security and defence strategies for the next ten years.   
 
The NDPG has ushered a number of significant changes in Japanese defence policy, force 
structure, and decision-making processes, as policymakers in Tokyo grew increasingly wary of 
Chinese maritime expansion in the disputed waters of East China Sea. Whilst the NDPG 
addresses a wide range of security challenges facing Japan, including the continuing 
destabilising influence of North Korea and new concerns about cyber-attacks, the core of the 
document focuses upon increasing Japan’s ability to cope with what are described as “grey 
zones” conflicts that arise from disputes over “territory, sovereignty and economic interests.”  
The 2010 defence guidelines continue a trend begun in the previous NDPG, shifting the focus of 
Japan’s Self Defence Forces (JSDF) from northern defence in Hokkaido toward the island chains 
that extend far to the south and closer to Taiwan and the Chinese mainland.  The new policy 
includes the creation of a “Dynamic Defence Force”, replacing the “Basic Defence Force 
Concept.”  The new concept behind the Dynamic Defence Force allows the Japanese forces to 
operate actively and seamlessly in the middle ground between the extremes of peace and military 
contingency, and response to emergencies.192  Whilst the previous defence policy seeks to 
develop a multifunctional flexible defence response element to encompass emerging twenty-first 
century threats, it was criticised as being distinctive dividing up the roles between peacetime or 
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emergency situations.  On the other hand, the new NDPG calls for an ‘integrated security 
strategy’ that can be called to respond whether there is conflict or not.193  Furthermore, the new 
guidelines also recognise the existence of ‘gray-zone’ disputes, which are tensions over territory, 
sovereignty, and economic interests that are not to spiral into wars.”194  On this basis, Japan 
pledges to strengthen its intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) capabilities along 
with developing a more mobile and flexible force structure that is better coordinated to respond 
to any contingency that might arise.195 
 
Another development seen in the new defence policy is the formulation of Japan’s security 
policy objectives.  In the 2004 security guideline Japan focused on two points, to thwart direct 
threats and to help improve the security of the international environment.196  In the 2010 NDPG, 
three security objectives are specified: “to prevent any threat from directly reaching Japan and to 
eliminate threats that have reached it so as to minimise the ensuing damage, and thereby secure 
the peace and security of Japan and its people; to prevent threats from emerging by further 
stabilising the security environment in the Asia-Pacific region and by improving the global 
security environment, so as to maintain and strengthen a free and open international order and 
ensure Japan’s security and prosperity; and to contribute to creating global peace and stability 
and to secure human security.”197  The Japanese government has positioned the concept of 
human security as one of the key perspective of its foreign policy with a perspective on making 
the 21st century a human-centred one.198  It is associated with the basic human needs model and 
emphasises the freedom from want aspect popularised by the United Nations. Japan has been 
implementing human security through the Trust Fund for Human Security, Official Development 
Assistance (ODA), and the Commission on Human Security (CHS).199  Since it was introduced 
by former Japanese Prime Minister Keizō in 1998, human security has been implemented 
through the country’s development policies and activities in the area of post-conflict peace 
building and peace-consolidation in Southeast Asia, especially Cambodia and Aceh.200 
 
Figure 2.1, below, shows Japan’s integrated security strategy that has included emerging 21st 
century threats such as terrorism, weapons of mass destruction, cyber warfare, the health 
concerns, and natural disasters, such as earthquakes and tsunamis  along with China’s growing 
naval presence in the region and North Korea’s nuclear and missile threats.201   The defence 
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policy also pursues to confront emerging non-traditional security challenges that threaten the 
country.  The shift in Japan’s security framework shows a significant step in its long-term 
strategy to confront a changing security environment.202 
 
Figure 2.1: Japan’s Integrated Security Strategy  
 
 
 
Source: Matthews R. Defence and the economy. In: Till G, Chew E, Ho J, editors. Globalisation and defence in the 
Asia-Pacific: Arms across Asia. New York: Routledge; 2009. 
 
 
This is not the first time Japan has formulated a security framework. In 1980, the Japanese 
government already embraced ‘comprehensive national security’ (‘sogo anzen hosho’) as its 
security framework.203  However, this is the first time a comprehensive security went beyond the 
spectrum of a military thinking what with the prioritisation of non-traditional security issues. The 
framework is an articulation of three concepts that focused on self-defence, non-military 
diplomacy, and disaster response.204 Incorporating natural disasters in the security strategy has 
been the most interesting piece in recent years. Earlier, many observers are sceptic about the 
inclusion of earthquakes or tsunamis in a national security doctrine, but today, natural disasters, 
climate change and pandemics form part of the make-up of non-traditional security threats.  
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2.8.  Blurring the Lines: Philippine Defence ‘and’ Development 
 
Separately, the thrusts of defence and development have been used to achieve the objectives of 
foreign policy. Lately, the line dividing the two has been hazy. Although their primary role is to 
defend the state from external aggression, Armed Forces across the world have performed duties 
beyond their defence responsibility. Militaries have taken on tasks related to economic 
development, nation-building, the preservation of political stability, managing public enterprises, 
providing disaster relief, enforcing public order, as well as engaging efforts to conserve natural 
resources.205   
 
The defence posture practiced by Singapore, China and Japan suggests the need to re-examine 
the validity of Benoit’s argument that defence contributes positively to development.  Singapore, 
China and Japan have taken advantage of new ideas about security espoused by contemporary 
scholars, policymakers, and international institutions.  Apart from state sovereignty and 
territorial integrity, these three Asian countries have embarked on ways to address threats such as 
climate change, piracy, human/drug trafficking, pandemics, natural disasters, and transnational 
crime.  Most of these threats require a coordinated response as well as transnational cooperation 
among all stakeholders (such as the government, non-government organisations, local 
communities, and other non-state actors).206 How these security strategies compare with that of 
the comprehensive security goal of the Philippines is illustrated in Table 2.1.   Clearly, the four 
countries have embarked on responding to both traditional and non-traditional security 
challenges.  
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Table 2.1: Comprehensive Security: Commonality of Policy Objectives between the 
Philippines, and Singapore, China, and Japan  
 
Philippine 
Comprehensive 
Security Strategy  
Singapore’s Total 
Defence 
China’s 
Comprehensive 
Security 
Japan’s Integrated 
Security Strategy 
• Defence industry  
√ 
 
√ 
 
√ 
• Response to natural 
disasters 
  
√ 
 
√ 
 
√ 
• Transnational 
crime 
 
√ 
 
√ 
 
√ 
• Terrorism, 
communism and 
insurgency de-
escalation 
 
√ 
 
√ 
 
√ 
*Gleaned from the information in Section 2.7: Comprehensive Security in Asia Pacific 
 
Source: Author 
 
 
Whilst the Philippines may not enjoy the concept of ‘rich nation, strong army’ like Singapore, 
China and Japan, to some extent, the country has sought to link defence and development in its 
pursuit to create an integrated security strategy through especially the following three policies of 
the Internal Peace and Security Plan (2010), the Armed Forces of the Philippines Modernisation 
(1995 and 2010), and the National Security Plan (2011-2016).  A country with both insurgency 
and terrorism threats, the Armed Forces of the Philippines have been at the forefront of a 
campaign to tackle some of these domestic challenges, and as part of its pursuit for political and 
economic stability, have embarked on ‘non-traditional’ missions. As part of the comprehensive 
security action plan, these non-traditional missions involve carrying out long-term projects aimed 
at contributing to the economic development of the country.   
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2.9 Summary 
 
In this chapter, development theories, such as modernisation theory, dependency theory, world-
systems theory and globalisation theory, have been identified and examined. This was followed 
by a discussion on civil-military relations highlighting the works of Samuel Huntington and 
Morris Janowitz. A key section of this chapter weighed on whether defence is a drag on growth 
or a force that facilitates development.  Spending for defence has been denounced by critics as a 
huge shift of the country’s resources from a social welfare function to something socially 
draining. One of the first scholars to suggest that defence spending might have a positive effect 
on economic growth was Emile Benoit through his study of 44 countries.  To further understand 
the comprehensive security, this chapter also contextualised how defence and development work 
in certain Asian countries. The experience of Singapore, China, and Japan were highlighted 
citing data about the implementation of each country’s defence policy. At the end of the chapter, 
the three security policies of the Philippines of which this study focuses on were slowly pealed to 
see how they compare with the more successful Asian economies. Whilst the policies are not 
novel, they have not been evaluated in the specific context of Philippine development planning. 
Thus, the research gap that this thesis seeks to address has regard to an empirical analysis of the 
success of these policies to integrate defence into the Philippine national development 
framework, as encapsulated in the conceptual framework (Chapter 1, page 23).  
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Chapter 3 
Examining Global Trends of Defence and Development 
 
 
3.1  Scene Setting 
 
The last chapter was concerned with critically evaluating the literature on defence and 
development. These included development approaches, such as Smith’s free market, 
Rostow’s ‘take-off’ model, modernisation theory, including globalisation paradigm and here 
civil-military integration in the Asia Pacific was argued. The message was clear, however, 
that some countries in the Asia Pacific, such as China, Singapore, and Japan, embrace 
security in broader terms. Table 2.1 in Chapter 2 offers a framework of analysis that reflects 
these development priorities. Against this backdrop, the primary objective of this chapter is to 
critically discuss the themes and practice posed by this study: defence industry, internal 
security, and non-traditional security encompassing both responses to natural disasters and 
transnational crime.  
 
Section 3.2 discusses the components of defence industry. Section 3.3 discusses 
counterterrorism and counter-insurgency perspectives. This section provides examples of 
how certain countries undertake these efforts. Section 3.4 examines the role of the armed 
forces during national disasters. This section provides an understanding of civil-military 
engagement during a disaster. Section 3.5 of this chapter examines the response against 
transnational crime. Section 3.6 critically examines policies of China, Japan, and Singapore 
in relation to defence industry, counterterrorism/counter-insurgency, response to natural 
disasters, and transnational crime.  Section 3.7 closes the chapter. This sets the tone for the 
subsequent country case study of the Philippines in Chapter 4, in terms of its defence and 
development process, and evaluation of the implementation of policies in relation to the 
defence industry, internal security, and non-traditional security (Chapter 5).   
 
 
3.2  Defence Industry 
 
Whilst there was no global arms industry to speak of prior to World War II, well rather not on 
the same scale as it does today, arsenals producing rifles and cannon, shipyards constructing 
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warships already existed in the 1920s and 1930s.  However, this received slim attention from 
scholars, except for a few studies done on companies, such as Krupp, Maxim, and Vickers 
after World War I ended.1  By end of the Second World War and the ensuing Cold War, 
interest escalated due to the dramatic impact on scale, scope, and character of the global arms 
industry the two conflicts brought.2 As the arms industry expanded in terms of national 
security significance, economic importance, and technological complexity, its profile also 
increased. Today, the defence industry is as closely and as intently scrutinised as the 
electronics, aviation, or financial sectors. A dynamic phenomenon, global defence industry 
has the capacity to constantly move and go through periods of prospers and decline.3 With 
the collapse of the Soviet Union and the end of the Cold War, defence industries worldwide 
confronted a new military, political and economic reality.4 Defence industries around the 
world were prompted to restructure when this happened. The number of major defence firms 
shrunk noticeably as they merged or procured the military assets of other companies leaving 
the industry. The result then was an armaments production controlled by a few large defence 
companies such as Lockheed Martin, Northrop Grumman, and Boeing in the United States, 
for example, and BAE Systems, Thales, and DASA in Europe.5   
 
National security is the commonly implicit main driver of defence industrialisation as many 
countries consider it a very important issue. It is not coincidental that shifting interest in 
defence industrialisation often parallels episodes of international conflict or tension, such as 
that leading up to World War II and during the Cold War.6 The recent crisis in Ukraine also 
confirms this point, where an increase in military build-up is seen in countries bordering 
Russia.7 It is noteworthy that the more ambitious defence-industrial programmes in the 
developing world tend to be found in states with strong national security issues, such as India, 
Iran, Pakistan, and South Africa.8  Bitzinger suggested five main factors that seem to be 
affecting the global defence industry today, which in turn may drive future changes and 
transformation when it comes to the structure, organisation, activities, and processes of 
defence industry.9 These are (1) the hierarchical nature of the global process of armaments 
production; (2) the impact of military spending upon the defence industry; (3) the effect of 
the international arms trade; (4) the process of defence-industrial globalisation; and (5) the 
emerging information technologies-based revolution in military affairs.10  
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3.2.1  Hierarchy in Armaments Production 
 
The hierarchy in the global arms industry can significantly affect the nature of armaments 
production in a given nation, likewise, its role and relationship in the global defence 
commerce.11 There is no consensus on how to classify arms-producing nations, but it is 
typical to define global defence industry into three or four tiers. Keith Krause, for example, 
ranks the United States and the former Soviet Union at the top of the chain and describes both 
countries as critical innovators.12 In the second tier, described as adapters and modifiers, 
most Western Europeans are categorised for their developed military technologies, while the 
rest of the arms-producing countries are grouped into a third-tier called copiers and 
reproducers.13 Andrew Ross may agree with Krause’s description of tier one; his second tier 
includes China, Japan, France, Germany, Sweden, Italy and the United Kingdom; and in the 
third-tier are the developing, newly industrialised countries like Israel, India, Taiwan, and 
South Korea.14 Ross added a fourth-tier characterised by states with very limited arms 
production capabilities such as Mexico and Nigeria.15  
 
Bitzinger, et al define the first tier as countries with the capacity for across-the-board 
development and manufacture of advanced conventional weaponry, such as the United States, 
Britain, France, Germany, and Italy.16 The four European nations have achieved tier 1 status 
primarily through the unification of their defence industrial capabilities, via collaborative 
programmes and joint ventures. If the basis lies on the inheritance of the Soviet military-
industrial complex, Russia may or may not fit into this grouping, as its defence industrial 
capacities have deteriorated in the last 20 years because of scarcity of funds to maintain its 
defence R&D base. Given the U.S. dominance in defence capabilities especially on its 
research and development fuelled by a huge military R&D budget (approximately $72 billion 
in FY2012, more than the rest of the world’s defence R&D budgets combined), it seems 
suitable to label the United States as Tier 1a and the rest as Tier 1b. The second tier is divided 
into three groups: (Tier 2a) industrialised countries possessing the capabilities for advanced 
but quantitatively limited defence production, such as Australia, Canada, Israel, Norway, 
Japan, and Sweden; (Tier 2b) developing or newly industrialised nation with modest military-
industrial complexes, such as Argentina, Brazil, Indonesia, Iran, South Africa, South Korea, 
Taiwan, and Turkey; and (Tier 2c) developing industrial states with large, broad-based 
defence industries but still inadequate in R&D and industrial capacities to develop and 
produce highly sophisticated conventional arms, such as China and India.17 The bottom Tier 
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3 are countries that possess very limited and generally low-tech arms production capabilities, 
such as the manufacture of small arms or the licensed assembly of foreign-designed systems, 
such as Egypt, Mexico, and Nigeria.18 
 
 
3.2.2  Impact of Defence Spending 
 
The past twenty five years have witnessed a wave of ups and downs in global defence 
expenditures. When communism collapsed and the Cold War ended in the early 1990s, major 
cuts in defence spending have been observed around the world. From 1989 to 1999, global 
defence budgets fell by nearly 35 per cent, whilst defence spending fell by almost half, from 
4.7 per cent to 2.4 per cent.19 Among the leading European arms-producing states, total 
defence spending fell by 12 per cent between 1991 and 2004, from $194 billion to $170 
billion, as measured in constant 2003 U.S. dollars, according to data compiled by the 
Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI).20 French military expenditures fell 
by 8 per cent over this period, Britain’s defence budget declined by 12 per cent, and German 
military spending dropped by 30 per cent.21 Since the Cold War ended, an even bleaker data 
was seen. Using constant 2000 U.S. dollars, combined defence spending by Europe’s big 
three (Britain, France, and Germany) fell nearly 20 per cent between 1989 and 2003.22 Over 
that same period, total military expenditures for the then 15 members of the European Union 
(EU) declined 14 per cent overall.23 After the collapse of the Soviet Union, Russian spending 
dropped sharply by more than 90 per cent from an estimated $200 billion in 1989 to $14 
billion in 1999.24 
 
Along with the decline was ‘peace dividend’ that allowed the countries to develop and 
produce arms that it neither needed nor afford.25 According to Intriligator (1996), peace 
dividend refers to the benefits resulting from lower defence spending and the conversion of 
military production into civilian production.26 This state of affairs, in turn, compelled leading 
arms producers to engage in major rationalisation and consolidation efforts. Among the large 
advance arms-producing countries hundreds of thousands of defence workers became jobless 
and countless of communities were badly affected as defence manufacturers cut back 
production or decided to close down.27 
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Since the turn of the millennium, global defence expenditures made a huge rebound. Based 
on SIPRI statistics, world military spending has grown by nearly 50 per cent between 2000 
and 2011 (See Figure 3.1).  But as the effects of the 2008 global financial crisis began to have 
an impact on government budgets and as the United States began to wind down its wars in 
Afghanistan and Iraq, the world total levelled off after 2009 and has now begun to fall. But in 
2012, global defence expenditure fell 0.5 per cent for the first time since 1998 due to deep 
cuts in the spending of the United States and Europe that were only partly offset by increases 
in countries such as China and Russia. In 2014, defence spending in Asia and Oceania 
increased by 5 per cent reaching $439 billion mostly caused by China’s 9.7 per cent increase 
in military expenditure.28 Other top spenders include Australia with 6.7 per cent increase, 
South Korea and India of 2.3 and 1.8 per cent, respectively, whilst Japan’s spending remained 
the same.29 Meanwhile, tensions in South China Sea have prompted Vietnam to boost its 
spending by 9.6 per cent, whilst nearby Indonesia, decided to break its spending by 10 per 
cent.30  
 
 
Figure 3.1: World Military Expenditure, 1988-2014 
 
 
Source: SIPRI Military Expenditure Database, http://www.sipri.org/research/armaments/milex/milex_database. 
The totals are based on the data on 172 states. The absence of data for the Soviet Union in 1991 means that no 
total can be calculated for that year. 
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3.2.3 International Arms Trade 
 
A growing dependence on international sales to increase business revenues was observed 
post-Cold War era. Arms markets may have domestically declined, but the significance of 
defence sector overseas has grown. In 2007, BAE Systems’ focused almost 80 per cent of its 
business overseas and just 22 per cent in the United Kingdom.31 The same goes with other 
European companies like France’s Thales and Dassault, and Sweden’s Saab, which in 1998 
generated more than 60 per cent of its revenue from outside markets.32  Countries elsewhere 
have similar experience, like Israel which exports more than 75 per cent of its output.33 For 
many defence companies, international sales do not just serve as additional revenue, 
considerably, they have become critical to the survival of the defence industry. Competition 
in the global market is high, whilst production facilities and jobs are threatened. Besides, 
territorial and maritime disputes, and counterterrorism and counter-insurgency efforts have 
opened up the global defence market, especially in the Southeast Asia region. Arms 
manufacturers are increasingly ready to transact business, and offer potential buyers 
incentives, such as offsets, technology transfers, and foreign direct investments.34  
 
 
3.2.4  Globalisation of Armaments Production 
 
From a traditional, single-country set-up, the globalisation of the arms industry has shifted to 
a more transnational scale. In a time of limited defence budgets, increasing R&D costs, and 
progressively competitive arms markets, arms-producing states looks at this 
internationalisation of armaments development and production as possibly the only 
affordable way to continue having an economically and technologically competitive defence-
industrial base.35  
 
The content and shape of the global arms market is essentially affected by the expanding 
defence technology and industrial base. This process will likely have acute effects for 
different national security issues that include defence policy and military guidelines, arms 
control, regional security, and the future of national defence industries.36 Globalisation elicits 
palpable national security concerns and the future of self-sufficiency in arms production, the 
military and commercial outcomes of global technology diffusion and proliferation of 
conventional armaments. Globalisation serves as a challenge to the future of self-sufficiency 
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in many arms-producing countries, as foreign ownership and participation in joint ventures 
and international collaborative programmes weaken the national nature of the domestic 
defence-industrial base. International competition through increasing the efficiency of 
defence contracting might be healthy, but some arms producing countries are apprehensive 
about the consequence of losing grip over key industrial assets and core technologies.37 In 
addition globalisation raises substantial misgivings about the inadvertent diffusion of 
advanced military technologies and other know-how relating to arms production. 
Furthermore, globalisation has implications to national security, to the point that reliance on 
foreign sources for critical defence systems could raise unwanted vulnerabilities, especially in 
times of conflict or war. Ultimately, the process of globalisation will affect the patterns of 
arms production, economic growth and development in the domestic scene, and international 
relations.  
 
 
3.2.5  Technology and the Revolution in Military Affairs (RMA) 
 
The RMA is deduced as shift in character and conduct of warfare, and is perceived as a 
process of discontinuous and disruptive change.38 The current RMA model has been 
inevitably associated to the developing views of network-centric warfare (NCW), also known 
as network-enabled capabilities or network-based defence.39 According to the NCW 
perspectives, it is the revolution in information technologies – the growth in computing 
power, advances in communications and microelectronics, miniaturization, and so on – that 
makes possible the comparable RMA and allows innovation and improvement in the areas of 
command, control, communications, computers, intelligence, surveillance, and 
reconnaissance (C4ISR).40  In 2003, the United States Defence Department has said that 
“NCW causes combat power to surge by networking sensors, decision-makers, and shooters, 
in order to attain the desired outcomes of increased speed and survivability, greater lethality, 
and a degree of self-synchronisation.”41 
 
Developments in technology have corresponded with significant innovations in the way 
militaries are engaged around the world. From the use of cavalry units in World War I to the 
deployment of Unmanned Aerial Vehicles, known as drones, the ways in which military 
operations are planned and conducted have evolved considerably. Furthermore, the NCW 
doctrine gives a military the ability to “to achieve a high level of shared battlespace 
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awareness that is developed to achieve strategic, operational, and tactical objectives in 
accordance with the commander’s intent.”42 This includes not just joint warfare in a specific 
theatre of operations, but also the coordination of dispersed forces on a global level. This 
being examined, the next section will discuss how the military counters terrorism and 
insurgency.  
 
 
3.3 Internal Security: Counterterrorism and Counter-insurgency 
 
The Cold War years observed terrorism and political violence through the bipolar lenses of 
east versus west, communism versus capitalism, and evil versus good.43  This was followed 
by some diverse trends in the terrorism literature, particularly during the 1970s and early 
1980s, when there was a complete emphasis on international and transnational terrorism 
whilst ignoring domestic terrorism; and also the tendency to put a heavy spotlight on left-
wing terrorism and ignore right-wing terrorism.44 
 
By the end of the Cold War, there was a shift on how conflicts were analysed through the 
realisation that each has its own unique variables.45  In the post-Cold War era, Americans 
focused on terrorism in the wake of the 1993 World Trade Centre bombing and the 1995 
Oklahoma City bombing, whilst the Soviet tackled Chechen’s ongoing insurgency against 
Russian rule.46   Suddenly, the world became more complicated and accordingly, the enemy 
became more spread out. Drug trafficking, organised crime, and illegal immigration were 
identified as traditional concerns when confronting terrorism. Furthermore, new kinds of 
threats were formulated, ranging from infectious diseases47 to information warfare48. The 
recognition of old/new threats was, in turn, transformed into a wider operational mandate for 
government agencies in charge for counterterrorism. The mandates of the different agencies 
that formerly were quite separate, such as customs, border control, security intelligence, 
defence, and policing, began to cloud into one another.49  The inclination to put distinct 
events into the same category was also manifested in various analyses of terrorism of that 
period. One analyst, for instance, consolidated drug trafficking, international crime, ethnic 
cleansing, religious fanaticism, rural guerrilla, and urban terrorism all together as legitimate 
concerns for counterterrorism policymaking in the post-Cold War world. 50  In the mid to late 
1990s, the “new terrorism” phenomenon began to emerge as analysts recognise the threat of 
Islamists extremists and, in particular, discharged Afghan fighters returning home after the 
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defeat of the Soviets in Afghanistan. Islamist extremism increasingly began to draw the 
attention away from other post-Cold War threats. This trend only became more serious after 
the attacks on 11 September 2001.  
 
It has been more than a decade since the 9/11 attacks, still enduring policy debates whether to 
adopt a counterterrorism or counter-insurgency strategy in countries like Afghanistan, exist.51 
But these discussions do not offer clear explanations on how to strategically counter the 
threats of these security challenges.  Debates on how to counter insurgency and terrorism in 
conflicts such as in Afghanistan, have been described as somewhat short-sighted because of 
too much concentration on the strengths and weaknesses of short- and long-term 
commitments whilst sidestepping critical discourses on sustainable security strategies.52    
 
According to Michael Boyle, “a counter-insurgency strategy should not be seen as a 
counterterrorism strategy and vice-versa.”53  The main tenet of counter-insurgency recognises 
that a sole military solution is not practical making it necessary for a combination of military 
and political solution that adopts a population-centric approach.  Counter-insurgency doctrine 
rests on a few crucial scaffolds of protecting the local population, promoting good 
governance, eliminating enemy safe-havens, and training the locals to take the fight to the 
insurgency.  Bruce Hoffman classifies counter-insurgency into two: classical and modern. 
The former pursues an insurgency that is confined within the borders of a country, whilst the 
latter takes principles of the classical counter-insurgency and uses them to combat insurgency 
at the international level that while countering insurgency, also addresses the underlying 
socio-economic conditions that allow terrorism to thrive.54 Winning the ‘hearts and minds’ 
are the famous lyrics behind a more softer counter-insurgency approach inclined by countries 
that want to promote good governance and gain legitimacy in the eyes of the population.55 
Such a perspective shows how development can be a key in addressing some of the issues 
and concerns causing terrorism and insurgency.56   
 
Equally complex is counterterrorism, which over the last fifty years, has developed into a 
more dangerous form of unconventional warfare, mirroring, and responding to the evolving 
trends in global terrorism.  Before the 1990s, tactics used by terrorists include hijacking of 
planes, kidnapping, and raiding embassies to promote their causes.  In recent years, terrorism 
tactics have become more indiscriminate making it more dangerous if governments fail to 
elevate its responses. Terrorism today is indeed a complex, multifaceted phenomenon.  In 
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terms of countering terrorism and its complexities, hard and soft power approaches are 
applied as all-encompassing strategy. 
 
 
3.3.1  What is Terrorism?  
 
Although terrorism is thought to be as old as history, there is no one definition of the term. As 
Charles Tilly has appropriately said, the definition “sprawls across a wide range of human 
cruelties”.57 The term terrorism first entered the Western consciousness in relation to state-
organised violence and repression and, in particular, to describe the actions of French 
revolutionaries against their domestic enemies in 1793 and 1794. During what became known 
as the Reign of Terror, France’s new government legally executed as many as 17,000 people, 
and it is estimated that another that another 23,000  were illegally executed. In subsequent 
years, terrorism was a tactic used by dictators such as Adolf Hitler, Stalin, and Pol Pot, and 
expanded to include attacks by non-government, such as the Irish Republican Army, Basque 
separatists, and the Palestinian Liberation Organisation (PLO) on governments and public at 
large. Today, multiple definitions of terrorism exist. Alex Schmid and Albert Jongman have 
counted as many as 109 different definitions.58 In their words, “authors have spilled almost as 
much ink (trying to define the concept) as the actors of terrorism have spilled blood”.59 
Terrorism expert Walter Lacquer has also encountered over 100 definitions and has come to 
the conclusion that the “only general characteristic generally agreed on is that terrorism 
involves violence and the threat of violence”.60   
 
 
3.3.2  Inventory of Counterterrorism Approaches 
 
Steven and Gunaratna define counterterrorism as measures to decrease susceptibility to 
terrorist acts, to thwart and respond to terrorism, and having the capacity to respond to any 
attack.61 In the response against terrorism, two types have emerged. The hard approach 
indicates the use of the military in combatting the terrorists, and the soft approach, which can 
range from legal jurisdiction to rehabilitation.  Statistics indicate that in the U.S., from 1983 
to 1998, counter-terrorism response leaned more toward the use of the legal system, where 
only three of the 2,400 terrorist incidents during the period of investigation were responded 
with military means.62 This confirms the claim by some counterterrorism analysts that in the 
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1970s, the more dominant model of response was the use of the justice system and eventually 
transformed into a military response by the 1980s.63 No clear explanations have been 
provided why this is so, but one angle being looked at is at that time, the U.S. does not have 
much experience yet in dealing with issues of counterterrorism.64 A state can use a range of 
counterterrorism policies, strategies, and instruments to fight groups resorting to terror.  
 
Political measures 
 
A number of political measures can be used to counterterrorism and to try to resolve its 
causes or grievances, which can be political, economic, or social in nature. These measures 
include negotiations, socioeconomic, and political reforms, and international cooperation to 
cut off terrorist financing, extradite terrorists, regulate borders, and sharing of intelligence.65  
 
Legislative and judicial measures 
 
These measures include emergency and other special legislation to expand the government’s 
power to arrest, detain, and incarcerate suspects and to gain intelligence about the group’s 
operations; use of the courts to undertake investigations; legislation to disrupt terrorist 
financing; and amnesty and repentance measures to lure active members and to reintegrate 
them into the mainstream.66 
 
Security measures 
 
These measures include military deployments to protect the population; intelligence 
operation; organisational machinery to coordinate security units and operations; and 
preventive actions for defence, such as the hardening of facilities and control of access. 67 
 
In the context of Southeast Asia, the realities of insurgency and terrorism often overlap. 
Terrorist organisations work hard to exploit local grievances and use these grievances to 
spread their ideas of hate and violence; taking advantage of insurgent sanctuaries as base of 
operations to plan and launch terrorist attacks. The strength of terrorist groups in the region 
stems from their robust and interconnections between groups.68  The governments of 
Southeast Asia face a number of challenges in establishing a common front against terrorism, 
specifically in the areas of overcoming sovereignty and non-interference issues.69 Whilst such 
mind-sets are understandable, there are the same areas that terrorist and insurgent groups 
exploit in their operations. Terrorists take advantage of the porous borders and cross 
relatively unhindered from one country to the next.  
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3.3.3 What is insurgency?  
 
Insurgency has long existed ever since people have used violence to resist states and empires, 
but its strategic significance has receded and flowed throughout history, increasing when 
conventional war between great powers was unlikely and states were ineffective at defeating 
it. When governments fail to meet the expectations of its citizens, tensions arise and 
negotiations fail, creating the basic elements why people would likely support a rebellion.70 
 
Following the Second World War, insurgency emerged from the combination of nationalism 
and anti-colonialism, peasant unrest, leftist, or communist ideologies, which exploited and 
organised this discontent, and, in some cultures, a tradition of banditry and raiding.71 There 
were two main trends: conflicts based on opposition to outside rulers, particularly the 
European colonial powers, and class based conflicts (some with ethnicity elements) against 
local elites. In both Latin America and the Philippines, the latter trend was the most common.  
Policing was central; local issues and grievances were paramount. Where the British saw 
counter-insurgency as akin to colonial policing, and thus stress the synthesis of police and 
military efforts, the French and later the Americans considered it to be more like war than 
policing. Eventually the latter perspective dominated. As articulated by Clausewitz, 
insurgency conceptualised as war is viewed as purposeful behaviour with a rational, policy-
focused dimension intermixed with passion and chance.72 The idea that insurgency was a 
variant of war dominated American thinking, where former President John F Kennedy called 
it another type of war because of its used of infiltration, ambush, guerrillas, instead of directly 
confronting the enemy.73  
 
 
Whilst most Western nations have adhered to the idea that insurgency is war of a peculiar 
variant, this notion has not been universal. Some strategic theorists such as Ralph Peters, 
Edward Luttwak, Martin van Creveld, and Michael Scheurer argue that it is more like war 
than not, and hence the objective is the use of force to defeat the enemy.74 Many practitioners 
of counter-insurgency, from Rome to the Soviet Union and contemporary Sri Lanka, took this 
track, treating insurgency as an enemy-centric conflict where decisive military victory was 
attainable. From this perspective, the appropriate response is force directed at insurgents and 
their supporters. It also suggests that it is primarily a military activity, and that decisive defeat 
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of the insurgents should be the goal. Despite the logic of this idea, the norm has been to 
attempt an uneasy blend of war and political economic re-engineering.75 This may tackle the 
symptoms of pathological systems but does not address the root of the conflict.  
 
 
3.3.4 Counter-insurgency not Conventional Warfare 
 
The difference between conventional war and counter-insurgency arose from the triangular 
nature of the conflict. Conventional war sought to destroy the rebels or at least render them 
ineffective.  At times, this was done indirectly by eroding the rebel’s armed forces’ support, 
or physically, by destroying the enemy’s industry and agriculture depriving them of a supply 
base and hide-outs.76 General Sir Fran Kitson differentiates counter-insurgency from 
conventional warfare by noting that the former makes use of campaign propaganda to lure the 
citizens into participating in their cause.77 On the other hand, propaganda plays second fiddle 
to armed struggle.78 
 
As Galula observes the experience of conventional warfare maybe similar to most characters 
in counter-insurgency warfare where there are obvious disparities between the concerns of 
the two opposing sides.79 The first links to the physical situations suffered by the ones 
concerned that directly affect the ways they struggle, and the other implies to the rubrics by 
which the two sides must act.80 Guerrillas do not act or speak for a ‘state’, but are, rather, in 
direct clash with the political institution of their state and generally seek to replace the 
existing political order.81 Generally the state has at its disposal a variety of tough methods to 
engage in conventional warfare, from diplomatic and trade sanctions to the use of military 
force. But because insurgents have a shortage of the traditional equipment to counter the 
government they are fighting against, they possess some unique advantages and can stay 
hidden, thus targeting can be a challenge compared when in a conventional war situation. 
Given that rebels can mix and mingle with the general public, the risk of collateral casualties 
from inaccurate attacks on them by the state is high. These unfortunate events have, in many 
instances, been exploited by the guerrillas in their campaign propaganda.82 All of this 
requires strategic thinking when pursuing a counter-insurgency approach.  Having discussed 
the traditional role of the military, the next section will examine the role of the armed forces 
in non-traditional security issues. 
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3.4 Role of the Military during Natural Disasters 
 
Natural disasters such as earthquake, flood, volcanic eruption, drought, tornado and hurricane 
have affected lives, livelihood, and properties, and have caused peaks in mortality and 
morbidity. Since 1990, natural disasters have affected more than 200 million people every 
year.83 For example, the 2004 tsunami that affected 14 countries including Indonesia and Sri 
Lanka killed 230,000,84 and the 2010 earthquake in Haiti killed 225,000 people, destroyed 
health care facilities; and left many homeless.85 In the last the thirty years, the scale of 
disasters has magnified, due to the rapid rate of environmental degradation such as 
deforestation and waste disposal, and to increasing climate variables such as higher 
temperatures, and more violent wind and water storms.86 From 2000 through 2014, there 
were three times as many natural disasters recorded as there were from 1980 through 1989 
(See Figure 3.2).  
 
Figure 3.2: Total Number of Reported Natural Disasters between 1980 and 2014 
 
 
Source: Emergency Events Database (EM-DAT) [Internet]. 2015 [cited 12 April 2015]. Available 
from: http://www.emdat.be/.  
 
 
The effect of a disaster on the local economy usually consists of direct consequences, such as 
damage to crops and infrastructures; and indirect consequences, such as unemployment.  
According to a United Nations Report published in March 2015, global economic losses from 
natural disasters have continued rising to an average of $250 billion to $300 billion 
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annually.87 This shows that disasters disrupt long term growth paths and pose challenges to 
governments and communities.  
 
 
Nonetheless, societies have been able to reconstruct damage properties and building and 
people have been able to rebuild through recovery and relief efforts. In recent years, the 
humanitarian focus that has characterised disaster response is changing, along with the way 
nations, especially the military, have responded to large-scale disasters.  The military has also 
been accepted as a disaster response agency that provides assistance and resources to civil 
communities in natural disasters.88 In the United States, the role of the military has grown 
more notable and substantial, almost to the point that the armed forces is increasingly seen as 
the first responders, since the inception of the Federal Emergency Management Agency 
(FEMA) in 1979.89  The task of FEMA is to coordinate disaster responses around the United 
States, which has overwhelmed the resources of the local and state authorities.90 Following 
the October 2005 devastating earthquake in Pakistan, domestic and international military 
actors mounted the largest and longest humanitarian airlift operation ever undertaken.91 Also 
paying attention to the role of the military during natural disasters are regional alliances such 
as NATO, which played a key role in the Hurricane Katrina response in 2005. 
 
Increasing curiosity over the military’s role in disaster response is driven by different 
dynamics. According to Hofmann and Hudson (2009), assisting in relief efforts can improve 
the image of the military at the same time provide training opportunities.92 This is also one 
way for the armed forces to expand its role, especially at a time when defence worldwide are 
undergoing budget cuts.93 With an increasing incidence scale of natural disasters, national 
and foreign militaries can be expected to play a bigger role, where the capacity of 
humanitarian organisations may be expectedly stretched.94 A lot of countries usually send 
their military to assist in disaster relief and response. Most of the time, the armed forces is 
called to response to emergency relief activities such as search and rescue, evacuation and 
provision of relief goods and services because of lack of personnel and logistical incapacity 
by the local government.95 However, such actions need to be contained within the bounds of 
defined structures, like the Oslo Guidelines,96 wherein the military is a member of the inter-
government agency coordinative framework.97 Whilst deployment directives firmly stay 
within the chain of command, part of the concerned armed forces unit’s (its personnel and 
assets) mission is to engage civilian government units and authorities on a horizontal 
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fashion.98 Moreover, depending on the severity and extent of the disaster, the figure armed 
forces personnel and assets deployed is also usually scaled.  
 
Unlike other domestic missions, the involvement of the armed forces in disaster relief is 
deemed relatively uncontroversial. For Desch, having the military engaged in disaster 
response does not necessarily mean unhealthy relations between civilians and the armed 
forces not like counterterrorism, law enforcement, or social welfare.99 By nature, the 
deployment of the armed forces is usually transitional and sticks to a certain time-table, this 
non-traditional role does not go against the balance of civil-military relations in a 
democracy.100 Meanwhile, three conditions have been noted in assessing if the function 
provided by the armed forces heads to a more healthy practice of civil-military relations: (1) 
it does not crowd out civilian actors who can do the same job better; (2) it does not enable the 
military to gain additional institutional privilege; and (3) it does not veer the military away 
from its core mission.101 The role played by the military in civil-military relations, especially 
in disaster response, is important; without undermining the role of the civilians.102 
 
A key factor in looking at the role of the armed forces in responding to disasters is through 
the humanitarian response framework that is normally led by a civilian authority or agency of 
the country involved.103 The collective response stated in this framework highlights the 
fundamental tenet of democratic civil-military relations, where it takes into account how the 
civilian actors can employ the help of the local and foreign military assets and, likewise, how 
these defence entities can deal with civilian authority especially during disaster response 
operations.  Moreover, the framework has features that can be further studied such as the 
identification and stipulation of the military’s task in disaster response; the clarification of 
how to the civilians deliver authoritative decisions for the military to follow; and the 
integration of foreign military assistance into the disaster response operation.104 
 
One source of potential tension in civil-military relations is the engagement of the armed 
forces with non-government organisations (NGOs) during disaster response, given their 
different organisational, cultural, and historical backgrounds. It was stressed by Mandel 
(2002) that there is a danger of ‘militarisation’ in disaster response, especially since military 
responders are better-equipped compared to humanitarian organisations.105 Furthermore, 
concern over the military’s ‘armed’ credentials as state agents adds a layer of politics to their 
presence, which contradicts to the role of relief organisations as neutral actors.106  For 
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example the conduct of relief activities and information sharing during the 2004 tsunami 
disaster between the military and the NGOs were described as parallel and irregular.107 The 
thin interaction between groups both was because of the existing biases about the military as 
human rights violators108 and the opinion by the NGOs to limit its engagement with the 
military.109  
 
The framers of the Oslo Guidelines recognise that that disaster response is not the military’s 
domain and thus maintain it be the ‘last resort’ and a temporary measure. Principally, military 
personnel are state forces; hence any deployment and presence in foreign soil have sensitive 
implications and must be threaded carefully. Consequently, foreign contingents have the 
responsibility to avoid interaction with the local population and where possible to dissociate 
the tasks they perform from their military nature. Furthermore, even though the presence of 
foreign military is only for a limited timeframe, it is paramount that any engagement must 
adhere to institutionalised bounds of engagement.110 It also recognises civilian authority over 
military assets and host government-led framework for disaster response.111 In developing 
countries affected by large-scale disasters, more often than not, the local government is 
affected and unable to respond. When such a situation happens, the military is requested to 
step in and becomes the focal point of coordinating rescue and relief operations, until when 
civilian authority is restored. If not properly handled, civil-military relations can be a 
challenge.  
 
 
3.5 Transnational Crime 
 
The maritime domain covers more than 70 per cent of the earth’s surface made up of seas, 
oceans, rivers, lakes and inland waterways. As a very important global resource, it provides 
food, livelihood, energy resources, jobs, ecological services, and tourism opportunities. The 
maritime domain also plays a key role in sustaining domestic and international transportation 
and trade, the movement of the people, as well as the preservation of peace and security. If 
there is good order at sea, peaceful trading, the security of shipping and transportation, the 
development of marine resources in accordance of international law, and the freedom of 
navigation are upheld. 112 There are also challenges at sea that threaten to unsettle the good 
order and these include piracy, trafficking in persons, arms and people smuggling, trafficking 
of illegal drugs, and other transnational crimes.  
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Asia, where the Philippines is a part of, is a distinctively maritime region. The relative lack of 
land-based transport infrastructure, both within and between nations, as well as its 
geographical natures, that the role of the sea is very crucial. Asia strategically lies on two 
important waters – the Indian and Pacific Oceans – that economically and strategically 
benefit countries such the United States, China and India.113 Many countries consider 
themselves stakeholders of a peaceful maritime domain with extensive interests; therefore, 
transboundary cooperation must be facilitated.114  
 
 
3.5.1  Maritime Security 
 
The concept of maritime security started to draw attention after the 9/11 attacks and the 
related apprehensions on maritime terrorism.115  The escalation of piracy off the Somalia 
coast between 2008 and 2011 brought the issue of maritime security to the fore and elevated 
it high on policy agendas.116 Since 2010, maritime security strategies has increasingly been 
recognised as a vital part of the security framework of states, regional institutions, maritime 
organisations such as the United Kingdom,117 the European Union,118 the United States,119  
African Union120, NATO with its Alliance Maritime Strategy 2011,121 and the Maritime 
Safety Committee (MSC) of the International Maritime Organisation included maritime 
security in their list of tasks.122  Meanwhile, territorial disputes in the East China Sea and 
South China Sea have seen claimants make considerable investments toward their blue water 
navies recognising the importance of the maritime domain as a security space.123 
 
Discussions of maritime security frequently draw attention to challenges or ‘threats’ (e.g. 
transnational crimes, maritime terrorism, illegal fishing, environmental crimes, or maritime 
accidents)124 that prevail in the maritime domain.125  In recent years, arguments on whether to 
include climate change and disasters at sea as maritime issues have also been increasing.126  
There are those who propose that maritime security can be described as “good” or “stable 
order at sea”.127 As a consensus though, there has not been a satisfactory definition of what is 
maritime security.128 
 
Apart from being a contested concept, maritime security also involves very different 
activities. According to Bueger (see Figure 3.3), at least six domains of practice constitute 
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maritime security: The first domain includes traditional tasks of ensuring security at sea, that 
is, activities related to national defence and power projection.129 The second is comprised of 
diplomacy and geared at ensuring freedom of navigation and access to ports, but also 
preventing maritime inter-state disputes and establishing common security.130 Third, 
maritime security includes law enforcement operations at sea, that is interdictions, 
inspections, or patrols.131 The fourth dimension refers to legal regulations and the setting of 
rules and standards across various legal domains, such as, trade, environment, shipping or 
criminal law.132 The fifth domain involves the field of capacity building. They are directed at 
strengthening the level to which agencies can respond to maritime security issues by 
developing human resources and equipment.133 Finally, the sixth domain includes activities 
related to the sharing and fusion of information and maritime situation and domain 
awareness.134  
 
Figure 3.3: Domains of Maritime Security Practice 
 
Source: Bueger C. From dusk to dawn? Maritime domain awareness in Southeast Asia. 2015.  
 
Various agencies and professions work in each of these domains, including, but not limited 
to, navies, coast guards, maritime police, port authorities, regulatory agencies, or ministries of 
fisheries, trade, transport and foreign affairs. The domains together constitute maritime 
security practice, and none of them could be successful without the other. The relations 
between the practices are multifaceted and one should not assume a linear relationship, e.g. in 
the sense that legal regulation or information sharing precede law enforcement. Appropriate 
responses to maritime security challenges require that each domain is continuously informed 
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about the needs of the other, not the least to adapt to changing circumstances.  The domain of 
information sharing has become central to coordinate maritime security practice and develop 
cooperative regional maritime security regimes. As the National Research Council’s 
Committee of the 1,000 Ship Navy noted, information sharing can be a “key enabler” in 
maritime security,135 because it is an anchoring practice, and has potential benefit for all of 
the six other domains of maritime security practice.  
 
 
3.5.2  Domain Awareness  
 
A critical element to protecting maritime security is warranting that countries have the 
essential data at their disposal manage crisis or take responsive action if needed.136 As Colby 
notes: 
 
There are no limits to the types and sources of information which may be 
useful. The processing of intelligence refers to the treatment accorded to the 
raw data collected. It generally includes appraisal of the relevance of the 
information, as well as editing and cataloguing in forms useful to decision-
makers. These tasks vary enormously in complexity, depending in large 
measure on the amount and quality of data requested and actually 
collected.137 
 
The vastness and nature of the oceans present particular challenges for states seeking to 
improve their knowledge of the range of activities undertaken at sea. Intelligence gathering 
involves a range of operational and policy perspectives as well as legal considerations. The 
legal dimension provides a framework or advises the states’ operational exercises in seeking 
intelligence for the purpose of promoting or ensuring their maritime security. The policy of 
maritime domain awareness (MDA) and similar policies have been critical drivers and goals 
for intelligence gathering at sea, as well as information sharing.  MDA is one of the main 
U.S. policy initiatives since the 9/11 attacks. It seeks to generate and use information 
concerning vessels, crews, and cargoes. According to the United States maritime strategy 
plan published in 2013, MDA is the “effective understanding of anything associated with the 
maritime domain that could impact the security, safety, economy, or environment.”138 
Accordingly, the purpose of the MDA is to provide appropriate, timely, precise decision-
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making, to facilitate actions that will stop threats to the national security interests of the 
U.S.139 
 
The primary elements of a global MDA include: a global network of regionally based 
maritime information exchange partnerships, the institution of worldwide standards for 
broadcast of vessel position and identification; automated tools to discern patterns, changes, 
and potential threats, and alerting maritime partners of suspicious behaviour and potential 
threats.140 The need for international cooperation to achieve MDA and a shared interest 
among states for situational awareness and threat awareness to improve maritime security 
cannot be denied. Aside from cooperation across different government agencies, MDA also 
entails collaboration with the private sector.141 Collaboration with the private industry is vital 
considering that most international shipping is managed by the commercial sector. It has been 
suggested that the system would greatly benefit if commercial information from 
manufacturers and shippers could be made available.142  However, difficulties here are that 
valuable and detailed information is not likely to be made available to the U.S. government in 
the absence of domestic legislation requiring this, and even then the information may not be 
reliable or prove insufficient for the purposes for which it was sought.143 
 
Other states and regional groups have developed their own coordinated approaches to 
handling information relevant to maritime security. As one example, the European 
Commission proposed in 2008 a European Border Surveillance System (EUROSUR), to 
prevent unauthorised crossings by immigrants, reduce loss of life at sea, and enhance 
Europe’s security.144 Australia and New Zealand have adopted similar MDA policies in light 
of the large expanse of their EEZs and search and rescue regions.145  The Western Pacific 
Naval /symposium created a Regional Maritime Information Exchange (ReMIX) to share 
non-sensitive information on maritime security threats.146 The adherence of different states to 
this approach underlines that MDA is ‘the key to maritime security’.147 The need to collect, 
process, and share information is fundamental to the range of law enforcement and military 
activities that are likely to be needed to ensure maritime security.  
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3.6  Strategies in Practice: Selected Countries 
 
In Chapter 2, security policies of China, Singapore, and Japan were highlighted to explain 
comprehensive security in the Asia-Pacific context. The sections that follow look at specific 
practices on how these three countries tackle the issues of defence industrialisation, 
traditional security, and non-traditional security issues, discussed in preceding sections, thus 
strengthening the relationship between defence and development.  
 
 
3.6.1  China’s Defence Industry 
 
In almost every year for over two decades, China has increased its military expenditure by 
double-digit percentages. In March 2015, China announced that it would raise its defence 
budget by 10.1 per cent (approximately $145 billion).148 Whilst down from the previous 
year’s 12.2% increase, the pronouncement will continue to raise concern from Washington 
and neighbouring capitals with which China has an ongoing maritime territorial conflict. 
China’s new budget is more than three times those of other big spenders such as France, 
Japan, and the United Kingdom, and nearly four times that of its rising Asian rival, India.149 
It is also the only country besides the United States to have a triple-digit defence budget (in 
billions of U.S. dollars). Funding priorities of the Chinese military in 2015 included the 
strengthening of modern logistics, step up national defence, research and development, and 
develop defence-related science and technology industries.150 
 
With its broad-based defence industries but insufficient R&D capability, China has 
traditionally been categorised as a Tier 2c arms producer. China owns one of the oldest, 
largest, and most diversified military-industrial facilities in the world151  with around 1,000 
establishments, involved in research and trading, by end of the 1990s.152 In particular, China 
is one of the few nations, who has actually produced an almost full range of military 
equipment, from small arms to warships to aircraft carriers to ballistic missiles and nuclear 
weapons.153 However, the uphill climb has not all been a bed of roses. Its defence industry 
also suffered from a number of failings that have impeded the translation of advanced 
technologies and design into reliable weapons systems. As of the late 1990s, China’s military 
expenditures totalled only about $10 billion, significantly less than that of Japan and South 
Korea, and possessed one of the world’s most technologically backward defence 
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industries.154 China’s defence R&D was deemed deficient in several key areas, such as 
aeronautics, microelectronics, sensors, electronic warfare, and sophisticated materials.155 Not 
surprising at all, since the defence industry of China had traditionally been immature in the 
area of systems integration.156 
 
This pattern could be changing given the increasing progress in Chinese defence 
transformation in terms of quality and new weapons capabilities over the past decade or so. 
China has ambitions to be a regional superpower and is steadfast to modernise concentration 
on the RMA transformation process.157 One issue here is how China’s defence industry is 
performing compared with other arms-producing nations in relation to the constantly 
changing technological goalposts of weapons development. If in the next few years China can 
close the gap with other advance military systems and rise in the hierarchy, another issue is 
the growing disparity between economic performance and defence spending, which in the last 
ten years has grown to an average of 15.9 per cent annually.158  
 
 
3.6.2  Singapore’s Fight against Terrorism 
 
Singapore’s concern for its safety and security has been well documented long before 9/11. It 
has its fair share of terrorist attacks and ethnic tensions in the course of its history. In fact, 
several of its security agencies had been developing capabilities to deal with specific threats 
such as those in the chemical and biological domain. In 1999, the National Security 
Secretariat (NSS) together with the Ministry of Defence (MINDEF) was formed with the 
objectives of enhancing the coordination of Singapore’s security agencies and to forge and 
strengthen interagency linkage through the strategic convergence of these organisations and 
other government agencies, directing efforts against the emerging threats of non-conventional 
warfare and transnational terrorism.159 
 
The 2001 arrests of Jemaah Islamiyah (JI) members for plotting bombings in Singapore has 
increased its government’s efforts to enhance the protection of critical infrastructures such as 
border checkpoints and water installations, preserving property, and avoiding possible 
interference in the social order.160 The law enforcers and the Internal Security Department 
(ISD) continue to map out standard operating procedures to fine tune emergency responses 
through special trainings for security agencies and personnel on a regular basis. Stricter 
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border controls have also been put in place by the government to prevent the entry of any 
elements to transnational terrorism. Examples of such measure include the purchase of 
surveillance equipment to enhance the monitoring of goods and people against Singapore’s 
borders and the imposition to stricter visa requirements on foreign nationals.161 As a 
proactive measure, the Parliament signed into law the Terrorism (Suppression of Financing) 
Act criminalising activities related to terrorist-funding.162 In addition, the government has 
drawn up new frameworks for managing information technology in the face of cyberterrorism 
as well as regulating the use of materials that could be used to make weapons of mass 
destruction.163 
 
In 2003, the Ministry of Home Affairs (MHA) published a white paper entitled “The Jemaah 
Islamiyah Arrests and the Threat of Terrorism,” where officials proposed the importance of 
underpinning social cohesion and religious harmony recognising the critical role in 
countering terrorism by Muslims and non-Muslims alike.164 One of the measures put in place 
in relation to this is a community effort called Religious Rehabilitation Group (RRG) 
composed of local Muslim religious clerics to rehabilitate those who have been detained for 
participating in terrorist activities.165 The aim of the RRG is “to correct” the misinterpretation 
of the principles of Islam and dispel extreme and violent ideologies by counselling JI 
detainees and their families.166 Depending on the politics, culture, and priority, affected states 
have responded to terrorism from different viewpoints. Singapore has opted for an 
ideological response to counter extremism and it has worked very well for them, where in 
2015, already 57 detainees have been rehabilitated and released from detention since the 
programme started in 2002.167 
 
 
3.6.3 Japan’s Civil-Military Engagement during the March 2011 Tsunami 
 
On 11 March 2011, a magnitude-9 earthquake struck northeastern Japan that resulted to a 
major tsunami submerging approximately a 500km-wide area, leaving the local government 
paralysed.168 If this was not enough, the earthquake also caused the radioactive water to leak 
from the Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Power Station.169 At most 107,000 personnel of Japan’s 
Self-Defence Force (SFD) force were deployed from 11 March to 31 August 2011 (until 26 
December 2011) for the nuclear disaster),170 combining the strength of the three branches of 
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the armed forces – land, sea, and air – making the operation the biggest response it had to 
face.171  
 
Enacted into law in 1987 and subsequently amended in 1992, the Japan Disaster Relief (JDR) 
has enabled the SDF to participate in international humanitarian assistance and disaster relief 
(HADR) operations.172 To fulfil immediate requests for overseas HADR support, the JSDF 
maintains designated units through the Ground Self-Defence Force (GSDF), the Maritime 
Self-Defence Force (MSDF) and the Air Self-Defence Force (ASDF), and depending on 
need, can provide medical units, transportation vessels and aviation capabilities.173 Between 
1998 to April 2016, a total of 140 JDR Teams (19 search and rescue teams, 57 medical teams, 
46 expert teams, and 18 SDF units) have been deployed to 43 countries including Haiti in 
2010 and the Philippines in 2013.174 Through its Ministry of Defence, Japan has been sharing 
its HADR expertise with the other armed forces in the Southeast Asia, through the ASEAN 
Regional Forum Disaster Relief Field Exercise (ARF-DiREx), which was first initiated in 
2009, leading to a more strengthened bilateral relationship with the countries in the region.175  
 
 
3.6.4  Transnational Crime in the Context of Japan 
 
Japan is a major maritime power and an island nation, whose economy (the world’s third 
largest) and trade are reliant upon the safe passage of shipping. In particular, Japan transports 
80 per cent of its oil through the Malacca Straits,176 and a blockage of this sea lane caused by 
an intentional terrorist incident or an accident resulting from a piratical incident would 
significantly harm Japan’s economic interests.177 The cost of would-be deterring pirates or 
terrorists alone is substantial for the Japanese shipping industry. Since the late 1990s, 
successive Japanese governments have actively responded to a number of maritime security 
threats. A rise in maritime piracy in Southeast Asia encourage the Obuchi Keizō 
administration (1998-2000) to begin implementing a broad anti-piracy strategy that focused 
on building  maritime policing capabilities, establishing institutions to monitor and analyse 
maritime security issues, and amending domestic and international law.178 Subsequent 
Japanese prime ministers developed this anti-piracy approach into a model which the Asō 
Tarō administration (2008-2009) reproduced to confront the growing number of piratical 
incidents off the Somali coast, including the passage of an Anti-Piracy Law in March 2009. 
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Japan’s entrepreneurship in responding to piracy has had significant repercussions in the 
domain of maritime security.  
 
In order to confront maritime security challenges, Japanese governments have repeatedly turn 
to the Japan Coast Guard (JCG), not least because of the legacy of Japan’s imperialist 
expansionism and the anti-militarist norm that evolved in the wake of defeat in the Second 
World War.179 The reliance upon the JCG stems in part from the responses of both the 
Obuchi and Koizumi Junichirō (2001-2006) administrations to incursions into Japanese 
waters by North Korean ‘suspicious ships’ in March 1999 and December 2001, 
respectively.180 Whereas in the 1999 case, the Obuchi administration ordered the Maritime 
Self-Defence Forces (MSDF) to take maritime security action and chase the suspicious ships 
out of Japanese maritime territory, and in the latter case, the JCG pursued a North Korean 
‘suspicious ship’ into China’s Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ) where the ‘suspicious ship’ 
sank under mysterious circumstances.181 The 2001 case established a dual strategy in Japan’s 
foreign maritime security policy whereby the JCG would confront non-traditional security 
threats, whereas the MSDF would defence Japanese territorial challenges, as well as support 
US-led missions in the ‘war on terror’ in an auxiliary. Even in the defence of Japan’s 
sovereign territory, the deployment of the JCG to police disputed territories, such as the 
Daioyu/Senkaku Islands, and to defend against incursions by North Korean suspicious ships 
are examples of the Japanese government’s preference to rely on a law enforcement 
organisation rather than a military one at sea.   
 
 
3.7  Summary 
 
The analysis in Chapter 3 has sought to provide a clearer backdrop to the Philippine case 
study analysis of defence and development to be undertaken in Chapters 4 and 5, 
respectively. The focal concepts of this study – defence industry, internal security 
(counterterrorism and counter-insurgency), and non-traditional security – were defined and 
examined in this chapter. In bite size pieces, Chapter 3 also looked into what characterises 
defence industry, and how and where manufacturing countries fit in this characterisation. 
This chapter also discussed the importance of RMA and how developments in defence 
technology correspond with how militaries around the world engage. Furthermore, counter-
terrorism and counterinsurgency initiatives have also been identified. Likewise, how the 
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increasing role of the military in non-traditional issues, such as disaster response and 
transnational crime, affects its image has also been examined. To make the concepts more 
palatable, China’s defence industry was described, Singapore’s fight against terrorism was 
discussed, and how Japan engages its defence sector to confront non-traditional challenges 
was also examined. For this, the domains defence industry, internal security, and non-
traditional security remain strong areas for which the defence sector of the Philippines can 
learn from and enhance its strategic and operation capabilities. To begin, the next chapter will 
provide an in-depth analysis of Philippine security policies and zoom in on the three areas 
that this study wants to evaluate.  
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Chapter 4 
Traditional and Non-Traditional Security in the 
Context of the Philippines 
 
 
4.1  Defining Security 
 
The purpose of Chapter 4 will be to examine how the role of the military has evolved by 
focusing on traditional security whilst incorporating non-traditional issues into the system of 
the Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP) through the policies of different Philippine 
presidents starting from Ramon Magsaysay. Magsaysay’s administration is crucial to the 
discussion because apart from being in the highest position during the Cold War, he was once 
the Secretary of National Defence few years after World War II ended, during which time the 
security landscape was slowly shifting. This sets the context for the subsequent country case 
study of the Philippines in Chapter 4, in terms of its defence and development process, and 
evaluation of the implementation of policies in relation to the defence industry, 
counterterrorism/counter-insurgency, natural disasters, and combatting transnational crime 
(Chapter 5).   
 
The national security environment of the Philippines has undergone dramatic changes 
especially post World War II that made a huge impact on the country’s local and foreign 
policies. Since 1946, the external security of the Philippines has been the responsibility of the 
United States through the Philippine-American treaty. On the other hand, the Philippine 
government concentrated on settling internal concerns. However in 1991, the Philippine 
Senate rejected the proposal to extend the stay of the U.S. military bases in the country.  This 
left the nation-state with the huge task of securing its territorial integrity consisting of 7,107 
islands. Exacerbating this challenge is the South China Sea dispute involving neighbouring 
countries – Vietnam, Taiwan, Brunei and China.  
 
Along with the United States, the Philippines has also reinforced its security relations with 
Japan and Australia, and increased its participation in regional and global institutions like 
ASEAN, ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF) and the UN. However, whilst issues of sovereignty 
and maritime security are pressing concerns, it is interesting to note that the security policies 
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of the country downplay these challenges.   In particular, the inability of the AFP to defend 
the country against external threats has always been raised. This weakness is mostly 
attributed to the insurgency and Moro secessionism that has been ongoing for almost fifty 
years, as well as in the high military support dependence on the U.S.1  Notably, the old 
security policy of the Philippines saw the AFP focusing on internal defence, while reliant on 
the western ally for external defence. The inability of the Philippines to protect its territorial 
waters also limits the country’s ability to diplomatically manoeuvre because of insufficient 
influence in negotiations.2  Aside from the weight acted upon by military capability in 
diplomacy, Pangilinan (2008) also values military defence as a deterrent against threats, and 
as ‘insurance’ should diplomacy and deterrence disappoint.3  
 
The influence of the U.S. in the Philippines security policy is further observed in the issue of 
counterterrorism, when the latter joined the Global War on Terror campaign. However, the 
terrorism issue in the Philippines, although showing remnants of foreign influence is largely 
an internal security situation, associated, to some extent, with the government’s inability to 
provide quality basic services. Furthermore, the recognition of additional security challenges 
has balanced the outlook to pay close attention to other equally pressing concerns such as 
climate change and other environmental issues, maritime security, and transnational crimes. 
The presence of these issues signal the rise of developing countries with their sets of 
concerns, and new actors such as civil society and non-government organisations; and how 
both have affected the norm-setting agenda of international affairs. This brings to the fore 
some questions this chapter will address: What is ‘security’ to the Philippines as well as to 
the Filipino people?  Who is supposed to provide security?  What are the policies that must 
be undertaken to address these security concerns? These are some of the questions this 
chapter will address.  
 
 
4.2  Birth of the Philippine Armed Forces 
 
Historically, the responsibility of ensuring the safety of Philippine sovereignty and its people 
has been delegated constitutionally to a fairly small regular military force known as the AFP. 
Up until 1990, AFP was comprised of four service branches namely the army, air force, navy 
and constabulary. The Philippine Army (PA), Philippine Air Force (PAF), and the Philippine 
Navy (PN) are entrusted the duty to protect national land, air and sea, respectively.  The 
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responsibility of implementing law and order for rear-area defence during emergencies fell on 
the hands of the Philippine Constabulary (PC).  In 1901, the United States established the PC, 
followed by the formation of the Philippine Army in 1935.4  In 1991, the PC was abolished 
and replaced by the Philippine National Police (PNP).  As support to the AFP, the Citizen 
Armed Forces Geographical units (CAFGU), an irregular auxiliary force whose members are 
from the local communities, are activated to support area defence.5 
 
Granting that a likeness of a citizen’s armed force existed during the country’s struggle for 
independence from Spain, the military of the Philippines can map out its beginning to the pre-
colonial period.  Scholars of military studies observe that armed and organised Filipino 
fighters played an active role in combating against Japanese and American occupation 
forces.6  Interestingly, the present-day Philippine armed force was modelled after the military 
of the United States and was officially established by virtue of Commonwealth Act No. 1 of 
1935.7  Consequently, the Philippine Army was formally created as the first component of the 
Armed Forces under the National Defence Act.   The 1935 Constitution named the President 
as the armed forces’ Commander-in-Chief, laying the foundation for the military’s 
development into a key element of presidential politics in the Philippines.  Whilst a civilian 
defence secretary was tasked with day-to-day oversight of the army, the president was given 
wide-ranging powers over appointments and policies within the armed forces.  To balance the 
president’s authority over the AFP, the legislature was granted overseeing roles through its 
mandate to confirm the appointments and promotions of military personnel, as well as its 
control over the defence budget and legal investigations in cases of wrongdoing in the AFP.8 
 
However, the United States did not just refrain itself from influencing the structure of the 
AFP. American colonialism also shaped the civilian political institutions responsible for the 
management and supervision of the Philippine military by also determining its roles and 
functions.  Unlike neighbouring Indonesia and Myanmar, the Philippine military did not 
struggle independence violently from its American colonizers. In 1946, the U.S. handed over 
authority to a civilian Philippine government in an orderly and largely amicable manner.  
This meant that the AFP lacked the narrative of a heroic independence strain upon which it 
could base demands for political hegemony.9 In its place, influential and land-owning 
civilians became the dominant political class, whilst the AFP continued to display the 
characteristics of a colonial army.10  Since the protection of Philippine external defence fell 
on the U.S.’ shoulders, the AFP was entrusted to focused on internal defence, which 
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contributed, largely, to its size, training, equipment and supplies.11  The term ‘internal 
security’ became an encompassing expression of all threats targeted to the government and its 
citizens.12  Originating from a postcolonial standpoint, Hedman (2001) backed this by 
concluding that, “neither national interests of security nor the political dynamics of 
reconstruction” dictated the organisation of the Philippine forces.13   
 
 
4.3  The Evolving Role of the Military 
 
A persistent question surrounding countries in Asia involves the role of the armed forces in 
civil governance. In some countries, the military plays a stabilising role allowing for peaceful 
transitions between political leaderships, whilst others observe a very thin line dividing 
civilian and military affairs.14  In the Philippines, the ‘interventionist’ tendency of the AFP 
developed as a consequence of many factors as discussed above. Prolonged exposure to 
social ills and the realisation that much leaves to be desired in governance politicised the 
young AFP officers.15  Moreover, the military played a key role in combating the twin armed 
conflicts that grew following regime change in 1972, namely the communist insurgency of 
the Communist Party of the Philippines (CPP), its armed wing – the New People’s Army 
(NPA) – and the National Democratic Front (NDF) on the one hand, and the separatist 
movement led by the Moro National Liberation Front (MNLF) on the other.  The use of 
coercion in governance16 was palpable in these conflicts and would sustain the military’s 
political role beyond 1986.  Longstanding exposure to domestic conflict where national 
development is a component of the overall antidote would contribute to the military’s 
politicisation and the development of an ‘interventionist’ tendency among its officers.  The 
next sections will show how the role of role of the military evolved from President Ramon 
Magsaysay to the administration of President Benigno Aquino; and how these affected the 
Philippine security policies.   
 
 
4.3.1  The Huk Rebellion and Ramon Magsaysay 
 
The internal direction of the AFP was first established with the rise of the Hukbalahap (or the 
Huks) insurgency, which launched serious campaigns against the government from 1946 to 
1954.  The Huk guerrilla fighers and the government forces were once allies against the 
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Japanese, but rebelled because they were kept out of the post-war political order.  Utilising a 
two-pronged approach to fight the insurgency, then Defence Secretary Ramon Magsaysay 
directed the AFP to “engage the Huks militarily in a more organised and efficient way, and to 
show them that the government had their interests in mind and that the military could be 
trusted to protect and take care of them”.17  The second strategy was materialised in the form 
of socio-economic activities where the AFP went on medical missions, distributed relief 
goods to those affected by the crossfire, built temporary roads and bridges, constructed 
makeshift schoolhouses, and drilled water wells in villages declared Huks-free.18 
 
Magsaysay’s successes in overcoming the Huk rebellion made him so popular that he won 
the presidency in 1953.  Under his leadership, the Philippines was domestically stable and 
internationally seen as a model for young democracy and developing economy.  In the 1960s 
rose a political maverick Ferdinand Marcos, who ran the country from 1965 to 1986.  
Democratically elected at first, Marcos turned into a classic third-world dictator by the 1970s 
and used the military as a strategic partner to stabilize his regime.  
 
 
4.3.2 Marcos and Martial Law (1965 – 1986) 
 
During the administration of President Marcos, the rise of developmental roles associated 
with counter-insurgency was established. The relentless internal conflicts from two fronts – 
communist insurgency and Moro secessionism – contributed to the civilian government 
becoming heavily on the security afforded by the military.  When Marcos declared Martial 
Law in 21 September 1972, he called the AFP his ‘partner in national development’.19  
Martial law cemented the breakdown of the government institutions, namely the executive, 
legislature, and judiciary.  As ‘partners of development,’ military roles were expanded to 
include non-military functions, the integration of the police and military into one government 
organisation, and clampdown on civil liberties, such as elections and freedom of 
expression.20  Consequently, this resulted to an intensified sense of political awareness within 
the AFP as the chief implementers of power over a highly personalised dictatorial regime.21   
 
Given that the military was now Marcos’ most important piece of state machinery, it was 
crucial for him to keep the armed forces under his control. From 1973 to 1975, the AFP saw a 
700 per cent increase in its budget where Php3.5 billion (approximately US$75.6 million) 
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was added.22  This was the highest defence budget for any state within the Southeast Asian 
region at that time.23  Accordingly, several thousands were recruited into the AFP ranks, 
boosting the number of soldiers from 70,000 in 1973 to 275,000 in 1975.24 Marcos’ 
employment of Huntington’s ‘subjective civilian control’25  repeatedly violated the chain of 
command by keeping loyal generals beyond the retirement age and favouring his military 
associates for promotion over more deserving officers.26 Likewise, military officers loyal to 
the dictator were appointed to key civilian posts in some government agencies.27   
 
Clearly such actions had growing implications on the professionalism of the military, leading 
to the formation of the Reform the Armed Forces Movement (RAM) by some disgruntled 
junior officers of the AFP.28 Soon enough, a plot to oust Marcos was laid using as backdrop 
the public demonstrations against the purported electoral fraud following the February 1986 
snap presidential elections.29 With the blessing of then Defence Minister Juan Ponce Enrile, 
who also aspired for reform, RAM disobeyed the AFP chain of command and rallied with 
other anti-Marcos groups.30  Beleaguered by mass protests and deserted by key generals, 
Marcos had no choice but to escape in 1986 and relinquish power to his archenemy, Ninoy’s 
wife, Corazon Aquino.  Whilst Marcos retired in Hawaii, he left the Philippines with 
weakened democratic institutions, politicised military and unresolved insurgencies. 
 
 
4.3.3 Corazon Aquino (1986-1992): Return of Democracy  
 
The reinstatement of democracy after the 1986 People Power Revolt had a huge impression 
on the Philippine armed forces.  Given its critical role in preserving the Marcos regime and in 
the political transition, it was vital that democratic civilian control be established and the role 
of the military be defined clearly.  It took the whole of the Aquino administration to rebuild 
Philippine civil-military relations to their pre-martial law state.  Given the tremendous 
entanglement of the AFP with the Marcos dictatorship, it was imperative to clarify the roles 
of the military and to impose democratically legitimated civilian control. The adoption of the 
1987 Constitution restated civilian authority over the military, including legislative power 
over defence budget and military appointments and promotions.31  The Philippine 
Constabulary was also abolished and saw the separation of the police and military, where 
after some time, the PNP has to assume from the AFP the primary role of preserving internal 
security affairs, so the latter can concentrate on external defence. But the seriousness of the 
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insurgency and secessionist problem demanded the continuing counter-insurgency role of the 
AFP32 and prevented the immediate transfer of key functions from the military to the 
police.33 
 
In the presence of political forces with diverse backgrounds, democratic institutions could be 
both unstable and accommodating even if interests were potentially unsound.34   In this 
context, the military became an important stakeholder in Cory Aquino’s administration, 
where the government agreed to the demands of higher pay, removal of cabinet officials who 
are deemed left-leaning or hostile to the armed forces, holding back on the trial of military 
officers and personnel suspected of violating human rights, and the employment of a more 
military method of suppressing internal conflicts.35   
 
However, as the restoration of democracy was accelerated by a military coup, the Philippines 
also became susceptible to military adventurism.  The Aquino administration was challenged 
by seven coup attempts from politicised and discontented officers, some of whom had led 
coup attempt against Marcos that resulted to the 1986 People Power Revolution.36  However, 
these coup plots were unsuccessful due to the lack of popular support from senior military 
officials, who remain loyal to the civilian government, and the latent U.S. support to the 
regime.37  Although survey polls bared widespread dissatisfaction with economic and 
political conditions under the Aquino government, this did not translate into public support 
for political intervention by the military.38 Hence, the coup attempts were unsuccessfully due 
to the strong opposition by civil society.  Moreover, the senior command remained loyal to 
the incumbent government and the US continued to support Aquino.39  But the seriousness of 
the last coup attempt in December 1989, where the soldier rebels were able to seize several 
military facilities, prompted the government to create a fact-finding body to investigate its 
causes and provide recommendations to avoid a repeat of the incidents.40 
 
The Davide Commission, named after its chairman Hilario Davide, conducted a rigorous 
probe of the issues surrounding the coup plot and also studied the armed forces as a political 
institution. Containing crucial findings and recommendations, the final report of the 
Commission exposed the persistent problems within the military institutions, which include 
inadequate pay and benefits for its soldiers, lack of logistical support and services to 
deployed personnel, favouritism in promotions, and the rampant corruption in the military 
and government.41 The investigation did not only stressed the value of security reform, it also 
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highlighted the need for the civilian government to get its act together, fulfil the promises of 
democratisation and people empowerment, and to work for genuine national development.42 
 
Other reforms include the establishment of the Office of Ethical Standards and Public 
Accountability (OESPA), which was given exclusive jurisdiction over active AFP members 
implicated in graft and corruption cases.43 In addition, a Code of Ethics was adopted to 
provide clearer guidelines for AFP personnel on matters concerning civil-military relations. 44  
Yet, the effectiveness of the code concerned not so much on the reluctance of the armed 
forces to be subjected to civilian power as it was the lack of credibility and effectivity of the 
authorities  to implement its function. The appointment of retired military officers to strategic 
government post was rampant, even after martial law, and this displayed the weakness in the 
bureaucracy and governance. In her book, Gloria (2003) concluded that the appointment of 
retired generals to strategic government positions could be accredited to the soldier’s 
socialisation and the nature of regime.45 The expansion of the role of the military to include 
community and outreach as a counter-insurgency approach permitted soldiers to take on 
civilian functions, which prepared them for subsequent bureaucratic appointment, a sign that 
the country’s civilian government failed to deliver the basic services in conflict and post-
conflict areas.46  Gloria also discussed that the regimes following the 1986 People Power 
Revolt also acknowledged, and/or perhaps “encouraged the influence and involvement of the 
armed forces in managing the affairs of the country.”47  
 
 
4.3.4  Fidel V. Ramos (1992-1998) 
 
Subsequent administrations sustained the process of reforming the AFP that started during the 
presidency of Aquino.  The general policy of the Ramos administration, however, was 
centred on reconciling with the adversarial groups – communist party, Moro secessionists, 
and even military rebels – through peace negotiations.  In 1996, a peace agreement was 
forged between the government and the Moro National Liberation Front (MNLF) that 
established autonomy in provinces and cities that voted to be part of the Autonomous Region 
in Muslim Mindanao (ARMM).48   Being an ex-military himself, Ramos had the advantage of 
dealing with a military, granting rebel soldiers an unconditional amnesty, which halted 
military adventurism temporarily.49  Many of those who joined the coups against the Aquino 
government returned to the AFP and were awarded with loyal and distinguished service to the 
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state under Ramos.50 This might have put coup attempts at a standstill, thus creating an 
environment favourable to economic growth, but some maintain that the rendering of 
unconditional amnesty weakened military discipline and undermined democratic civil-
military relations.51   
 
During this period, for example, “the rise in criminal activities particularly kidnapping and 
drug-related crimes, were attributed to the involvement of military and police personnel with 
various criminal syndicates in the country.”52  At the same time, this administration saw the 
appointment of dozens of retired military officers in a wide variety of civilian positions, 
including “many strategic and therefore powerful positions in such agencies as the 
Department of Defence, National Security Council, Department of Interior and Local 
Government, Department of Transportation and Communication, Department of Public 
Works and Highways, and many ambassadorial posts.”53  A major power broker under 
Ramos, for example, retired brigadier general Jose Almonte, served as head of both the 
National Security Council (NSC) and the National Intelligence Coordinating Authority 
(NICA).54  Moreover, even renegade RAM officers, like Gringo Honasan, ran for public 
office with some notable successes.  In a similar vein, the government’s accord with the 
MNLF in 1996 has seen its long-time leader Nur Misuari elected (without opposition and 
with backing from the Lakas-NUCD Party) as governor of the Autonomous Region Muslim 
Mindanao (ARMM).  Rather than signalling a new militarist trend in Philippine politics, 
however, this pronounced development ended with Ramos, who significantly, refrained from 
extending to his own defence secretary and former chief of staff, General Renato de Villa, the 
much-coveted presidential endorsement – and associated release of executive resources – 
which, under Aquino, had helped launch his own bid for Malacañang in 1992.55   
 
 
4.3.5 Joseph Ejercito Estrada (1998-2001) 
 
Ramos’ successor to the presidency, Joseph “Erap” Estrada, worked to establish his own 
network of supporters in the PNP and the AFP, favouring officers marginalised in the 
previous post-martial law administrations with plum posts.  In this regard, Estrada had forged 
a close alliance with Senators Enrile and Honasan, whose network of “mistahs” 
(cavaliers/classmates) from the Philippine Military Academy’s class of 1971, had been side-
lined under both Aquino and Ramos.  Notably, Estrada appointed Chief of Police Panfilo 
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Lacson as the director of the PNP, thus confirming a pattern of control by civilian politicians 
over coercive apparatuses of the state. Lacson, after all, had served as Estrada’s right-hand 
man in the Presidential Anti-Crime Commission (PACC) in the early 190s and is known to be 
a trusted lieutenant of the president.  Under Lacson, “parallel promotion of three classmates – 
Ruben Cabagnot, Tiburcio Fusilero, and Reynaldo Acop – to key PNP regional commands 
made them the most powerful cohort in the police”.56   
 
However, Estrada’s civilian political enemies proved equally astute in their cultivation of 
clients within the Philippine military and police.  Thus, when Estrada found himself 
increasingly besieged by popular protests in Manila and by the televised impeachment 
hearings in the House of Representatives in December 2000, the possibility of a military 
clampdown against these challenges to his presidency remained beyond reach.  Instead, with 
the prosecution walking out in protest from the Senate trial, the defection of civilian political 
allies from Estrada culminated with most of his cabinet resigning and joining street 
parliamentarians for a “People Power” showdown.  In the event, Estrada’s close allies in the 
military eventually abandoned their  president and commander-in-chief in the face of 
persistent pressures from influential businessman, politicians, and retired officers, and amidst 
signs of rapidly eroding support from the president among active AFP and PNP officers.57  
 
Thus, the ouster of Estrada from the presidential palace on 20 January 2001, and the 
simultaneous swearing in of his vice president, Gloria Macapagal Arroyo, to the highest 
political office of the land, saw an immediate changing of the guard in the military and police 
establishments.  First of all, AFP chief of staff Angelo Reyes, whose tenure had been 
extended by Estrada into the year 2002, had confirmed his timely resignation from the armed 
forces upon reaching official retirement age in March 2001.  Moreover, PNP director Panfilo 
Lacson promptly turned in his “courtesy” resignation and has been replaced by Leandro 
Mendoza as acting national police chief.  Finally, with all eyes focused on the May 2001 
legislative and local elections, the most important political battles ahead involve candidates 
associated with the new Macapagal Arroyo and old Estrada administrations, rather than the 
“word wars” and “coup talks” within military ranks.58   
 
As suggested by the following retrospective of the aborted Estrada administration, civilian 
political considerations have clearly continued to shape the broad contours of national 
security and law enforcement policies from the 1990s up to the early years of the new 
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century.  The much-touted modernisation programme to upgrade the armed forces’ 
operational capabilities after the closure of the U.S. military bases in the Philippines in 1992, 
for example, remained in virtual limbo under the tenure of Defence Secretary Orly Mercado. 
Despite legislation passed under the Ramos administration to implement such modernisation 
over a fifteen-year period, Estrada declared a one-year moratorium on government funding of 
this programme during his first month in office in 1998, citing more pressing problems 
because of the Asian financial crisis and the Philippine budget deficit.  Not until the 
following April 1999 did Manila earmark an initial $150 million toward this modernisation 
programme – “to supplement the 1999 defence budget, which had effectively been frozen at 
1998 levels in US-dollar terms”.59  Estrada waited until July 1999 before he “pledged to allot 
Php10 billion (approximately US$216 million) for the acquisition of military hardware and 
weaponry to speed up the modernisation of the poorly equipped Armed Forces,” with specific 
reference to the Philippine Air Force as the “initial beneficiary of the military upgrade.”60  
Although incidents in the South China Sea have provided an important backdrop to such 
pledges,61 the modest gains promised to the prioritised air force (still the smallest of the three 
services) pale against the political manoeuvring of Estrada and his supporters to introduce a 
new chapter in Philippine-U.S. “special relations” by way of the Visiting Forces Agreement 
(VFA), ratified by the Senate in Manila on 27 May 1999.62  The possibilities for politically 
and otherwise useful VFA spinoffs are presumably many – ranging from the investment in 
heavy infrastructure associated with developing harbour and airport facilities to the boost to 
local economies due to the influx of dollar-salaried servicemen and-women on rest and 
recreation.63 
 
Meanwhile, the AFP had been relegated to a comparatively circumscribed domestic role, to 
fight the insurgents and secessionist armed groups in the hinterlands. Whereas the National 
Democratic Front (NDF) declared an end to the peace talks with the Philippine government in 
1999 and added that “it expected fighting in the country to pick,”64 only pockets of NPA 
guerrillas remained in the mountains of Bicol, the Cordilleras, and in the rural hinterlands of 
“the Visayas island of Samar and the three southwestern provinces of Mindanao”.65  As the 
integration of former MNLF guerrillas in the armed forces proceeded apace, moreover, other 
armed Muslim groups have been confined to local pockets of influence, whether the small 
Abu Sayyaf, associated with terrorist tactics in Sulu and Basilan, or the much larger Moro 
Islamic Liberation Front (MILF), anchored in the backwater Mindanao provinces of 
Maguindanao, North Cotabato, and Sultan Kudarat.  In March 2000, Estrada launched an 
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“all-out” war against the Abu Sayyaf and the MILF, capturing about 40 of the latter’s camps, 
including its main base, Camp Abubakar.  Within a month of resuming the presidency in 
January 2001, however his successor, Gloria Macapagal Arroyo, ordered the suspension of 
military operations against the MILF so as to pave way for a new round of peace talks.66 
 
Finally, in the wake of the end of the Cold War and after the Senate vote blocking renewal of 
the Military Bases Agreement with the U.S. in 1991, the AFP had, for the first time, assumed 
responsibility for external defence.  Although the Mutual Defence Treaty of 1951 survived 
these far-reaching changes in Philippine-U.S. security relations, this agreement remains 
concerned with threats to either party stemming from “external armed attack in the Pacific” – 
thus precluding overt U.S. assistance in the Mindanao conflict and the Spratly Islands 
dispute.   
 
 
4.3.6 Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo (2001-2010) 
 
In 2001, a non-violent revolt inducted Arroyo as President after the aborted impeachment 
proceedings against Estrada.  Like in the 1986 People Power Revolt or EDSA I, the role 
played by the military was arguably crucial and resulted in some serious consequences for 
civil-military relations in the Philippines.  In July 2003, a group of junior officers led a 
mutiny against President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo protesting against widespread corruption 
in the AFP. Calling themselves the Magdalo group, the plotters took over the Oakwood Hotel 
in Makati City and declared their withdrawal of support from the president and commander-
in-chief claiming that they have exhausted all possible channels within the military institution 
to air their grievances and the mutiny was their last resort to be listened to.67 The mutiny 
failed but it revealed that some within the military system continue to harbour discontentment 
with civilian authorities.  
 
Largely due to the unwavering loyalty of military generals and the rest of the members of the 
armed forces, the Arroyo administration survived several more coup attempts.68  After the 
Oakwood Mutiny, the Feliciano Fact-Finding Commission was created to investigate the root 
causes and the issues behind it. Apart from the prevalent corruption within the AFP, the 
Commission reported the poor situation of soldiers in combat and widespread favouritism and 
politicisation of the military.69  The coup plot also highlighted the failure of the past 
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administrations to implement the recommendations proposed in the Davide Fact-Finding 
Commission report (see Section 4.3.3). The Feliciano Commission report endorsed to the 
government that legitimate grievances of the military must be given utmost attention, such as 
the improvement of the welfare of combat and non-combat personnel and to professionalise 
the military, in order to prevent future military adventurism.70 Soon after, President Arroyo 
embarked on some changes within the military system. Nevertheless, Hernandez argued that 
the failed mutiny showed that civil-military relations in the Philippines remained basically the 
same as that existing prior to 1986, which has an expanded military role including national 
development functions along with a weak civilian oversight institutions and poor socio-
economic conditions.71 
 
The involvement in internal conflicts is considered by the Philippine military force as a 
deviation from its main duty of developing its conventional military capabilities. From the 
standpoint of the AFP leadership, giving more importance to internal security problems 
diverts AFP’s endeavours toward the realisation of a self-reliant defence through pursuing 
modernisation projects.”72 Dissenters within the AFP warned that the military’s long-drawn-
out involvement in internal security prevents it from acquiring the air and maritime 
capabilities for a credible deterrent posture in the South China Sea.73 They added that the 
AFP might forget its training for territorial defence whilst its hardware (depreciated because 
of its constant use in counter-insurgency operations) might not perform optimally in 
conventional warfare. One defence analyst notes succinctly: “Whilst the AFP have made 
headway in reducing the communist and secessionist forces… these (successes) were 
achieved at the expense of an exponentially deteriorating capability to carry out even the 
most basic of territorial defence operations.”74 In addition, utilizing material continuously 
under “adverse combat conditions” causes excessive wear and tear on them, which 
effectively reduces their effectiveness and reliability.75 For instance, the Philippine Navy’s 
(PN) deployment of its patrol crafts in the counter-insurgency/counterterrorism operations in 
the southern Philippines reduces patrol visibility in other critical areas of the country. Hence, 
the incidence of intrusion of foreign vessels into the country’s territorial waters has 
increased.76 
 
Concerning the weak military capabilities of the AFP, the 2007 assessment report notes that 
the “PN lacks the assets for conduct of maritime patrols over territorial waters, since it does 
not have any anti-air capability and is incapable of conducting antisubmarine and mine 
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warfare operations.”77 It also outlines the Philippine Air Forces’ (PAF) inadequate air 
defence, surveillance, and air-lift and ground-attack capabilities. Clearly, it concludes that: 
“basic capabilities that enable the AFP to move, shoot and communicate are still wanting.” In 
2010, a group of ranking AFP officers admitted that the Philippine military’s aging 
equipment, limitations in combat readiness, logistic support, and inter-service operability 
hindered its potential for joint operations to combat external or traditional threats.78 Summing 
up, the report pessimistically and candidly states that the overall capability of the AFP to 
defend its territory remains inadequate.79 
 
In 2007, the AFP initiated a reform programme that aims to fundamentally transform the 
armed services so it can effectively respond to internal and external security challenges.80 It 
received a further boost from the DND memorandum on acquisition of defence material 
under the Capability Upgrade Programme (CUP) and the realignment of the purchasing 
process with that of the AFP’s mission.81 The urgent goal of the programme is to restore at 
least 70 per cent of the Philippine military’s capabilities for internal security affairs; and its 
long-term goal is to develop the Philippines’ territorial defence.82 
 
 
4.3.7  Benigno Simeon Aquino III (2010 - 2016): From Internal Security to Territorial 
Defence 
 
Upon assuming office in 2010, President Benigno Aquino III announced his intention to 
modernise the AFP, to buttress the country’s territorial defence, and to check China’s 
aggressive assertion of its sovereignty over the South China Sea.  During the welcoming 
ceremony for the incoming AFP Chief of Staff, General Ricardo David, President Aquino 
called on the military to defend democracy and be at the frontline of government reform.83 
Aquino asked his administration to revive and support the modernisation of the AFP, as well 
as ordered Defence Secretary Voltaire Gazmin to ensure that the modernisation programme 
becomes a means to intensify the military capabilities of the country.84 Furthermore, at his 
first state-of-the-nation address, Aquino proposed to rent out the Navy’s unused military 
reservations to private firms in order to raise US$100 million for the procurement of four new 
patrol vessels as part of the modernisation programme.85 
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Soon after, a joint DND-AFP task force formulated the AFP “Long-Term Capability 
Development Plan,” which appeals for the immediate shift of the policy from internal defence 
to external defence.86 The Long-Term Capability Development Programme of the Aquino 
administration provides a modest deterrent capability for territorial/maritime defence. It allots 
Php421 billion (an estimated US$8.5 billion) for a long-term capability upgrade with the 
bigger share of the defence budget allocated to the PAF and PN instead of the Philippine 
Army as per usual practice.87  The Air Force is expecting to acquire multi-role and lead-in 
fighter planes, surface attack aircraft, and long-range reconnaissance planes, while the Navy 
intends to procure multi-role attack vessels, offshore patrol craft, and surface-to-surface and 
surface-to-air missiles,88 as well as upgrade its materiel for joint maritime surveillance, 
defence and operations in the South China Sea.89  In tangible terms, the long-term capability 
plan has a blueprint of a three-year transition period “from full mission-capable ISO (internal 
security operation) to territorial defence capabilities.”90  
 
In the same vein, the Internal Peace and Security Plan (IPSP), released in January 2011, also 
stressed the importance of shifting the AFP direction from internal defence to external 
defence.91 While the IPSP recognises AFP’s capability to adequate perform its 
constitutionally mandated duty, the plan adheres to the long-term capability upgrade of 
developing the necessary capabilities within the three-year period.92 In the long run, the 
Philippine government wants to establish a modest but “comprehensive border protection 
programme” (including the country’s exclusive economic zone) that is anchored on the 
surveillance, deterrence, and border patrol capabilities of the PAF, the PN, and the Philippine 
Coast Guard.93 
 
However, the lack of financial support from the House of Representatives prevented the 
immediate implementation of the plan.  Nevertheless, the 2 March 2011 incident between a 
Philippine survey ship and two Chinese patrol boats at Reed Bank prompted the Aquino 
administration to redirect the country’s security focus.  The incident highlights the sensitivity 
of the territorial dispute in Philippine-China bilateral relations, and how it obscures the 
delicate balance of power in the areas contested, claimed in whole or part by the Philippines, 
China, Vietnam, Malaysia, Brunei, and Taiwan.94 The incident also triggered a strong 
clamour from the military and other government institutions for the allocation of resources to 
the development of AFP’s territorial defence capabilities.  When all diplomatic efforts to 
resolve the territorial row with China reached an impasse, the Philippines announced it would 
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upgrade the AFP’s outposts on the Spratly Islands; boost its military presence on the western 
island of Palawan near the disputed South China Sea; and allocate Php8 billion 
(approximately US$186 million) to acquire patrol boats and aircraft to safeguard its maritime 
boundaries.95 China’s heavy-handed behaviour in the South China Sea, as well as its 
uncompromising diplomatic posturing, further convinced the new administration of shifting 
AFP’s focus from internal security to territorial/maritime defence.  
 
 
4.4  The Armed Forces of the Philippines as Development Providers 
 
When Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo assumed the presidency in 2001, the military launched a 
‘new’ counter-insurgency programme called Bantay Laya (Freedom Watch).  This whole-of-
government approach increased the involvement of civilian agencies and other security 
institutions such as the police.96 The military was put in-charge of clearing and holding a 
community that was infiltrated by insurgents whilst national and local civilian agencies were 
tasked with proving the means to develop the area.  However, in reality, the military have 
often found themselves performing task related to the development phase of the campaign.  
Two factors have influenced this outcome:  First, the aim of the projects was to foster 
goodwill with the populace in order to expedite combat and intelligence operations.97 This 
led to the military taking initiative, directly implementing the projects themselves – even 
though they were supposed to only assist and provide support. Second, efficient service 
delivery (health, education, etc.) has always been a challenge in the far-flung areas of the 
country where governance failures are common.98 In such areas, the military usually come to 
represent the face of the government; the slow response and apathy of the civilian 
government often compel the military to fulfil the socioeconomic responsibilities of other 
government agencies.  
 
It is also worthwhile to examine the ramifications of civil-military relations at the local level.  
The relationship between local chief executive and military commanders, and their 
perceptions of each other on a wide range of issues (extent of communist threat, the loyalty of 
local leaders, the performance of the local government, etc.) affect the success of local 
counter-insurgency operations.99  These factors influence whether they would implement 
such projects with the assistance of civilian stakeholders. A critical coordinating institution is 
the local peace and order council, mandated by law as the venue where local security issues 
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are to be discussed and plan to address threats drawn up.  However, there has been a lack of 
due diligence when it comes to activating this mechanism.  The military has, in most 
instances, entered a community suspected of being under the influence of the insurgents 
without consultation with local authorities, causing enmity between civilian and military 
authorities.100  The lack of cooperation by local actors has also led to the unilateral 
assessment of a community’s needs by the military. This has often resulted in projects that do 
not meet the needs of the people. 
 
Nonetheless, there are exceptions to this trend.  Effective civil-military coordination for local 
peace and development has occurred in certain parts of the country.  In one province, for 
example, local officials took ownership of the counter-insurgency programme and the 
division of labour was well-respected.  Leadership that engendered cordial relations between 
stakeholders delivered positive results, with human development dramatically improving 
within a short period of time.101 
 
 
4.4.1 NADESCOM: A ‘Development Command’ (2007-2012) 
 
Even with the emphasis of civil-military relations, the Philippine government has tasked 
more development tasks to the military in recognition of their efficient implementation of 
civic action projects.  Since 2001, highly decorated retired military officials, who were 
actively involved in military projects and known for their field combats, have been assigned 
to key cabinet posts that are usually connected with defence and security.  In response to the 
government’s appreciation of the military’s capacity to undertake development missions 
whilst remaining engaged in internal security operations, the Department of National Defence 
(DND) and the AFP have made major institutional adjustments.  They have updated AFP 
doctrines to include civil-military principles as well as allotted resources and training toward 
the employment of non-traditional tactics such as building of infrastructures and socio-
economic activities.102 
 
The establishment of the National Development Support Command (NADESCOM) within 
the AFP in 2007 was part of this. Created as a functional command with a domain of 
operations spanning the entire archipelago, NADESCOM had been tasked to provide for the 
‘development of the capability to participate in the infrastructure projects of the 
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government.’103  A large of the NADESCOM was the Army’s Engineering Brigades. The 
NADESCOM’s objective was to support and assist the efforts of the military as well as the 
civilian government to improve conditions related to security and development.104 This 
would imply that it would not merely play a part in the internal security operations of the 
military but also the anti-poverty programmes of the civilian government.  
  
It can be noted that the scale of NADESCOM operation was wider compared to previous 
development support commands: it could conduct development projects in conflict, 
underdeveloped, and depressed areas.  From a legal point of view, this could be interpreted as 
going above and beyond the support-and-assist responsibility vested to the AFP by existing 
administrative regulations.105  This could, however, also be seen as a proactive step, since 
reducing poverty could help perception of its potential  contribution to economic welfare that 
was not found in any of the national government’s development plans.106 
 
The presence of NADESCOM characterised a shift in the military’s thinking, as it highlights 
the role of the AFP in development.  Its officials believed that they are not simply building 
infrastructure but also improving the people’s well-being.107  From their operation 
experiences, soldiers realised that structures built were often not utilised by the people, 
making counter-insurgency efforts unsustainable as localities ‘cleared’ from insurgency could 
potentially face security threats again.108  To confront this challenge, the NADESCOM had 
engaged on a comprehensive development programme with a package of infrastructure 
projects and socio-economic activities.109  Socio-economic initiatives included outreach 
programmes, skills development, nutrition, sanitation, livelihood training, values education, 
disaster relief, environmental conservation, development of cooperatives, etc.110  
 
NADESCOM development programmes were presented in two forms. First was through the 
Kalayaan Barangays (Free Communities) Programme that focused on conflict zones.  The 
beneficiaries of this programme were determined by the civilian government based on the 
assessment of the AFP’s Corps of Engineers. Whilst the DND and the Office of the 
Presidential Adviser on the Peace Process (OPAPP) oversaw the whole implementation, the 
information they gathered came from the military commanders assigned to conflict areas.  
OPAPP is the agency under the executive branch of the government, which takes charge of 
pursuing peace negotiations with rebel groups.111  They are also mandated to implement 
government programmes aimed at reducing conflict and promoting peace around the country.  
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The second programme was the Bayanihan sa Barangay (Cooperation in the Community), 
which permits the military to embark on development projects in communities anywhere in 
the country.112  National and local governments could enter contracts with NADESCOM for 
the delivery of services or the implementation of the government’s poverty reduction 
programmes.113  Private companies, foundations, non-government organisations, and even 
foreign donors could commission the NADESCOM to implement projects related to 
infrastructure, community outreach, livelihood, para-education, etc.114 
 
NADESCOM programmes were a break from the traditional role of defence.  The critical 
difference is in the balance of interaction between the military’s and the civilian institutions.  
Previously, the AFP had been engaged in development work with minimal civilian input or 
contribution.  Then, there was a shift to a clear demarcation of responsibilities between the 
two, with the military concentrating on combat operations.  The NADESCOM programmes 
rested between those two thrusts.  Although it engaged in development functions, there was a 
recognition that other government agencies have to be involved and a certain degree of 
civilian oversight provided.  The military saw itself as simply providing assistance to these 
efforts and not leading them. Despite its positive feedback, the NADESCOM was short-lived. 
In 2012, the programme was deactivated citing the need to restructure the FP under the 
Defence Planning Guidance 2013 to 2018.115   Upon its conclusion, NADESCOM was able 
to finish 1,800 projects including health centres, schools and farm to market roads.116  
OPAPP is expected then to handle the community development functions.  
 
 
4.5 Summary 
 
In the Philippine history, two momentous events are marked by noteworthy involvement of 
the military. The 1986 People Power Revolt or EDSA I, which eventually put an end to 
Martial Law, and the EDSA II Revolution that ousted President Estrada from power.  In 
EDSA I, military leaders Defence Secretary Juan Ponce Enrile and Philippine Constabulary 
Chief General Fidel Ramos openly defied Marcos to join the mass protests, while in EDSA 
II, Defence Secretary Orlando Mercado and AFP Chief of Staff Angelo Reyes withdrew their 
support from Estrada. Alagappa argues that in most development nations, the role of the 
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military includes non-traditional functions because it is assigned with issues related to 
politics, social, and economics, rather than just concentrating on traditional roles.117  
 
This chapter has examined the different defence and development policies initiated by the 
different post-World War II Philippine presidents starting from Ramon Magsaysay. It 
highlighted the tradition and non-traditional functions of the AFP through its mandate to 
protect the Philippine state, its people and territories, and participate in nation-building 
through development initiatives.118  From this mandate, it is clear that the AFP is both an 
implementer and participant of defence and development policies.  Whilst the National 
Defence Act of 1935 provides the external defence orientation of the AFP, it has also been 
directed to provide assistance in the maintenance of law and order and has consequently been 
involved in development and nation-building.119 
 
Does the Armed Forces of the Philippines perform new roles?  The discussion in this chapter 
says no.  The AFP has undertaken non-traditional military roles such as law enforcement 
activities and search and rescue operations along with its traditional duty of protecting the 
state’s territories since it was established. The AFP has been assisting the local government 
and other government agencies in disaster response, environmental awareness and protection, 
and anti-transnational crime activities. Furthermore, the AFP also participates in 
peacekeeping and humanitarian operations in countries such as East Timor and Haiti.  This 
chapter also cited the example of NADESCOM, a development command of the AFP, tasked 
to support civic action projects.   
 
In recent years, the education and training programmes and equipment acquisitions of AFP 
have been reviewed and upgraded to be more oriented toward the building of capabilities so 
its personnel can respond to both traditional and non-traditional security concerns. The AFP 
Modernisation Programme of 1995 and 2010 is crafted to bring the AFP to the same level of 
development as its neighbouring countries. This programme along with the National Defence 
Security Plan 2011-2016 and the Internal Peace and Security Plan of 2010 will be the subject 
in Chapter 5.  
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Chapter 5 
From Policy to Practice: Delivering the Philippines’ 
Defence-Development Paradigm 
 
 
5. 1  Introduction 
 
As the main security institution of a country, militaries around the world have performed 
duties outside of their defence functions. Their tasks have expanded from maintaining peace 
and order to including nation-building, economic development, the provision of disaster 
relief, and engaging in efforts to conserve natural resources.1  Looking at these extra 
functions, the Philippines armed forces are no different in performing non-traditional roles.  
For years, the country has borne the effects of lingering internal conflicts (e.g. insurgency, 
political instability and underdevelopment), and as a result, has sought to reinforce the 
linkage between development and security, a connection evident long before scholars and 
policymakers paid attention to the existence of a ‘security-development nexus’.2 Situated in 
the western part of the Pacific Ocean, the Philippines is no stranger to natural disasters.  The 
country lies in what is called “the ring of fire” and is visited on average by 19 to 20 typhoons 
every year. The Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP) is one of the key institutions, which 
has been at the forefront of the campaign in tackling these domestic challenges. As part of 
their pursuit to act on this, the AFP has embarked on ‘non-traditional’ missions, often called 
‘civic action’, which involves carrying out projects aimed at contributing to the economic 
development of communities within conflict zones and those affected by disasters.   
 
To a certain extent, the mixture of economic activities with combat operations has, 
characterised the military’s different campaigns such as counterterrorism and counter-
insurgency.  Involvement in economic functions has been justified on the grounds that it is 
critical to ‘winning the hearts and minds’ of those living on the front lines, supporting the 
military’s role in nation-building.3  Whilst the primary responsibility of the AFP is the 
“protection of the people and State” as stipulated in Section 4 of the 1987 Philippine 
Constitution, the implementation of development projects, such as environmental protection, 
disaster response and community engagement, is consistent with this mandate.  Similarly, in 
zones of insecurity and violence, the armed forces are semi-equipped with apparatus needed 
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for logistical capability to build roads, schools, health facilities and other basic 
infrastructures.  
 
The consequence of relying on the military to carry out development projects has however 
been a matter of some debate.  The scholarly literature on defence and development cautions 
that the divergence from the external-defence role could strain the military’s professionalism, 
and weaken its competency in the core role of war fighting.4  Another concern is that the 
military’s involvement in these unconventional tasks could increase its political autonomy 
which could potentially undermine democratic civilian control.5  Equally important, such 
engagement might lead to citizens being unable to differentiate between military and civilian-
government roles with respect to security and development.6 In fact, as described in the 
previous chapter, the AFP has been involved in civil society, most evidently during Martial 
Law.  Although this changed when a democratic system was restored after the 1986 People 
Power Revolution and the 1987 Constitution eventually put in place, remnants of military 
involvement in civilian matters still exist until today. A case in point is that out of the 13 
individuals appointed as Secretary of the Department of National Defence (DND) post-
Marcos era, eight were former generals of the AFP or Philippine National Police (PNP) 
chiefs.7  Nevertheless, the role of the armed forces cannot be undermined in the many 
responsibilities of the national government provided it is within the bounds of the 
Constitution and policy framework.  
 
Whilst Chapter 3 looks at the security policies promoted by the different Philippine 
presidents starting from Ramon Magsaysay to the administration of Benigno Aquino, Chapter 
4 highlights the three policies endorsed by President Aquino and discusses how these policies 
are implemented to emphasise the role of the armed forces in nation-building. Chapter 5 
argues that the military’s participation in Philippine development programmes can be 
described by two factors.  First, the resolution of domestic political crises through military 
intervention has provided the armed forces with leverage to (re)engage in non-traditional 
tasks and security policymaking vis-à-vis civilian institutions without sacrificing their 
traditional roles.  Second, the increasing significance of the comprehensive security concept 
has provided the military with a framework to validate its continued engagement with 
development activities.    Non-traditional missions can have a positive impact on national 
security if good governance and effective civilian oversight of security institutions exist.  
Security sector reforms aimed at promoting military professionalism and norms related to 
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transparency, accountability, respect for human rights and the rule of law, etc., could address 
the challenging consequences stemming from the expansion of the military’s functions along 
the security-development frontier.   
 
The purpose of this study is to evaluate the contribution of the Philippine defence sector to 
national development, and, in turn, comprehensive security. The succeeding sections discuss 
how three Philippine policies, identified in Chapter 1 and further explained in Chapter 3, are 
being implemented to enhance both defence and development.  These policies were chosen to 
represent the conceptual framework because it involves the four comprehensive security 
concepts of defence industry, counter-terrorism and counter-insurgency, civil-military 
relations during natural disasters and anti-trafficking, which this dissertation is analysing. The 
policies are namely, the AFP Modernisation Act of 1995 and the revised Act of 2010, 
Internal Peace and Security Plan of 2010, and the National Security Policy 2011-2016.  
 
 
5.2   From Policy to Practice 
 
With defence and development at its core, the conceptual framework (Figure 1.3 in Chapter 
1) illustrates the policy, process and performance exercised by the Philippine security system 
to protect its citizens from any harm to their well-being, and, indeed, to promote that well-
being. Thus, to be explicit, a major overarching aim of the three policies within the 
conceptual framework is to improve development levels through enhanced civil-military 
integration. The first such policy is the AFP Modernisation Programme of 1995 or Republic 
Act 9878 (RA 9878) and its subsequent revision, Republic Act 10349 of 2010, encompass 
doctrinal approaches to development, education and training, equipment and force structuring 
designed to bring the Philippine Armed Forces to the same level of development as its 
neighbouring countries. Since passage of the policy, the Armed Forces have put the 
modernisation programme at the centre of their initiatives to improve capabilities.   
 
The push to modernise the AFP came in the early 1990s after the United States had 
withdrawn its military bases in the Philippines when the Senate voted against it.8 The AFP 
Modernisation Programme (AFPMP), which was to be implemented through the DND, was 
approved on 23 February 1995 as a legal and policy framework9 to “modernise the AFP to a 
level where it can fully and effectively perform its constitutional mandate of upholding the 
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sovereignty and preserving the patrimony of the Republic.”10  To fulfil this mandate, five 
principal thrusts were identified, which focused on the development of structure, personnel, 
and doctrines. The modernisation programme comprised five components namely: (1) 
capability, material and technology; (2) bases and support system development; (3) human 
resource development; (4) doctrinal development, and; (5) force restructuring and 
organisational development.11 The programme was given a PhP331.62 billion (approximately 
US$7.51 billion) budget broken down into two sub-programmes: Sub-program 1 has a budget 
of Php164.55 billion (approximately US$ 3.73 billion) whilst Sub-programme 2 has a budget 
of Php167 billion (approximately US$ 3.80 billion). This was also distributed in tranches. 
Php50 billion (approximately US$ 1.13 billion) to implement the first five years of the 
AFPMP, Php74.2 billion (approximately US$ 1.68 billion) for the second year, and Php37.6 
billion (approximately US$ 852 million) on the third year, whilst the remaining five years is 
Php2.8 billion (approximately US$ 63.5 million).12 
 
R.A.7898 stipulated parameters to limit the effect of hefty military spending in the country. 
The first set of parameters is that AFPMP allocation will not hamper the basic economic and 
social services provided by the government. As such, the DND was required to make the 
programme sustainable by creating its own trust fund. The AFP Modernisation Act Trust 
fund was to be sourced from the defence budget; proceeds from the sale, lease or joint 
development of military bases and reservations;13  shares from the proceeds of the sale of 
military camps; proceeds from the Government Arsenal (GA); proceeds from the disposal of 
excess AFP assets; funds from the budgetary surplus; proceeds from the Malampaya Natural 
Gas field; and all interest of the trust fund.14 
 
The second set of parameters guarantee the economic and technological benefits to the 
country from AFP acquisitions. The programme intends to be able to decrease foreign 
exchange outflow, contribute to local job generation, and increase technology transfer to the 
Philippines. With this, the DND has to ensure that the programme offers Filipino contractors 
and suppliers an advantage, or foreign contractors and suppliers willing and able to locate a 
substantial portion of production in the Philippines; incorporates in each contract/agreement 
provisions for countertrade, in-country manufacture, co-production schemes or other 
innovative arrangements; and includes in the contract the transfer to the AFP of principal 
technology involved for the operation and maintenance of the equipment.15 
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The main components of the modernisation programme are the capability, materiel and 
technology development (CMTD) that covers the purchase of appropriate weapons systems 
and technology and its upgrade and maintenance.16 At 89%, CMTD gets the biggest portion 
of the total AFPMP budget, whilst the rest of the amount is distributed among the following: 
bases support system development (BSSD), human resource development, doctrine 
development, and force restructuring and organisational development.17 In 2007, from the 
total Php33.5 billion funds (approximately US$ 728.27 million), Php25.96 billion 
(approximately US$ 545.57 million) went to CMTD.18  
 
Unfortunately, the Asian 1997 financial crisis negatively impacted the programme, whereby 
financial investments in the country were greatly reduced. Funding for modernisation was 
austerely challenged. In 1998, with the advent of increased Moro separatist activity in 
Mindanao, the AFP shifted priorities from external defence to internal security, which also 
shifted the priorities of the modernisation programme to enhance Internal Security Operations 
(ISO) capabilities.19 The Revised Re-prioritised Project List (RRPL) was approved in 2004 
based on the project lists identified in the years 2001 and 2002 (see Appendix J).20  
 
The implementation period of R.A. 7898 expired on December 2010 without any significant 
progress in terms of modernising AFP capabilities. What was pursued instead was the 
upgrading of basic capabilities to bring these back to acceptable levels of readiness.21  
However, of the total amount of Php331 billion approved for the fund requirements of the 
programme, only Php35 billion was used for the capability upgrade programme of the AFP 
for internal operations. In the July 2011 report released by the Office of the Deputy Chief of 
Staff for Plans, J5, only 317 projects or 59.36 per cent were completed from the 534 planned 
projects. Appendix J shows on-going projects under R.A. 7898.  
 
When the term of the R.A. 7898 ended in 2010, President Aquino supervised the passage of 
the Revised AFP Modernisation Act, known as R.A. 10349, amending the 1995 AFP 
Modernisation Act and extending the AFP’s modernisation for another 15 years. The aim is 
to develop the Philippines’ minimum deterrence capability as well as its domain awareness 
across contested waters within the Philippines’ exclusive economic zone (EEZ).22  The AFP 
Modernisation Act has served as the primary source of funds for procurements to augment 
the AFP’s capabilities, whilst the annual defence budget has largely been dedicated to 
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compensation of personnel and maintenance of existing defence hardware. In his first three 
years in office, President Aquino allocated US$648.44 million to modernising the AFP. In 
2013, there was a 17% increase in defence spending, wherein US$1.73 billion was allocated 
for defence procurement in the period 2013-2017. Not surprising though that the significant 
increase in defence spending and procurement funds came on the heels of a Philippine-China 
standoff over the Scarborough Shoal and the Philippines’ subsequent decision to initiate 
compulsory arbitration vis-à-vis territorial disputes in the South China Sea.  
 
The Philippine economy has shown high GDP growth rates since 2012, averaging over 6 per 
cent growth, and if there is ever a time for Manila to invest in boosting its military capability, 
it is now. From $1.24 billion in 2004 to $3.29 billion in 2014,23 the Philippines made a 180 
per cent increase in its defence expenditures (See Figure 5.2). The percentage of growth may 
appear high, but decades of habitual non-investment mean that the increase hardly scratches 
the surface. In the late 1980s, the Philippines realized that its armed forces were inferior to its 
ASEAN neighbours in military equipment; worse, it found itself ill-equipped to contain the 
threats plaguing internal and external security. Likewise, several domestic political (e.g. 
corruption) and economic (e.g. Asian financial crisis) challenges have made it challenging to 
modernise the AFP on a large-scale.24  
 
Figure 5.1: Philippine Military Expenditure in US$ million (1998-2014) 
 
Source: Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI) Military Expenditure Database, 2014. 
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In his 2013 State of the Nation Address (SONA), President Aquino restated his desire to 
upgrade the capabilities of the AFP, but, cautioned it will not be easy due to budgetary 
constraints. Aquino said, “Building a minimum credible defence posture is not something we 
can take lightly. Do we follow others who prioritize the possession of a nuclear option at the 
expense of everything else? I do not think anyone would agree. We will balance our needs. 
We are committed to meeting the needs of our society, whilst remaining a good and 
upstanding member of the community of nations.”25 With AFP’s very limited annual budget, 
most of the money goes to the salaries and allowances of its personnel rather than to 
capability upgrades.26 When democracy was restored in 1987, the newly adapted Constitution 
prohibits the Congress and Senate from a allocating more funds to defence than for 
education. Since then, the minimum credible defence is a concept that has become popular in 
the public debate, but not clearly defined even by military officials. Some in the DND simply 
associate minimum credible defence with the acquisition of new military equipment and the 
improvement of military infrastructure as deterrence from external threats. Defence Secretary 
Voltaire Gazmin sees it as “an effective force presence inside the Philippines and its 
exclusive economic zone (EEZ) with exhibited competence to defend the country and protect 
its national interests if and when the need arises.”27 Similarly, DND Chief of Staff Dr Peter 
Paul Galvez defines it as “a relative level of capability that would make someone think 
twice.”28 Others, such as Brigadier General Aying, Deputy Chief of Staff for Plans and 
Programmes of the AFP, believe strategic direction is a crucial component of this effort.29 
 
The second Defence-Development policy observed in this study is the Internal Peace and 
Security Plan (IPSP) or “Bayanihan”, implemented in January 2011, and calls for a multi-
stakeholder approach in the pursuit of security and the protection of civil liberties.  The IPSP 
reflects the security thrusts espoused by Aquino, which involves four elements: governance, 
delivery of basic services, economic reconstruction, and security sector reform.  IPSP was 
crafted to provide strategic guidance for the AFP whilst performing its mandated functions.  
To assure its success, IPSP was anchored on two strategic approaches: The ‘Whole of Nation 
Approach’ and the ‘People-Centred Security/Human Security Approach’.30  The former is the 
framework that will guide how the AFP implements IPSP. Rather than simply defeating the 
enemy, ‘winning the peace’ provides the framework for the new IPSP approach.31  This is a 
shift from a predominantly militaristic solution to a people-centred strategy based on broad-
based consultations and strong partnerships with key stakeholders.32  The human security 
concept has several components: economic security, food security, health security, 
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environmental security personal security, community security, and political security requiring 
the entire government bureaucracy, private and public sectors, to implement collectively.33 
State security complements human security.34  IPSP aims to concretise the idea of putting 
human security at the core of the AFP’s plan and this signifies the intent of placing the people 
at the centre of its activities.   
 
Contained in the IPSP are four strategic concepts that contribute to the three areas focused in 
this study. The first concept is for the AFP to Contribute to the Permanent and Peaceful 
Closure of all Armed Conflict by observing the primacy of the peace process and supporting 
peace-building initiatives such as reconstruction and rehabilitation projects in conflict-
affected areas.35  The second concept is the Conduct of Focused Military Operations against 
armed threat groups by employing distinct methodologies to engage the New People’s Army 
(NPA), the Moro International Liberation Front (MILF), the Abu Sayyaf Group (ASG), and 
other threat groups.36 The third concept is to Support Community-based Peace and 
Development Efforts, which focuses on securing and bringing peace and development to 
conflict-affected communities.37 The AFP shall also contribute in supporting community 
development activities through the building of basic social infrastructure.38 The fourth 
concept is to Carry Out Security Sector Reform (SSR) in the AFP with the objectives to 
develop capability, professionalise the military ranks, and engage the stakeholders in AFP-
initiated activities.39 These strategic concepts significantly relate to the areas of practice 
identified in the conceptual framework. The first three concepts tackle the counter-
insurgency/counterterrorism efforts and non-traditional security, whilst, the fourth concept 
engages defence industrialisation.  The very domestic nature of this plan underscores the 
army-centric character of the Philippine armed forces.  
 
The third Defence-Development policy is the National Security Policy.  The policy aims to 
identify strategic priorities to establish the right balance in the “guns or butter” debate for the 
allocation of scarce resources, and to establish the prioritization between defence and 
development.40  Like the IPSP, the National Security Policy (2011-2016) looks at four key 
elements: governance; delivery of basic services; economic reconstruction and sustainable 
development; and security sector reform.41 Moreover, the policy is anchored in two security 
goals: (1) Promote internal socio-political stability and (2) Equip the Philippines to exercise 
full sovereignty over its territory and to provide protection to its maritime and other strategic 
interests.42  In his 2011 State of the Nation Address (SONA), President Aquino announced 
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that the acquisition of state-of-the-art vessels, aircrafts, and weapons for the military, police 
and other uniformed personnel were in motion.43  Likewise, he stated that the enhanced 
capacity of law enforcement agencies had resulted in increased efficiency and effectiveness 
of arrests, convictions, and prevention of crimes, transnational included.44  In addition, he 
reported of the improved morale and welfare of soldiers and law enforcers due to 
programmes implemented by the government, as well as an increase in the defence budget to 
include military modernisation.45  
 
Having described how the national policies were fit to realise a Philippine comprehensive 
security framework, the subsequent sections will analyse how these policies are implemented 
both at the national and local levels.  
 
 
5.3  Development Implications of the Philippine Armed Forces Modernisation 
 
Figure 5.2: Evaluating policies through the Defence Industrialisation Framework 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: Adapted from the conceptual framework in Figure 1.3. 
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1947,46 the Military Assistance Programme (MAP) of 1947,47 and the Mutual Defence Treaty 
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forming a tri-service armed forces on 4 October 1947 composed of the Army, Navy and Air 
Force. However, the threat posed by communist insurgents forced the AFP to deploy 26 
combat battalion teams for counter-insurgency operations.49 As a consequence, the AFP 
became largely army-centred focused on combatting internal concerns and  through the 
MDT, the AFP's conventional military function was limited to occasional participation in the 
Southeast Asia Treaty Organisation (SEATO)50 military exercises and joint exercises with 
American forces in Philippine territory.51 This understanding steered to a post-independence 
state where the U.S. forces took charge of territorial defence, whilst the AFP was responsible 
for internal security operations. 
 
The early 1970s, however, saw the Philippine government make an attempt to develop some 
capabilities for an autonomous defence posture. However with the Moro secessionism in 
Mindanao, and the general reluctance of the U.S. to provide the AFP with counter insurgency 
weapons made the Philippine government realise that it would have to supply its own armed 
forces with the necessary hardware for internal defence.52  As eloquently rallied by President 
Ferdinand Marcos in 1974:  
 
“We taught and we have learned our lessons well that we should never build 
our defences on the shifting sands of mutual defence agreements, and it is time 
we build it on firmer foundations. For whilst we have faith in our allies, we 
should not be completely dependent upon them. For whilst we believe in their 
courage and their capability, they also have their own national interest that 
may sometime conflict with ours. For in matters of defence the guarantee of 
friends can be modified to suit their needs and interest, as the history of 
nations vividly show.”53  
 
As such began the pursuit of developing an independent defence system depending entirely 
on the Philippines’ capabilities and resources. The AFP, specifically the army, began 
acquiring various non-American-made weapon systems and equipment in line with its 
organizational expansion.54 This was the Philippine government's first major step towards 
achieving an autonomous defence capability, as the programme was aimed at enabling the 
AFP to conduct defensive operations in any low- to medium-level conflict without relying on 
its western ally.55 
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The Self-Reliant Defence Posture (SRDP), through the enactment of Presidential Decree 415, 
took the development of a domestic defence industry as its objective. The programme 
envisioned the attainment of local production capability for war materiel whilst conserving 
foreign exchange and, in the process, spurs industrial and economic growth.56 The 
fundamental concept was to produce locally, when feasible, materiel for the Philippines 
armed forces through partnership between the military and civilian establishments, whilst 
those materials that cannot be sourced domestically will be imported with the eventual goal 
of acquiring the technology for the production of these materiel.57 Utmost to this purpose is 
the significant role of the military and government agencies of providing technical and 
financial assistance to civilian defence manufacturers. Achieving this objective and effective 
implementation involved the establishment of the Joint Staff for Materiel Development and 
its implementing arm, the Research and Development Centre. Project managers were also 
designated to manage the various projects. Considered as the first major step in the AFP 
capability upgrade, the government allocated US$ 25M to support research and development 
of the Philippine Army capabilities.58 Collaboration between the DND and the Department of 
Science and Technology (DOST) provide the network for the support of the programme, 
which also included the Department of Trade and Industry (DTI), Department of Finance and 
the University of the Philippines (UP).59 To pump prime the defence industry, an annual 
appropriation of at least Php100 Million (approximately US$5.9 million) was legislated,60 
which afforded the necessary monetary backing to support defence-related research and 
development projects. Having the proper support structure is important to attract defence 
companies to invest. Officials of the Defence department commissioned SRDP projects with 
the arsenal facility of the government and local manufacturers, encouraging the use of 
indigenous resources and production capability to equip the AFP so that it could perform its 
“basic functions to move, shoot, communicate, and survive, free from external intervention 
and influence.”61 
 
 
Initially, the SRDP programme was successful in affording a medium for the development of 
the industry whilst meeting its basic requirements for materiel.  One programme of note 
involved the production of Simba Armoured Fighting Vehicles (AFV), which was a joint 
venture between GKN Defence, a unit of British automotive and industry group and 
Philippine-based Asian Armoured Technologies Corporation. The AFP ordered 150 Simbas 
of which eight were delivered fully built, whilst the remaining 142 AFVs were assembled in 
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the Philippines under a countertrade arrangement.62 Other projects included domestic 
production of small arms, radios, and assorted ammunition. In 1974, the Elisco Tool 
Manufacturing Company was given the task of producing 150,000 M16s (Models 613 and 
653P) under licence from Colt,63 which provided a turnkey plant and actual production began 
in 1982 with an additional contract for 60,000 rifles subsequently included.64  Other SRDP 
projects included mortar production (the manufacture of 81mm mortar tubes began in 1974 
and 60mm tubes in 1977); a MKII hand grenade was produced by 1978; and 5.56mm 
ammunition began to be produced by Government Arsenal (GA) in 1983. M16 rifle 
production was also accompanied by the manufacturing of various accessories, for example, a 
company called El Oro made M16 bayonets.65 In an interview with GA Director Jonathan 
Martir, he stated “the SRDP not only increased Philippine self-reliance, but also cut costs, 
provided jobs, and saved much-needed foreign-exchange funds.”66  
 
In the early years of SRDP, some 15 defence companies participated in supplying military 
hardware to the AFP. However, more than forty years later, the programme has failed to 
achieve any of its objectives. Most of the defence companies, which were part of the SRDP, 
had difficulty sustaining its business operation, therefore had to close down, because of 
insufficient defence acquisition budgets, graft, corruption, inflation and a lack of support 
from the national leadership. These conditions were exposed in the 2003 Philippine-U.S. 
Joint Defence Assessment Report, which reviewed, among others, the counter-insurgency 
strategy used by the Philippine Armed Forces.67 In a presentation attended by the author, 
Major General Guillermo Molina, former Deputy Chief of Staff for Plans and Programmes of 
the AFP, shared the result of a Defence Capability Assessment and Planning System 
(DCAPS) of the DND which revealed the AFP’s limited capabilities for territorial defence 
because it can only provide limited coverage making Philippine air space vulnerable to air 
intrusions.68  
 
 
5.3.2  Development of Defence Production  
 
The Philippines has a very modest domestic arms industry, although interest in the production 
of small arms, ammunitions, and munitions has been around since at least 1917.  A series of 
measures was proposed for the creation of a local arms industry prior to independence, but all 
failed to pass until the enactment of Republic Act 1884 (R.A. 1884) – an Act establishing a 
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Government Arsenal – signed in 1957. This declared that it was government policy “to 
achieve within reasonable time self-sufficiency in small arms, mortars, and other weapons, 
ammunitions for these weapons, and other munitions for the use of the military 
establishment.”69 It also mandated the creation of a government arsenal for the purpose. 
 
~ Micro-industrial Analysis 
 
The result of R.A. 1884 was the establishment of state-run arsenal located 120km north of 
Manila, within 370 hectares of land, in the province of Bataan.70 The Government Arsenal 
(GA) designs and manufactures small arms, mortars, other weapons and ammunition for 
these weapons, and other munitions for use by the AFP and the PNP.71  It produced its first 
small arms cartridge in August 1971. However, it was not during the onset of Martial Law in 
1974 when GA began to manufacture integrated small arms ammunition.72 
 
Today, GA retains its role as the major supplier to the AFP and the PNP. Under government 
regulations enacted in April 2000, GA is charged with developing “capabilities to enhance 
self-sufficiency in the country’s defence requirements. Towards this end, the GA shall be 
effectively used in the production of basic weapons, ammunitions and other munitions for the 
use by the AFP and PNP.”73 GA’s mandate further allows it to use its production facilities to 
arrange joint ventures, co-production or similar arrangements with ‘local and foreign 
entities’.74  The GA was originally envisioned to be a centre for defence industries to meet 
domestic requirements and supply the world market but due to the constraints of existing 
laws in the early 1980s, such possibility did not conceive.75 However, under R.A. 7898 and 
the regulations described above, GA is permitted to export arms produced “in excess of AFP 
and PNP requirements.”76  
 
The GA has four major production plants, namely, the case and bullet plant (cases and 
bullets); the primer plant (boxer primers); the propellant plant (propellant powders); and the 
cartridge assembly plant (loads and assembles the different components into finished 
cartridges).77  Supporting its production lines, the GA is stocked with the machine shop (for 
fabrication of punches, dies, gages and machine parts); metallic link belt shop (metal links for 
cartridge linkage); carpentry shop (fabrication of tooling, gages, and other measuring devices; 
proof house (ballistics-test of in-process and finished products); and physical and chemical 
lab (inspection-test of metallic raw materials, chemicals, components and finished 
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products).78 These are in addition to the power and water utilities, a three-level 
communications system, an industrial safety/security network and several welfare service 
facilities that include a 25-bed secondary hospital.79  
 
In April 1998, the PNP’s Firearms and Explosives Division (FED) recorded 45 legal 
manufacturers of small arms, 533 authorised dealers and 133 gun repair shops in the 
country.80 Among the private players, one of the biggest is the Arms Corporation of the 
Philippine (Armscor), which claims to be the “largest arms and ammunition manufacturer in 
Southeast Asia and is present in over 60 countries.”81 Whilst selling to the PNP and to some 
extent the AFP, the principal market of Armscor is the civilian gun market, in the Philippines 
and abroad.82 In ASEAN, Armscor is the biggest supplier of ammunition for the Royal Thai 
Army, Royal Thai Navy, and Royal Thai Police.83  In 1905, two British gentlemen Roy 
Squires and William Bingham opened a printing company in Manila called Squires Bingham, 
Co, which was later bought by an American named Arthur Hileman, who then converted the 
place to a general merchandise store.84 In 1941, Filipino businessman Don Celso Tuason 
bought the company, then turned it into firearms and ammunition manufacturing company 
when the Second World War broke out and import and foreign exchange were restricted.85 
License to manufacture firearms and ammunition was then granted by President Elpidio 
Quirino in 1952.86 The company was eventually re-organised into Arms Corporation of the 
Philippines, during which time, Don Celso had turned over the management of the 
corporation to his three sons: Demetrio, Butch, and Severo.87 In 2012, Don Demetrio retired 
as Chair and passed the baton to his son Martin.88 When the younger Tuason took over the 
reins from his father, Armscor has already established two offices in the United States – one 
in Nevada called the Armscor Precision International and the Armscor Cartridge (importer f 
of ammunition cases and bullets from Armscor Philippines). 
 
Two of the newer players include United Defence Manufacturing Corporation (UDMC) and 
FERFRANS Specialities.  UDMC, owned and led by Mr Gene Carino, provides assault rifles, 
special-purpose rifles and precision rifles to the PNP, AFP, Philippine Coast Guard, among 
others. Situated in the vicinity of Parañaque City, one of the cities that make up Metro 
Manila, the manufacturing plant of UDMC houses their research, development, prototyping, 
and production units.89    FERFRANS is a firearms and ammunition manufacturer based in 
Cebu City in the Philippines, which was established in 1997. The company owned by 
brothers Ferdinand and Francis Sy provides weapons for the PNP and the AFP. It was the 
151 
 
operational requirements of the PNP Special Action Force and specialised military units in 
the US that motivated FERFRANS to design and develop its products.90  
 
As shown in Table 5.1, Armscor, among the respondents, employs the largest number of 
employees at 1,200 employees, who work in its Philippines factory alone to satisfy the 80% 
export demand of its products. The smallest company of the respondents is FERFRANS with 
only 10 employees, who give service support to their clients in the Philippines and Asia.91  
 
Table 5.1: Company Size 
Company Year Established Ownership Number of Employees 
Government Arsenal 1970 Philippine - Public 500-1000 
UDMC 2006 Philippine - Private Less than 250 
FERFRANS 1997 Philippine -  Private 10 
Armscor 1930 Philippine - Private 1200 
Source: Fieldwork and survey of Philippine defence companies in August 2013. 
 
 
Of the four respondents, only the GA revealed their annual turnover for 2008-2013, although 
the rest did mention during the interview that they did well in the years stipulated. Table 5.2 
reveals that there has been a rise in the GA’s revenue since 2008. In 2013, GA reported an 
annual turnover of 23 million rounds, which is a 17% increase from the 19 million rounds 
recorded in 2012. This can be attributed to the Philippine government’s sense of urgency to 
modernize its military capability largely involving the South China Sea issue.  
 
Table 5.2: Annual Turnover (Production output in million rounds), 2008-2013 
2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 
9.30 15.00 15.30 18.36 19.00 23.00 
Source: Interview with Roger Gamban, Chief Strategic Management Office and Chief Liaison Officer, 
Government Arsenal in August 2013. 92  
 
As mentioned earlier, trajectory of the Armscor Company is gearing towards an overseas 
market where 80 per cent of its products are exported. The older Tuason said that it took 
around 40 years for Armscor to break into the American market.93 When the younger Tuason 
took over the U.S. sales in the early 2000s, Armscor sales broke $800,000 and within two 
years, sales were up by $2.5 million.94 Correspondingly, this foreign market view is also 
shared by the two other private companies mainly to keep the business afloat.  Although the 
three private companies participate in government biddings and do get orders, the AFP and 
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PNP largely buy their supplies from the GA, which primarily was established to support the 
small arms needs of the military and law enforcers. Aside from the Philippine government, 
Figure 5.3 shows the types of customers the four companies cater to.  
 
Figure 5.3: Types of Customers 
 
 
Source: Fieldwork and survey of Philippine defence companies in August 2013. 
 
 
All the respondent companies reported having the Philippine armed forces and national police 
as their buyers. Except for the GA, three of the respondent companies revealed having mixed 
customers, who are largely foreign governments.  100% of GA’s goods go to the AFP and 
PNP.95 FERFRANS provides weapons for the PNP and AFP, as well as several police units 
in the United States, and several countries including Malaysia, Indonesia, and Peru.96 
Although both Armscor and FERFRANS have offices in the United States to support their 
clients based there, only Armscor sells its products to private individuals, whilst FERFRANS 
wants to concentrate in supporting law enforcement and military personnel. In April 2013 
UDMC sent a letter inviting President Aquino to visit and see what the company could do for 
the armed forces in line with the modernisation efforts.97 A month later, General Chito 
Dizon, head of the President Security Group (PSG) inspected the units to see if the UDMC 
rifles meet the requirements of the PSG’s Special Reaction Unit. The General said that if the 
rifles pass further testing, the PSG will place an order for the elite unit. This is a welcome 
respite for Mr Cariño, who could only look as the country’s military and police forces buy 
rifles and other weapons from abroad. A provision in the Procurement Law (Republic Act 
9184) disqualifies companies such as UDMC from submitting a bid for government contracts 
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for assault rifles. At the July 2015 Congress review of the AFP Modernisation, it was 
revealed by Assistant Secretary Patrick Velez of the DND’s Finance, Acquisitions, 
Installations, Logistics Office that there is a need to amend the law because it is not 
conducive for defence procurement and does not support small players.98  Not all defence 
materiel are completely off-the-shelf, that is why, it is difficult to provide and establish 
baseline for procurement. Items such as life-cycle cost and enhance capability are not given a 
premium as far as R.A. 9184 is concerned. Meanwhile, to increase publicity for the company, 
Armscor and UDMC are frequent exhibitors in defence trade fairs in the Philippines. 
Furthermore, the latter is an active user of the social media such as Facebook and Twitter.  
 
~ Human Resource Development 
 
Human resource is an important facet of the defence industry. With the help of education 
institutions - higher learning and vocational institutes – skills and capabilities in specific 
areas in defence and security industries are developed and upgraded. Figure 5.4 shows the 
educational background of the employees of the companies surveyed. 
 
Figure 5.4: Educational Background of Employees 
 
 
Source: Fieldwork and survey of Philippine defence companies in August 2013. 
 
More than 45% of the employees of the companies surveyed are graduates of vocational 
schools, followed by university graduates who comprise almost 27.75%. This is a reflection 
of the employees’ roles in the company as shown in Figure 5.5. 
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Figure 5.5: Roles of Employees in the Company 
 
 
Source: Fieldwork and survey of Philippine defence companies in August 2013. 
 
Figure 5.5 shows that 57.6% of the employees of the companies surveyed are involved in the 
operation of plants. As these companies are manufacturing in nature, the technical nature of 
the job indicates that companies prefer workers who have practical and mechanical 
knowledge of the machines they would need to operate. In 2013, the Philippines gross 
domestic product (GDP) was at 7.2%, making it one of the fastest growing economies in 
Asia.99 Growth was attributed to the impressive performance of the construction and 
manufacturing sectors, as well as the surge in government and consumer spending.100 This 
contributed to the increase in the creation of jobs within the defence sector see Table 5.3. 
 
Table 5.3: Creation of Jobs 
Increase in the creation of 
jobs over the past five years 
Respondents % 
Yes 4 100 
No - - 
Total 4 100 
Source: Fieldwork and survey of Philippine defence companies in August 2013. 
 
 
FERFRANS owner, Mr Sy, revealed during the interview that the company has increased its 
creation of local jobs over the past five years, however, minimal. Although there has been an 
increase in production as deemed by the rise in FERFRANS’ annual turnover, most of the 
work remains at its office in the United States, where the owners spend most of their time. 
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However, Mr Sy would not disclose the figures pertaining to these details. On the other hand, 
the GA shared that for the period 2010 – 2013, 300 new staff were hired as engineers, 
medical staff, security and firefighters, munitions operators, machinists, labourers, and 
carpenters.101 Since Martin Tuason took over the helm of the company, Armscor’s operation 
in the United States has expanded with the opening of its newest brand, Rock Island Armory, 
and the building of a new facility in Nevada with 50 people. With this new development, all 
firearms emanating from their company will now go with the Rock Island Armory brand, 
whilst the Armscor brand will now only be limited to the ammunition. Still, Armscor’s 15-
acre property in the Philippines remains the main manufacturing based of the company.  
 
With regards to management training and skills development, Table 5.4 shows that 75% of 
the companies surveyed only spend less than 10% of their budget to training and skills 
development of their employees.   
 
Table 5.4: Annual Expenditure on Management Training and Skills Development 
 
Annual expenditure on management 
training and skills development 
Respondents  % 
Less than 10% 3 75 
11-20% 1 25 
21-30% - - 
31-40% - - 
41-50% - - 
Greater than 50% - - 
Total 4 100 
Source: Fieldwork and survey of Philippine defence companies in August 2013. 
 
As one of the oldest defence companies in the Philippines, many of Armscor’s machines, 
whilst in good condition, are at least 20 years old and manually operated.102  However, 
Armscor allots between 11%-20% of its budget to enhancing the skills of its employees, a 
little higher compared to the other three companies.  UDMC justified that most of its 
machines are computer-operated and can be programmed to produce as many rifles as 
necessary.103 In the case of FERFRANS with only 10 employees, the company hires qualified 
employees but does not need to spend much on skills training, rather focus its energy on 
R&D, which they do most of the time in the U.S.    This change in the condition of the 
environment has affected in the maintenance and creation of defence industry related jobs.  
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~R&D Strategy 
 
Investment in R&D is very important in ensuring a successful defence industry, especially as 
it involves the innovation of new ideas and technologies. The commitment of Philippine 
defence companies towards R&D activities has been satisfactory. Of the Philippine 
companies interviewed (see Table 5.5), three spend more than 50% of their annual 
expenditure to research and developing new technologies. Clearly, majority of the companies 
interviewed value the importance of investing in R&D in order to be competitive. The three 
private companies have foreign governments as clients; therefore, their innovations must 
remain relevant to the needs as well as to the changing security environment.  
 
Table 5.5:  R&D Expenditure 
 
Annual R&D expenditure as a 
percentage of revenue 
Respondents % 
Less than 10% 1 25 
11-20% - - 
21-30% - - 
31-40% - - 
41-50% - - 
Greater than 50% 3 75 
Total 4 100 
Source: Fieldwork and survey of Philippine defence companies in August 2013. 
 
 
Government Arsenal, being a government entity, only spends less than 10% of its annual 
revenue to R&D. This reality does not reflect the strategic goal of the GA to improve 
ammunition technology and expanding the capability for weapons production as called for in 
its charter.  According to Gamban, the desire to invest in R&D is there but more important 
for the GA is to prioritise where the money should be spent first.104 Such is a different case 
with the three private companies. The UDMC, FERFRANS, and Armscor have allotted at 
least 50% of their budget to research and development. With more diverse clients, the private 
companies must constantly improve their products to attract more customers.  The three 
private companies are all family-owned enterprises, thus the bulk of marketing ideas and 
research falls on the shoulder of the owners and family members.  
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Table 5.6: Presence of R&D Facilities  
 
Company R&D Facilities Respondents % 
Yes 4 100 
No - - 
Total 4 100 
Source: Fieldwork and survey of Philippine defence companies in August 2013. 
 
 
All companies interviewed for this research have R&D facilities as illustrated in Table 5.6. 
The Government Arsenal has its main laboratory in Bataan, where it conducts development 
testing. The location of both UDMC and Armscor facilities is in Manila. Meanwhile, 
FERFRANS laboratory is located in Cebu City, with an office in the United States, the same 
with Armscor. In an interview with Department of National Defence Chief-of-Staff Dr Peter 
Paul Galvez, he confirmed the approval of a defence economic zone proposal that will house 
a defence complex involving local and international defence companies.105 This will be 
further discussed in Section 5.3.4.  
 
Of the companies surveyed, only one receives R&D funding from the government. Although 
very limited, the R&D funding of the GA is included in the yearly appropriations of the 
government. The rest of the local firms surveyed rely on their own revenue to support 
research and development. This is shown in Table 5.7.  
 
Table 5.7: Government R&D Funding Assistance 
 
R&D funding assistance from the 
government 
Respondents % 
Yes 1 25 
No 3 75 
Total 4 100 
Source: Fieldwork and survey of Philippine defence companies in August 2013. 
 
 
Mr Cariño realises that R&D is expensive and, more often than not, is at the expense of the 
company without government subsidy. He argued that private companies need support by 
way of orders.106  Even with the presence of local defence companies that are prepared to 
cater to the needs of the clients, the Philippine armed force still imports its medium and large 
calibre ammunitions. The Philippines currently produces munitions only for small calibre 
firearms. Again, the problem lies with the procurement policy, which states that “the 
prospective bidder must have experience of having completed at least one contract that is 
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similar to the contract to be bid.”107 With the Philippine defence industry at its infancy and 
defence material can be sourced from very limited suppliers, there is concern that this will 
support the oligopolistic designs of some defence contractors.  Clearly, it is a challenge for 
smaller players to break in. Without the support of the government, local private companies 
acknowledge that they have no match for foreign brands. In May 2013, the Philippine 
Defence Department awarded a contract for 50,000 M4s to U.S. Company Remington. The 
other bidders included big American firms such as Colt, Manroy and Sig Sauer. This 
frustration is shared by Armscor, who lost a bid for a PNP contract for 60,000 9mm pistols to 
an importer of the Australian-made Glock.108 Armscor was the only Philippine company that 
made a bid. Nevertheless, all executives interviewed remain confident that collaboration with 
other institutions is the way to go as reflected in Table 5.8.  
 
Table 5.8: Collaboration with Institutions 
 
Collaboration with other 
institutions 
Respondents % 
Yes 4 100 
No - - 
Total  4 100 
Source: Fieldwork and survey of Philippine defence companies in August 2013. 
 
 
All the companies surveyed have collaborations with different academic and private 
institutions. As expected, the GA has a constant cooperation with the Department of National 
Defence – AFP involving the enhancement and repair of basic weapons, improvement of 
quality of ammunition, and conduct of familiarization firing.109 Likewise, the government 
defence company also has collaboration with the DOST through its Metals Industry Research 
and Development Centre in the testing of raw materials.110  UDMC Chair and CEO Gene 
Cariño shared in the interview that the Philippine Navy’s Naval Special Operations Group 
(NAVSOG) continues to field test the Pneumatic Valve and Rod (PVAR) rifle, manufactured 
by UDMC, as it suits the PN’s fighting environment.  
 
For companies to stay ahead of the pack, it is important for them to produce new creations, 
inventions and relevant designs to participate in rapid production development and growing 
competition in the market. Moreover, ensuring that products are patented is similarly 
significant for the growth of the company, which is characterised by constant change, 
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competition, and challenges.111 Table 5.9 shows which among the defence companies have 
registered their patents.  
 
 
Table 5.9: Patent Registrations 
Does the company have any 
patent registrations? 
Respondents % 
Yes 3 75 
No 1 25 
Total 4 100 
Source: Fieldwork and survey of Philippine defence companies in August 2013. 
 
 
The three private companies have made sure that with every introduction of new product in 
the market, they have an exclusive right. For instance, UDMC holds several patents for its 
Pneumatic Valve and Rod Gas-Piston System (PVAR System) used in M16s, M4s, and other 
similar weapons.112  However, GA does not have any patent registrations of its manufactured 
small arms ammunition, despite that fact that it has introduced a new product in the last five 
years as reflected in Table 5.10. With the realisation of the Defence Economic Zone (Section 
5.3.3) in the near future, it is crucial for the GA to patent its products for it to remain 
competitive if it has the intention to expand its market. Currently, 100% of its products are 
bought by the AFP.  
 
 
Table 5.10: Introduction of New Product and Production Servicing Methods 
 
Did your company introduce 
a new product, service or 
production method in the last 
five years? 
Respondents % 
Yes 4 100 
No - - 
Total 4 100 
Source: Fieldwork and survey of Philippine defence companies in August 2013. 
 
 
The Teflon coated cal. 45 training ammunition has been introduced by the GA to the AFP 
and PNP. Likewise, UDMC, FERFRANS, and Armscor have each came up with a new 
product in the last five years.  In 2012, FERFRANS launched their own weapon after four 
rigorous years of research and development both in the Philippines and in the U.S. The 
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FERFRANS Special Operations Assault Rifle or the FERFRANS SOAR provides unique 
features, such as the rate reduction system that controls the heat, and wear and tear of the 
weapon, which achieved the needs of the AFP and PNP.113  
 
 
5.3.3  Defence Economic Zones 
 
Plans to expand the operation of GA into a Government Arsenal Defence Industrial Estate 
(GADIE) is gaining momentum with the approval of the Master Development Plan (MDP) by 
the Secretary of the DND and the issuance of the Environmental Compliance Certificate 
(ECC) in 2015.114 The creation of the GADIE is allowed under the revised AFP 
modernisation programme. The MDP is required to build the right zoning of structures to be 
situated in the GA’s 340-hectare estate.  The ECC is part of the GADIE application for 
issuance of presidential proclamation as Special Economic one.  The GADIE aims to be the 
centre for the manufacture of various products to support the country’s defence and security 
requirements.115 Similar with the objective of the SRDP, any excess material in the local 
scene will be sold in the global market. The project will include appropriate locations, rod 
network and various infrastructures that would be constructed, relative to the manufacture of 
defence materials to include company housing area and attendant facilities.116 In 
consideration of the existing GA facilities, the strategy involves the outlining of the 
expansion into stages, having distinct areas for new developments and future plans to prevent 
confusion of projects and management.117 New developments or Phase 1 will be a prospect 
for a Public-Private Partnership (PPP) undertaking.118 Joint deal revenues in the GA may be 
added to the trust fund of the modernisation programme. On the other hand, the improvement 
and expansion areas or Phase 2 will be dependent on the programmes and budget approved 
by the government.119 Both phases will be classified into two major zones: the Non-explosive 
zone (location for defence related industries that are not in the manufacture of hazardous 
products) and the Explosive zone (for defence products that are hazardous in nature). (see 
Table 5.11).120 
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Table 5.11: The Proposed Defence Industrial Estate 
Phases Zones Projects 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Phase 1  
(Development of Defence 
Industrial Estate) 
Administration Zone New GA administration 
building, Engineering Office, 
Commission on Audit Office, 
Multi-purpose Hall, entry 
processing and security area, 
hotel and service apartment, 
convenience store, 
commercial spaces, new 
emergency hospital and 
sports complex 
Housing Zone Executive housing, staff 
housing of 30 hectares total 
area as per Presidential 
Proclamation 371 (latter is 
excluded from the MDP) 
Non-Explosive Zone Rifle manufacturing plant, 
brass rolling mill, KIA Motor 
plant, etc. 
Explosive Zone Manufacture of medium and 
high calibre ammunition, 
melt loading facility of PAF, 
and other projects 
 
 
 
Phase 2 
(Improvement and Expansion 
of Existing GA Facilities) 
Non-Explosive Zone Lead wire manufacturing 
plant, case and bullet 
division, raw material 
warehouse, and planning and 
logistics division warehouse   
Explosive Zone Primer loading plant, TNR 
manufacturing plant, 
additional cartridge 
magazines, 40mm and other 
medium calibre ammunition 
manufacturing plant, ball 
powder manufacturing plant, 
NC and NG manufacturing 
plants, melt loading facility 
of PAF, and others 
Source: Establishment of Government Arsenal Defence Industrial Estate. (2015). Bulletin. Fieldwork in Manila 
in July 2015. 
 
The present GA will be kept as a facility principally operated and managed by the 
government, where its development and expansion is dependent on the needs and priorities of 
the AFP and the PNP.121 As the first defence economic zone in Southeast Asia, several 
foreign companies have expressed interest. This will materialize through the approval of tax 
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incentives by the Philippine Economic Zone Authority (PEZA) allowing for the participation 
of not just local companies, but also foreign manufacturers to operate in the defence zone. 
Already weapons and munitions manufacturers from Canada, the United States, South Africa, 
and South Korea have pronounced their plans to set-up shop.122 Topping the list are South 
Africa’s Rheinmetall Denel Munition and a unit of South Korea’s S&T Holdings Company, 
which has firmed up a proposal for a Php2 billion ($44 million) firearms manufacturing 
plant.123  Also considering are U.S. based Colt’s Manufacturing Co. and Canada’s Waterbury 
Farrel.124 However, interested companies are not only confined to the manufacture of 
weapons and ammunition manufacturers, but as well as backpacks, boots, food packs, and 
logistics. By getting local and foreign firms to invest and produce munitions in the country, 
more jobs will be created, and provided that the Congress amends the R.A. 9184, the 
government will cut short its procurement process and support streamline procedure.  
 
 
5.4 Internal Peace and Security Plan, and Socio-Economic Recovery  
 
Figure 5.6: Evaluating policies through the Counter-Terrorism/Counterinsurgency 
Framework 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: Adapted from the conceptual framework in Figure 1.3. 
 
 
 
 
 
AFP Modernisation 
Act of 1995 & 2010 
National Security 
Policy 2011-2016 
Internal Peace and 
Security Plan 2011 
Counter Terrorism/Insurgency 
• Integration of rebels into 
mainstream society 
• Strengthening intelligence 
capabilities 
• Securing vulnerable targets 
• Enhance preparedness in the 
event of a terrorist attack 
• Use of force against armed 
threat groups 
• Ensure effective delivery of 
basic services 
 
Metrics 
• Number of 
terrorists/insurgents 
re-integrated into 
society 
• Community 
involvement case 
studies  and 
development projects 
• Intelligence successes 
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5.4.1  Philippine Internal Security Context 
 
The 2005 Philippine Human Development Report says that the security environment of the 
country is being challenged by two of the world’s longest running armed conflicts - the Moro 
secessionist movement in Mindanao in the south, and the communist insurgency occurring in 
several provinces around the country. From 1986 to 2004, insurgency in the country had 
affected 91 per cent of its provinces that caused mortalities, social disruption, economic 
degeneration and chronic poverty.125 The insurgency has been attributed to social injustice, 
political marginalisation, lack of education, limited livelihood opportunities, as well as the 
non-implementation of land reforms.126  As argued by Banlaoi (2010), the “long-drawn 
insurgency is a complicated symptom of a political malady that was ingrained in Philippine 
society.”127 His study pointed to social exclusion and economic marginalisation as root 
causes of armed uprisings in the country.128 Ranked 117 out of 187 on the Human 
Development Index (HDI)129, the Philippines has a population of 100 million, of which 
41.7% lives on less than $2 a day.130 Poverty incidence in the Philippines remained high at 
25.8% in the first half of 2014, suggesting that the “jobless economic growth” in the country 
did not trickle down to the poor.131  This suggests that in insurgency-affected areas with high 
poverty rates and insufficient delivery of basic services, such as health and education, there is 
a strong campaign to recruit into rebel groups.  
 
However, certain areas have successfully managed to confront the challenges of insurgency 
and terrorism using non-traditional measures. The two case studies presented below illustrate 
how development initiatives overcame the destabilising impact of internal security. First, is 
the insurgency concern in Negros Occidental province and how the military was able to 
engage the locals to participate in their development efforts, and second, the secessionist 
problem in three municipalities of Maguindanao.  
 
 
5.4.2 Peace and Development Plan: Case Study 1 - Negros Occidental  
 
Located in the heart of the Philippine archipelago, Negros Occidental is a lush sugarcane 
region inhabited by 2.9 million people. Its economy is mainly agricultural, with 98 per cent of 
its alienable and disposable land being used for agriculture and 2 per cent for inland fishery.  
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Despite the high economic state of the province, Negros Occidental has one of the lowest 
average family incomes in the country. Some students in the rural areas are forced to leave 
school to work in sugar plantations. This situation has resulted to low levels of literacy 
among children. Furthermore, this situation has caused inter-generational poverty and 
illiteracy, where some families, in order to survive, decide to join the armed struggle.132  
Whilst on the run with his family to avoid military detection, one rebel returnee interviewed 
said they survived on monthly rations of rice and coffee.133 Four years of their life were spent 
on gun fights with the military, educating the masses on anti-government propaganda, and 
collecting revolutionary taxes from private businesses.134  In the mid-1980s, the New 
People’s Army (NPA) cadres had gained widespread support in sugarcane haciendas, 
villages, and towns, successfully wrested concessions from elites on behalf of the working 
poor and the movement itself, and posed a powerful challenge to planters and authorities. 
They lost this position by the early 1990s under the combined influence of counter-
insurgency, regime change, and internal conflicts within the movement.  
 
Before being declared by the Philippine Army as “insurgency-free” in June 2015,135  the 
province was under a guerrilla regional front called the Kilusang Rehiyonal – Negros (KR-N) 
with an Executive Committee and Regional Operational Command, a Regional White Area 
Committee and three guerrilla fronts, namely: Northern Negros Front (NNF), Central Negros 
Front (CNF), and Southwest Front (SWF).136  The KR-N has a total of 259 politico-military 
personnel and 191 high-powered firearms. The three guerrilla fronts are strengthened by a 
total of eight guerrilla platoons operating in the hinterlands to arouse, organize-expand and 
mobilize vulnerable people and communities with their ideological-political-organizational 
mass works, affecting/influencing at least 100 barangays with 27 highly affected/influenced, 
from a total of 662 barangays province-wide.137 The guerrilla movement is capable of 
disrupting and damaging economic activities and facilities, threatening non-supporters, and 
extorting money from landowners and businessmen to finance their operations.         
 
Since 1987, several government programmes have been launched as well as counter-
insurgency operations conducted. Based on government data from 1986 to 2010, at least 
66,000 identified former communist insurgents from all over the country have benefited from 
financial and relief assistance from numerous types of government programs.138 The number 
of beneficiaries continues to grow every year yet an increasing trend in the recruitment and 
personnel strength of the NPA for the period from 2000 to 2010 was noticeable particularly 
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in Negros Island. Contributory to this alarming trend is the very wide mountainous areas in 
Negros Island, where only two Army battalions were operating there from 2002 to 2008.139 
However, without the military and law enforcement agencies the situation could have been 
worse. In an interview with Lt. Col. Ariel Reyes, former Commander of the 47th Infantry 
Battalion based in Cauayan, Negros Occidental, he foresees an increase of residents joining 
the NPA since the government has given mining companies the permit to conduct mining 
explorations in the area.140  It is construed that this adverse trend is a manifestation that 
Negros Island remains to be a fertile ground for communist insurgency, and that the peace 
and developmental approaches employed by the government will fall short if its goals and 
objectives are taken for granted.  
 
In 2012, the provincial government of Negros Occidental launched the 5-year Peace and 
Development Plan for communities affected by armed conflict.  Former 303rd Infantry 
Brigade Commander Brigadier General Jon Aying hatched the idea and proposed it to Negros 
Occidental Governor Alfredo Marañon, whose council decided to adopt it.141 The advocacy 
plan has short-term and long-term objectives that include: (1) to promote poverty reduction, 
food security and sustainable economic development; (2) to develop a healthy, educated and 
active community with high moral values; (3) to promote balanced ecology, biodiversity and 
disaster risk reduction and management; (4) to promote effective and efficient 
implementation of development programs and delivery of basic services in the countryside; 
(5) to secure communities from armed conflict, criminality and disasters; (6) to advance 
community empowerment, ownership and people’s shared responsibilities in governance, 
peace and security; (7) to resolve conflicts and grievances existing and arising within 
communities and among community groups.142  These objectives have been matched to the 
needs of the province, likewise, they reflect the aims of governance and sustainable 
development advocated by the NSP policy. As BGen Aying emphasised, “national security 
can be defined as governance determining the kind of security and development for the nation 
wherein practically security and development cannot be dichotomized.”143 Consequently, the 
plan formed the basis for the creation of the Provincial Peace Integration and Development 
Unit (Pro-PIDU) by virtue of Governor Alfredo Marañon Jr’s Executive Order 12-016 signed 
on 17 July 2012.144  The Pro-PIDU undertakes plans, programmes and activities to help 
address issues facing the marginalized communities in the province. Its five interdependent 
components are socio-economic, psychosocial and cultural, environmental and natural 
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resource management, good governance, and justice and security. Table 5.12 shows the 
specific activities enveloped in the components.  
 
 
Table 5.12: Components of the Pro-PIDU 
Socio-economic Psychosocial and 
cultural 
Environmental Good Governance Justice and 
security 
A. Crisis 
Intervention 
Projects 
• Humanitarian 
Caravan 
• Emergency 
Relief and 
Assistance 
• Survival Needs 
Project 
• Community-
Based Life 
Support Project 
• Guns for Peace 
Remuneration 
B. Sustainable 
Livelihood 
Projects 
• Wellness Farm 
• Household 
Backyard Farm  
• Vocational 
Technology 
• Balik Sibilyan 
Debriefing 
• Trauma Healing 
• Wellness 
Information & 
Education 
Programme 
(WIEP) 
• Educational 
Assistance and 
Scholarship 
Programme 
(NOSP) 
• Health 
Assistance and 
Programme 
(NOCHP) 
 
• Awareness 
Programme 
• Support to NGP 
• Support to Anti-
illegal Logging 
Programme 
• Support to Anti-
illegal Mining  
 
• Peace Process 
• AFP-Guns for 
Peace 
• Peacebuilding 
Initiatives 
• Stakeholder 
Engagement and 
Meetings 
• City-Municipality 
PIDU Creation 
• Grassroots 
Governance 
Organizations 
• Good Governance 
Awareness 
Programme 
 
• Awareness 
Programme 
• Grassroots 
Community 
Resiliency 
Programme 
• Community 
Mediation and 
Reconciliation 
Programme 
• Military 
Operations 
• Integrated 
Community 
Defence and 
Public Safety 
• Legal 
Cooperation 
 
Source: Fieldwork at the 303rd Infantry Brigade Camp in Negros Occidental from February to March 2014.  
 
Col. Aying said “the programme is not a one-shot deal.”145  The AFP IPSP emphasises that 
the primary focus in the conduct of military operations is not just defeating the enemy but 
more significantly, Winning the Peace, if possible without the use of arms. As a long-term 
strategy, Pro-PIDU aims to transform the capacity of the government, AFP included, to 
deliver services especially to the underprivileged or the marginalised members of the society. 
But with the lingering reputation of the military as human rights abusers during the Martial 
Law years, the AFP is careful to label each action as their own.  Hence, it is paramount that 
the local government unit takes ownership of the activities. Besides it is also their 
responsibility.  The socio-economic component is headed by DWSD; the psychosocial and 
cultural by the Department of Education; the environment by the Department of Environment 
and National Resources; good governance by the provincial office; and the justice and 
security by the AFP. Through the humanitarian caravan, for example, some government staff 
travelled to remote areas with the military to deliver basic services. They bring with them 
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doctors, lawyers, agriculturists, and dentists. Politicians, who sometimes tag along, were 
curiosity amongst the residents. “Oh, that’s how Governor looks like!”146 
 
One of the projects of Pro-PIDU is the organic wellness farm, for which the provincial 
government has allotted Php1.5 million (approximately US$ 32,500)147 for the preparation of 
land and development of facilities. So far, the farm has generated an income of Php300,000 
(approximately US$ 6,500) in gross sales and has catered to the socio-economic needs of 
around 34 family members of former rebels.148 Additional plans for satellite organic farms 
are being drawn up to establish sites in other parts of the province, particularly the first, fifth 
and sixth districts.149 It is the goal of the Pro-PIDU advocates to see the institutionalization of 
the programme within the provincial government to ensure the annual appropriation of 
budget regardless of who stays in the elected position. Other project components of the Pro-
PIDU include the emergency relief and assistance, and the Guns for Peace program. Since 
2012, at least 150 rebel returnees (see Table 5.13) have received cash in exchange for 
firearms and livelihood assistance from the government.150 According to BGen Aying, it is 
“not the goal of the military to bring its enemies to their knees but to their senses.”151 
Commenting on the implementation of the IPSP in the province, Lt. Col. Reyes said that 
there is still much to do because of many factors to consider. He cited that in order for IPSP 
to be successful, stakeholders (government, public, business, academe, NGOs, armed forces, 
etc.) must be directly involved and committed to contribute their share in solving primary 
issues. As a document espousing Whole-of-Nation Approach and the Human Security 
Approach, IPSP was crafted with the involvement of local government agencies, NGOs, civil 
society, and academe, giving equal emphasis to combat and non-combat dimensions of 
military operations.  
 
Table 5.13: Livelihood and Financial Assistance to Rebel Returnees 
Institution  Amount Assisted Number of Rebel 
Returnees 
Amount (Php) 
OPAPP (CLIP) Admin Cost – 500.00 
Immediate – 5,000.00 
Livelihood – 50,000.00 
 
 
 
33 rebel returnees 
 
1,831,500.00 
 
Admin Cost – 500.00 
Immediate – 5,000.00 
34 rebel returnees (being 
processed by PSWDO) 
187,000.00 
 
OPAPP (SIP) 
  
7 former rebels 
350,000.00 
Provincial Immediate – 5,000.00  820,000.00 
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Government Livelihood – 50,000.00 82 rebel returnees 
Total  156 rebel returnees 3,188,500.00 
Source: Fieldwork at the 303rd Infantry Brigade Camp in Negros Occidental from February to March 2014.  
 
In 1993, the Office of the Presidential Adviser on the Peace Process (OPAPP) was created “to 
provide technical and administrative support to the Presidential Adviser on the Peace Process 
in the discharge of his/her functions for the coordination and implementation of all 
components of the comprehensive process.” 152  In 2007, President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo 
launched the social integration programme (SIP), housed within the peace process office, for 
rebels seeking to return to normal life before a peace agreement.153  Under Aquino, the SIP 
became the comprehensive local integration programme (CLIP); it now relies on mayors and 
provincial governors to deliver assistance in attempts to skirt inter-agency coordination 
problems in Manila.154 The amount covers the administration cost (investigation on the 
authenticity of the returnee), immediate assistance, and livelihood assistance. The Provincial 
Social and Welfare Development Office (PSWDO) does the profiling to find out the needs of 
the person. According to Jennie Macalipsay of PSWDO, a questionnaire is used to determine 
the needs of the rebel returnees and he/she will be referred to the proper government agency 
for support.155  Prior to the profiling though, the identity of rebel returnees will have to be 
validated and authenticated first by the AFP to ensure that they are not sent by the NPA 
leadership to infiltrate. Since money is involved, the military is cautious that the person did 
not just resurface to avail of the financial support that will eventually help the rebel group.  
Whilst most of the returnees return to mainstream, the rebel interviewed remains in the 
custody of the 303rd IB because of his former leadership position within the NPA. He and his 
family face constant threat from former comrades because of their knowledge of operations 
and unit structure of the movement.  His children attend the neighbourhood secondary school, 
whilst he helps out in the organic wellness farm of the Army and earns Php200/day. 
Intending to start his own organic farm when he can eventually go back to his old home, the 
former rebel strives to learn as much as he can about livestock and organic farming as he is 
keen to apply that knowledge and new skills on his own soil.156 
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5.4.3 Social Work and Development: Case Study 2 – Maguindanao  
 
Maguindanao is a province located in the Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao 
(ARMM) composed of 36 municipalities, which are further subdivided into 508 barangays 
(small independent communities of persons). It is a province rich in history, culture and 
resources. But despite its agricultural abundance, Maguindanao remains one of the poorest 
provinces in the Philippines with a 57.8% poverty incidence according to national 
statistics.157 For decades it has witnessed several conflicts and its residents are continuously 
displaced whenever military troops and Moro rebels clash. Most often than not, these 
hostilities occur in the farms of the residents.  
 
From 2011 to 2014, there was a total of 280 incidents recorded in the province, of which the 
highest number of incidents was in 2014 with 88 incidents double from the 43 incidents of 
2013 (see Figure 5.7).  
 
Figure 5.7: Incidents in Maguindanao, 2011-2014 
 
 
Source: Bangsamoro Conflict Monitoring System, 2015. Fieldwork in Davao City from September to October 
2014 in Davao City.  
 
 
Incidents are characterised as ambuscade, encounters, arson, assault, bombing, hostage 
taking, shooting, theft and abduction, which threat groups based in Maguindanao, perpetrated 
against the military, law enforcers, government personnel and/or civilians. Figure 5.8 shows 
that in 2014, the Bangsamoro Islamic Freedom Fighters (BIFF) have conducted the most 
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number of attacks, whilst the least is the Jemaah Islamiyah with only one encounter during 
the last four years.  
 
 
Figure 5.8: Incidents Perpetrated by Threat Groups, 2011-2014 
 
 
Source: Bangsamoro Conflict Monitoring System, 2015. Fieldwork in Davao City from September to October 
2014 in Davao City.  
 
 
Of the 36 municipalities, the study has focused on three – Barira, Buldon, and Matanog. 
These three combined has a territory that stretches up to 32,000 hectares and served as host to 
Camp Abubakar, once the main stronghold of the Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF) 
since the 1980s.158 Until the late 1990s, the camp was also the MILF’s largest settlement and 
centre of its Shariah-based government. Forest and bodies of water acted as natural barriers 
around the camp, enhanced by trenches and tunnels dug by the MILF members.159  Its 
founder and chair Salamat Hashim, and his military chief Al Haj Murad Ibrahim used to live 
and held office there.160 Camp Abubakar had a school, a training academy, a hospital, 
businesses, farms and markets, providing for the needs of its fighters and civilian residents.161  
For many Muslims in Central Mindanao, Camp Abubakar served as their “Malacañang 
Palace” (official residence and principal workplace of the President of the Philippines), where 
leaders were summoned for important consultations and where wayward members of the 
MILF and even Muslim civilians were brought for discipline and punishment.162 For most 
non-Muslims, Camp Abubakar was the seat of power of an organisation they perceived to be 
a threat to their lives, properties, and peace in their communities. In the book Under the 
Crescent Moon: Rebellion in Mindanao, Vitug and Gloria note that it was the policy of the 
government under President Fidel Ramos to keep off Camp Abubakar and the other main 
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camp of the MILF, Camp Busrah, situated in Lanao del Sur.163 The authors quoted former 
Defence Secretary, Renato de Villas, as saying: 
 
“These [Camp Abubakar and Camp Busrah] have become political symbols. If we 
raid Abubakar and Busrah, it would mean an all-out war against the MILF. We hit 
them elsewhere but never in these two camps.” 164  
 
A certain kind of respect was accorded to the camp.  
 
For the armed forces, the area was a “no man’s” land where those who ventured risked losing 
their lives.165  Ironically, this is also one of the favoured areas of deployment by new 
graduates of the Philippine Military Academy (PMA), especially for faster career 
progression. The more dangerous, the better. The expansion of MILF armed activities from 
the central portions of Mindanao to the Lanao provinces in the north increased MILF 
logistical requirements, especially military hardware and daily subsistence. In search for 
resources, the MILF intensified its extortion activities, in areas such as the 64-kilometre 
Narciso Ramos Highway, which borders the provinces of Lanao del Sur and Maguindanao. 
By March 2000, the number of MILF checkpoints and roadblocks along the Highway had 
increased. These were meant for extorting fees from commercial and private vehicles passing 
through the area, claiming that the first-class, two-lane highway was part of Camp 
Abubakar.166 Whilst the road was built to cut travel distance by more than three-fourths, 
travellers were advised to drive through it only during day-time due to the risk it poses.  
 
The MILF had constructed well-entrenched defensive positions along the Highway, evidently 
in recognition of its strategic importance. Before President Joseph Estrada’s “all-out-war” 
campaign against the MILF in 2000 after the peace talks broke down, Camp Abubakar was a 
fortified rebel base with concrete bunkers roofed with layers of coconut trunks, man-made 
ditches, and could virtually resist close hits from 105mm artillery shells.167  Construction 
materials to be used in the completion of the Narciso Ramos Highway in 1994 were diverted 
by MILF sympathizers for its bunkers.168 It was obvious that such reinforced defensive 
positions along the Highway were dangerous as they could prevent the movement of AFP 
troops and logistical flow between the 4th Infantry Division (northern Mindanao) and the 6th 
Infantry Division (Central Mindanao).  
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Eventually, the Camp fell into the hands of the Philippine military at the end of a two-month 
offensive. However, the campaign came with a price – those paid for by the affected 
communities. The conflict harmed families in 14 provinces, four cities, 89 municipalities, and 
around 489 barangays.169 The campaign resulted in a mass exodus of 800,000 to one million 
civilians in Mindanao, making it perhaps the single biggest episode of internal displacement 
in the country since World War II.170 In Southeast Asia, the Philippines was recorded to have 
the fourth largest number of internally displaced families after Burma, East Timor, and 
Indonesia in 2001 based on the World Refugee Survey of U.S. Committee on Refugees.171 
  
After the fall of Camp Abubakar, the 603rd Infantry Brigade (IB) of the Philippine Army’s 6th 
Infantry Division was deployed in the MILF’s former base located in the tri-boundaries of 
Barira, Buldon, and Matanog municipalities. Under the 603rd IB are the Army Special Forces 
Battalion, 37th, and 39th Infantry Battalions.172All three places are 4th class municipalities with 
a combined population of 76,684 people in 14,391 households.173 In 2005, Camp Abubakar 
was renamed Camp Iranun by President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo. The place, subsequently, 
became a “peace zone” and residents have since been witnessing the tremendous pouring in 
of local and foreign funded projects meant to complement the efforts of accelerating the 
socio-economic growth of local communities. 
 
The AFP assisted the Department of Social Welfare and Development (DSWD) in relief and 
rehabilitation. The soldiers constructed temporary shelters for the displaced communities and 
conducted numerous medical and dental missions.174 Priority was given to reconstruction and 
rehabilitation of school buildings. In coordination with the Department of Education 
(DepEd), military engineers repaired a building in Buldon and nine school facilities in 
Matanog.175  Beyond building schools, a number of AFP personnel served as teachers to 
displaced children through the Army Literacy Patrol System (ALPS).176  The AFP also 
assisted the Department of Agriculture (DA) in the construction of farm-to-market roads; 
supported the Department of Public Works and Highways (DPWH) in repairing mosques, 
municipal halls, and roads. The AFP Corps of Engineers became the de facto implementing 
arm of the National Irrigation Authority (NIA), given the latter’s request to have the 
Langkong-Sarmiento-Abubakar Road paved.  
 
Although there was an increase in attacks by the BIFF in 2014, none of these happened in the 
Barira, Buldon, and Matango areas. According to the 603rd Commander, “there has not been 
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any single rebel-Army encounter in the area since 2003.”177 This he owed to the compliance 
by both sides of the government-MILF Agreement on General Cessation of Hostilities,178 
which is being enforced with the help of a multinational peacekeeping group, the Malaysian-
led International Monitoring Team. Seeing the progress gained, the 603rd IB was pulled out of 
Camp Iranun and replaced with a smaller contingent of about 600 combatants in 2015.179 The 
brigade has since been relocated to Pigkalagan District in Sultan Kudarat in Maguindanao, 
170 kilometres away.  
 
In terms of economic progress, foreign investors from South America, the Middle East and 
other parts of Asia have shown interest to engage in high value crop production in the town 
of Matanog, which boasts of fertile soil.180 La Frutera Corporation, a banana company, is 
exploring the possibility of allotting at least 1,000 hectares for banana plantation.181 Fruit 
producer Dole Philippines has also proposed setting up a 5,000 hectares pineapple plantation, 
whilst a Guatemala-based investor is eyeing coffee plantations.182 These investors have 
pledged to provide technical requirements and capital, as long as the town can assure peace 
and order as well as the people’s cooperation. The mayor of Matanog, Mohammad “Kits” 
Guro has attributed the relative peace to the efforts of the 603rd IB.183  
 
However, this relative peace may be short-lived. At the national level, the government and 
the MILF leadership have been conducting peace talks since 1998, which resulted in several 
attempts of signing a peace agreement. The latest document was the Bangsamoro Basic Law 
(BBL), although has been in the pipeline since 2012, was not approved by the 16th Congress 
of the House of Representatives before it adjourned in February 2016. The BBL, which was 
supposed to replace the Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao to create a Bangsamoro 
political entity, was expected to be one of the highlights of President Aquino’s administration 
before he stepped down in June 2016.  In the absence of a bill, there is a fear among civilians 
of hostilities brewing in the near term.  
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5.5 National Security Policy (2011-2016): Focus on Non-Traditional Security 
 
Figure 5.9: Evaluating policies through the Non-Traditional Security Framework 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: Adapted from the conceptual framework in Figure 1.3. 
 
 
5.5.1  Frontline to Disaster 
 
The Philippines geographical location makes it susceptible to natural disasters. The country 
experiences around 900 earthquakes and 20 typhoons of which six to nine make landfall each 
year, making it the third-highest disaster risk country in the world. One indicator that shows 
the big role AFP plays in disaster response is the budget it allows for humanitarian affairs and 
disaster response (HADR). Since 2010, the AFP sets aside Php1 billion for disaster response 
and management annually.184 Another factor contributing to this is the fact that a number of 
conflict-affected areas are susceptible to calamities and many times the military finds itself 
functioning two roles at one time – internal security and disaster response.185 
 
In November 2013, the Philippines was severely affected by Typhoon Haiyan which turned 
out to be one of the deadliest natural disasters to ever strike earth in recorded history. A storm 
surge followed that smashed through coastal neighbourhoods and farmlands across central 
Philippines. The typhoon killed thousands and left millions homeless, whilst hitting an 
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already poor region and pushing them deeper into poverty and increasing their vulnerability 
to the next disaster.  A year before that, on 4 December 2012, Typhoon Bopha struck the 
Philippines, with the island of Mindanao worst affected. While Typhoon Bopha was not as 
strong as Typhoon Haiyan, it hit a region ill-prepared for this kind of calamity. Using these 
two disasters as case studies, the contributions of the Armed Forces to disaster response are 
explained in the following sections.  
 
 
5.5.2  Typhoon Haiyan: Case Study 1 – Coordination and Support 
 
Tropical Depression 31W or Typhoon Haiyan struck the Philippines on 8 November and was 
recorded the most powerful storm in recent history.186 Days before the storm moved toward 
the mainland, the Philippines National Disaster Risk Reduction and Management Council 
(NDRRMC)187 public advisories were issued alerting local authorities to monitor the 
situation and disseminate early warning information to communities. With a force equivalent 
to a Category 5 hurricane, Typhoon Haiyan (locally named Yolanda) struck the central region 
of the Philippines.188 For the next 16 hours, the super typhoon directly swept through six 
Philippine provinces and affected over 10% of the nation’s population of 105 million 
people.189  According to the U.S. National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration 
(NOAA), Haiyan had powerful winds up to 200 mph (300 km/h) with gusts up to 225 mph 
(360 km/hr).  The speed of the storm as well as advance warning prevented greater flooding 
and may have saved many lives.190 Almost 90 per cent of infrastructures were heavily 
damaged or destroyed, including airports, roads, schools and medical facilities.191 
Furthermore, decentralised government authority, a shortage of available government 
workers, looting, and heavy rains delayed some relief efforts.192 
 
Within a few days after the typhoon made a landfall, the Philippine government reported that 
an estimated 11.5 million people had been affected by the storm, with more than 540,000 
displaced (of which roughly 380,000 were staying in 1,215 evacuation centres and 162,000 
outside the centres).193 The government also reported that 792,000 people194 were evacuated 
in advance of the disaster. The city of Tacloban (population 220,000) capital of Leyte 
province was one of the hardest hit places and the scene of the most concentrated destruction 
and death (see more data in Table 5. 14). Thousands of Tacloban residents reportedly 
drowned in a “two-story high” storm surge, including people seeking safety in a sports 
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stadium that served as a shelter.195 With a steady growing population combined with poor 
infrastructure in disaster-prone areas, the Philippine archipelago is highly vulnerable to 
natural calamities and humanitarian crises.  
 
 
Table 5.14: Effects of Typhoon Haiyan 
Super Typhoon Haiyan Impacts 
Impact Metrics 
People dead 6,300 
damaged (totally/partially) houses 1,084,762 
Cost of damages (agriculture) $466,276,540.56 USD 
Cost of damages (infrastructure) $204,687,584.40 USD 
Cost of damages (social) $1,176,940,732.33 USD 
Cost of damages (cross-sectoral) $65,541730.70 USD 
Total cost of damages $1,913,446,497.99 USD 
Source: NDRRMC Updates on the Effects of Typhoon Haiyan.196 Data gathered during fieldwork in Tacloban 
City and Ormoc City in September 2014 
 
 
Of the 17 regions of the Philippines, nine were affected – Western, Central and Eastern 
Visayas, regions VI, VII, and VIII, respectively.197 Region VI includes the following 
provinces: Aklan, Antique, Capiz with the capital of Roxas City, Guimaras, Iloilo, and 
Negros Occidentals.198 Region VII includes Bohol, Cebu with Cebu city as its capital, Negros 
Oriental, and Siquijor. Lastly, Region VIII is composed of Biliran, Eastern Samar, Leyte with 
the capital of Tacloban City, Northern Samar, Southern Leyte, and Western Samar (See 
Figure 5.10).199  The huge infrastructure damage brought by the typhoon to these areas 
slowed rescue and response, and also hampered the delivery of goods and services to those 
affected. 
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Figure 5.10: Typhoon Path of Haiyan 
 
Source: Johnson, R. (2013, 7 November). Super typhoon Haiyan strikes Philippines. The Washington Post. 
Retrieved from http://www.washingtonpost.com/national/health-science/super-typhoon-haiyan-strikes-
philippines/2013/11/07/f2796efa-481b-11e3-a196-3544a03c2351_graphic.html  
 
 
Local and international organisations and foreign governments activated their response to aid 
those who were affected by the typhoon. The AFP in support of foreign militaries such that of 
Australia, South Korea, the United States, played a critical role in clearing airports and roads 
to quickly allow much needed humanitarian assistance to be delivered.200 United Nation 
agencies, such as the U.S. Agency for International Development’s Office of Foreign 
Disaster Assistance (USAID OFDA) and the United Nations Disaster Assessment 
Coordination (UNDAC), were also quick to respond by sending teams into the affected areas 
to conduct initial rapid assessments.201 These initial rapid assessments are crucial for the 
timely and accurate determination of the potential damage and the much needed aid. During 
Typhoon Haiyan, the Philippine military responded with 25,526 personnel.202 Military efforts 
involved the use of 47 sea vessels, 46 aircrafts, and 570 mobility vehicles.203 Appendix L 
shows the timeline of AFP deployment to areas affected by the typhoon.  
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With the magnitude of devastation caused by Typhoon Haiyan and the overwhelming 
response by the international community, the AFP created the Joint Task Force Yolanda.204 
The mission of the Task Force was to conduct humanitarian assistance and disaster response 
operations in coordination with the local government units (LGUs) and foreign military 
forces to track the distribution and delivery of relief of goods, deployment of responders, 
assets and resources in order to mitigate the effects of the super typhoon.205 Its concept of 
operation was to establish the AFP-OCD-HADR command coordinating centre that set up 
logistical hubs where goods and supplies were positioned and ferried using all available land, 
sea, and air assets. In addition, the command centre also facilitated coordination of all efforts 
with the international military forces through the multi-national coordinating centre (MNCC). 
MGen Velarmino said that the MNCC was established to facilitate coordination and 
cooperation of foreign military forces with the affected nation to support the HADR in 
affected regions in Central Philippines.206 The host nation determines the priorities for 
support and articulates those priorities to the MNCC for support. Upon the transition from 
relief to early recovery to rehabilitation phase, engineering units would assist in the 
reconstruction of damaged infrastructures and provide engineering support to other agencies 
as requested by the Regional Disaster Risk Reduction Management Council (RDRRMC).207  
 
The other mechanism the AFP used to facilitate the response operations during Typhoon 
Haiyan included the Office of Civil Defence (OCD) being the executive arm of the 
NDRMMC and maintains the operations of the centre 24/7. The main office of the OCD is in 
Camp Aguinaldo, where the DND office is located, showing the close coordination of the two 
offices. It is supported by all 16 regional centres nationwide to constantly monitor any 
disaster-related incidents and disseminates appropriate advisories and guidelines to all 
concerned. In an interview with OCD Region VIII Director Dr Blanche Gobenchiong, she 
said that the NDRRMC operating centre given its limitations in some areas achieved its 
mission by continuously improving its core functions on alert and monitoring, multi-agency 
operational coordination, response resource mobilization, information management, 
operations capability upgrade to effective programme coordination.208 On alert and 
monitoring, the operations centre provides warning in close coordination with warning 
agencies. It disseminates warning to areas threatened by disasters to provide the public with 
advisories on the extent, potential or ongoing emergency situation including necessary pre-
cautionary measures to be undertaken. The operational centre monitors the probable 
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consequence of potential ongoing and past disasters on emergency situations, alerts available 
response units, and monitors the transition from emergency response and relief to early 
recovery phase.  
 
Another coordinative mechanism used in the influx of humanitarian response and aid were 
the one-stop shop facilities, which were activated on 12 November 2013, four days after the 
typhoon hit. Open 24 hours/7 days, the facilities served as the information hub for all 
transactions between and among donors, consignee, and recipients of foreign donations. The 
identified government agency expedited the documentation and processing of imported 
donations including the issuance of customs, immigration, quarantine clearances and the 
flight clearances. During initial operations, two one-stop shop facilities were established – at 
the Ninoy Aquino International Airport (NAIA) and in Mactan airport in Cebu. With the 
concept of one-stop shop, the Department of Foreign Affairs (DFA) also established the 
Typhoon Haiyan Action Centre to facilitate the entry of relief goods and personnel by air or 
by sea. The Action Centre was led by the Bureau of Customs with representatives from the 
Department of Finance, Bureau of Immigration, DSWD, Department of Health (DOH) and 
OCD. In the operationalization of the one-stop shop of the DFA, the following coordinative 
policy procedures were adopted:  
• The PH government should be informed first of the offers of assistance through the 
embassies 
• Medical assistance coordination with the DOH; 
• Search and rescue with the NDRRMC or OCD;  
• Goods must be consigned accordingly or to the embassy 
• Military assistance with the DND Operational Coordination with the MNCC; 
• Cash assistance to social welfare account, NDRRMC or PRC 
 
During the height of the Typhoon Haiyan operation, civil-military coordination at the tactical 
level was established through co-location concept in Cebu, Roxas; and Tacloban, liaison 
visits in Manila, Ormoc, and Guian; and direct assignment of foreign military contingents to 
government departments and ministries. Co-location as a form of network governance is a 
way of organizing response teams when responding to an emergency situation.209 This 
temporary set-up enables effective communication, as well as, enhances efficiency due to 
collaboration and task allocation. According to Major General Velarmino, Commander of 
Task Force Yolanda (Haiyan), one of the best experiences of civil-military coordination 
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mechanism was the establishment of the civil-military coordinating centre in Roxas City on 
14 November 2013, wherein co-location strategy among local agencies and foreign countries 
was adopted.210 Functions performed included (i) liaison and coordination between civil-
military and other organisations, (ii) receive, validate, and coordinate requests, and (iii) 
provide as a venue of sharing information (e.g. 3rd Infantry Division of the AFP provides 
situation updates). 211As a need-based set up, any organisation that wants to extend will have 
to drop by first in one of these centres to register their name and members. Depending on the 
kind of support (e.g. food, shelter, medicine, etc.) the organisation is providing, those in-
charge in the monitoring centre will check their records on who needs such assistance before 
the helping organisation can proceed. Members of the Task Force meet daily to update each 
other about the condition in their respective responsibility.   
 
Allied countries provided overwhelming international support during the disaster relief 
operations. 57 countries responded to the appeal of the government among which 29 have 
military capabilities that were engaged in search, rescue, and retrieval operations and other 
humanitarian assistance activities such as providing medical services. Overall, there were 
15,400 multinational military personnel involved in the operations, 145 military aircrafts, and 
29 navy ships were utilized providing support for the AFP and other government agencies 
and NGOs.212 Transportation assets of other multinational forces were integrated to further 
fast track the delivery of the needed resources to the typhoon affected areas. The Joint Task 
Force Yolanda coordinated and monitored the flight schedule, naval schedule, and initiated 
force protection for 29 multinational foreign military performing HADR operations in the 
different typhoon affected areas.213 These actions were commended by the UN 
Undersecretary General for Humanitarian Affairs Baroness Valerie Amos, who said that, 
“This is the most effective civil-military coordination we have ever seen at the field level and 
should be used as a model for future disaster response operations.”214   
 
Issues and challenges faced and identified by the military were revealed during interviews 
with military personnel involved in the Haiyan operations.215 Table 5.15 identifies these 
issues and challenges categorised as processes, capabilities, information, and resources.  
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Table 5.15: Issues and Challenges Experienced During Typhoon Haiyan 
 Issues and Challenges 
Processes • Command and Control not immediately established 
Capabilities  • Need for additional strategic lift capability 
• Need for Incident Command System and other related training 
Information • Lack of situational awareness with limited rapid damage and needs 
assessment 
• Need to enhance public information dissemination on disaster 
events 
Resources • Lack of HADR resources 
• Need to maximise reservists involvement 
• Lack of a facility for the Multinational Coordination Centre 
(MNCC) at the strategic and operational level 
• Lack of an emergency communications system 
• Lack of long range public address systems and portable address 
devices 
• Lack of disaster response equipment down to battalion-level 
Source: Interviews and Survey results.216 Fieldwork in Tacloban City and Ormoc City in September 2014.  
 
A few days before the arrival of the typhoon, government agencies, including the AFP, were 
mobilised. On 7 November, President Aquino conducted a national live television broadcast 
and dispatched the secretaries of the Department of National Defence and the Department of 
the Interior and Local Government to Tacloban City to coordinate preparations for disaster 
response.217 Concurrently, DSWD prepositioned food, medicine, and other relief support, and 
emergency funds were apportioned and put on standby.218 However, despite these 
preparations, military personnel interviewed attributed the issues and challenges to the 
massive destruction of the typhoon. Processes initially put in place by local government units 
were not immediately established since local personnel trained in disaster response were the 
victims themselves. Even with the AFP’s extensive experience in responding to frequent 
typhoons and earthquakes, its lack of capacity for airlift and sea transport limits its 
humanitarian capabilities in the archipelagic environment. With just three C-130 transporters, 
a limited number of utility helicopters and a few landing and logistic vessels, the massive 
storm exposed the government’s inability to deliver essential quantities of materials and other 
aid, such as food, water, and medicine, to a wide coverage area.  This brings to the lessons 
identified by the AFP as shown in Table 5.16, which captured overarching points to address 
in preparation for future disaster events.  
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Table 5.16: Lessons Identified by the AFP 
 Lessons Identified 
Preparedness for typhoon at 
Haiyan magnitude 
• Need to elevate preparedness for a worst case scenario such as 
super Typhoon Haiyan 
• Ground preparations were insufficient for the magnitude of 
Typhoon Haiyan with strong storm surges which swept away 
evacuation centres 
Multilevel response should 
be seamless 
• Local to national level responsibility handover 
• Responder assistance should be sent from outside of the region 
• Leadership dealt with overwhelming circumstances 
High Expectations from 
military support 
• There was an over dependence on the military’s strained assets 
and resources 
• Responsibility should be equally shared with other civilian 
organizations 
• There was a limited mechanism between the AFP and the regional 
disaster risk reduction and management council (RDRRMC) for 
the logistics operation for immediate supply replenishment during 
the response 
Overwhelming International 
Support 
• Early response from the international community occurred after 
the expedient disaster declaration by the government 
• 57 countries and 29 multinational military organizations 
participated in HA/DR operations 
Effectiveness of the MNCC • The MNCC facilitated coordination with foreign military forces to 
support HA/DR missions 
• For Typhoon Yolanda, it was the first time the AFP had an 
operational MNCC 
Training Readiness • AFP has limited training on inter-agency HA/DR operations  
• There is limited unit training on HA/DR operations  
• HA/DR operations are dependent on using appropriate equipment 
Faculties and Logistics • The AFP has available facilities for coordination and HA/DR to 
include command and control and storage of equipment and goods  
• AFP lacks the Deployable Joint Command and Control (DJC2) 
facility that could utilized for HA/DR operations  
• Command and control, and interagency/ multinational 
coordination were drastically impacted by the disaster event  
• There was minimal logistics preparation and no pre-positioning of 
additional supplies/equipment in anticipation of the typhoon 
which led to shortfalls 
Source: Interviews and survey results.219 Fieldwork in Tacloban City and Ormoc City in September 2014.  
 
Two days after the typhoon made its first landfall, the Philippine government issued a request 
for humanitarian assistance to other countries.220 The timely response of the AFP and by 
militaries of other countries addressed the immediate needs of survivors, and was key in the 
success of the succeeding rescue and relief operations. The humanitarian professionals and 
local government personnel interviewed for this study provided three reasons why the 
contribution of the military was significant to the overall success of relief efforts. First, the 
storm destroyed key infrastructure (e.g. airports, roads, communication systems) that was 
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essential to support relief operations; and its strong winds toppled down trees and utility 
poles, and left debris scattered all over making it difficult to pass.221 Facilitated by the initial 
efforts of the AFP, the heavy lift capability of Australia, South Korea, U.S., and other foreign 
militaries were vital to speedily reinstate transportation routes for the relief goods to be 
moved, as well as re-establish communication lines. Second, the storm damaged hundreds of 
acres of crops and properties across a number of provinces and municipalities. Military 
capabilities made it possible for government agencies and humanitarian organisations to 
access hard to reach areas.222  Third, the prompt response of the armed forces afforded life-
saving relief to survivors in the initial crucial days, whilst the government agencies and 
humanitarian organisations prepared capabilities to deploy.223 The devastation of Typhoon 
Haiyan highlighted critical capability shortcomings in airlift and sealift within the AFP that 
limited their ability to respond rapidly to the humanitarian crisis.224  Within days of the 
disaster, numerous foreign military contingents were supporting humanitarian operations, 
providing equipment, logistics and relief supplies. For example, the U.S. Department of 
Defence deployed 13,400 military personnel, 66 aircraft and 12 naval vessels including an 
aircraft carrier battle group.225 Australia, Canada, Japan, the United Kingdom and 16 other 
countries deployed military ships, aircraft and personnel, providing the Philippine 
government with significant quantities of relief supplies and logistical capacity to reach 
affected areas.226 Dozens of countries also donated to relief efforts in the form of cash 
assistance and supplies.  The slight response from fellow ASEAN countries was noticeable as 
this disaster resulted in a limited collective effort despite the ASEAN Agreement on Disaster 
Management and Emergency Response whose mechanism was established in 2005.227   This 
could be attributed to the small “light” fleets owned by most ASEAN countries that are 
deemed more useful for defence and surveillance, and not for large-scale disaster response 
such as Typhoon Haiyan operations.  
 
 
5.5.3 Typhoon Bopha: Case Study 2 – Effectiveness and Efficiency 
 
The second case involves another typhoon that happened in southern Philippines, which is 
rarely visited by a typhoon. Typhoon Haiyan may be the strongest typhoon recorded in 
modern history, but the challenge of Typhoon Bopha is also concerning precisely because the 
areas affected have not experienced typhoon, much more, have an idea how to respond to 
one. Typhoon Bopha (locally named Pablo) made landfall three times in the Philippines, 
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spreading destruction across 30 provinces, in December 2012.228 The islands are no stranger 
to typhoons and other severe weather events, but Bopha was different; Mindanao, the area of 
initial impact, typically does not experience typhoons of this magnitude. It destroyed 
properties and agricultural crops, cut power and telecommunication lines, and forced the 
cancellation of flights and ferry services. Strong winds and heavy rain left thousands 
homeless, as well as flooded roads and bridges needed by rescue personnel trying to reach 
stricken regions.229  The death toll reached 1,067 people, with most on the southern island of 
Mindanao, where floods and landslides caused major damage on December 4 (see Table 
5.17). A total of 834 people remain missing, about half of them are fishermen.230  
 
Table 5.17: Effects of Typhoon Bopha   
Super Typhoon Bopha Impacts 
Impact Metric 
People dead 1,067 
Damage to: agriculture $566,985149.36 USD 
                    Infrastructure $161,613,943.54 USD 
Total cost of damages (private properties) $61,045971.89 USD 
Total cost of damage  $789,645,064.78 USD 
Source: Fieldwork at the Office of Civil Defence Region XI in Davao City from September to October 2014.  
 
Relief food and medicines had been on standby whilst thousands of people along the 
country's eastern border were being prepared for evacuation to safer ground in preparation for 
the typhoon.231  With Bopha expected to strike the southern parts of the Philippines, as well 
as cities and provinces in Southern Tagalog and Metro Manila, the possibility of landslides 
was advised in Surigao, Davao, Compostela Valley, Misamis Bukidnon, Lanao del Norte, 
Lanao del Sur, Zamboanga, Leyte, Cebu, Bohol, Negros, Panay and Mindoro.232 The national 
police, coast guard (PCG) and navy had pre-positioned their personnel on key areas and their 
units for disaster response in preparation for Bopha's impact. Appendix M cites the AFP’s 
role during the Typhoon Bopha response.  
 
One of the most badly hit areas in the province of Compostela Valley was the municipality of 
New Bataan.  Within New Bataan is a village called Barangay Andap, where the flash flood 
originated bringing with it rocks from the mountains and destroying everything along its path 
– houses made of straw, people, animals, and farms. Along its trail was also the camp of the 
66th Infantry Brigade’s (IB) Charlie Company, which was not spared and seven soldiers lost 
their lives that day. The area is known for insurgency activities, hence the presence of the 
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Army. According to the Civil Military Operations (CMO) Commander of the 10th Infantry 
Division, Lt Col Llewellyn Binasoy, the main role of military personnel in far flung areas is 
counter-insurgency, so most equipment available are intended for fighting the rebels, not for 
disaster response.233 However, the Philippine Army acknowledges the added responsibility of 
HADR and receives disaster response trainings from the NDRRMC in partnership with the 
AFP such as the Combat Life-Saver, Search and Rescue.234 It has been found out that some 
of the typhoon victims were members of the rebel group. Asked how the military deals with 
it, Lt Col Binasoy of the 10th Infantry Division said that:  
 
“First and foremost, this is a humanitarian situation. We do not distinguish. This is 
what is good about IPSP, when we are taught about human rights, which is universal. 
And during the times of disasters, we need to adhere to the International 
Humanitarian Law. This is what we instil to the soldiers.”235   
 
In an interview with Mr McAdrian Cobero, Operations Staff of the OCD, he shared that 
Compostela Valley is one of the most progressive provinces in terms of implementing HADR 
training.236 This is largely due to the leadership and political will of Governor Arturo Uy, 
who made sure that mechanisms needed to establish an Incident Command Post (ICP) are in 
place as per implementing guidelines of the NDRRMC. The first ICP post located at the 
provincial capitol was installed two days after the typhoon made landfall. Considering the 
devastation caused by its strong winds and heavy rains – no power, down communication 
lines, and unpassable roads – this is already considered a fast response. ICPs were also 
established in the five municipalities that were affected. ICP is the field location where the 
primary functions of overall management of the incident are performed. In 2012, the 
Philippine government through the NDRRMC adopted the Incident Command System (ICS) 
as an on-scene incident management mechanism that regularly conducts training for disaster 
managers and managers of all local government units, non-government organisations and 
private sector agencies.237  Whilst government employees were the focal persons in the 
disaster response operation at the provincial ICP and the military take instructions from them, 
in the municipal ICPs, meanwhile, it was the other way around. The Armed Forces 
temporarily took the reins since the municipal employees and local police force were the 
victims themselves. According to Ms Arceli TimogTimog, Head of the Provincial General 
Services Office (PGSO), the municipal ICPs were relinquished back to the civilians after 
three days.  
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The physical presence of the military helped a lot in the disaster operation but it was not 
enough. They had guns and ammunitions but what they needed at that time included “rope, 
lifejackets and chainsaw” as commented by Lt Col Mike Aquino, Ex-O of the 1001st Infantry 
Brigade in Maco, Compostela Valley.238   Disaster response as one of the responsibilities of 
the AFP is explicitly stated in AFP Modernisation, IPSP and NSP policies, but the reality is 
the money needed to augment this obligation is not programmed within the defence budget. 
As a consequence, army units must rely on their smarts and initiative to support this need.  
 
 
5.5.4 Analysing Military Response during Natural Disasters 
 
The involvement of the AFP in disaster response operations is a function of legal and 
normative principles as documented in Presidential Decrees, Republic Acts, and 
Memorandum of Understandings (MOUs). Formerly known as the National Disaster 
Coordinating Council, the NDRRMC has been chaired by the Secretary of National Defence 
since 1978.  NDRRMC provides the armed forces a legitimate role in disaster response as 
well as stipulates a framework for civil-military engagement. The regular presence of natural 
disasters in the Philippines has afforded a historical basis for this kind of engagement: (a) that 
the armed forces takes directives from the civilian authority (whether the NDRRMC chief, 
the governor or the mayor) on deployment, activities, tasking, reporting procedures and 
timetables (including pull-out of troops from the site); and (b) although disaster response is 
secondary military mission, its significance is equally important in attaining the strategic 
goals of the military especially in areas affected by insurgency.239 As argued by Desch240 and 
Goodman,241 the participation of the AFP in humanitarian affairs and disaster response 
creates minimal disagreement, mainly because of these crucial purposes. Based on the two 
case studies discussed, there was no tension between the military and civilian authority in 
making crucial decisions concerning search and rescue operations.  
 
The NDRRMC is composed of 44 members that include the Secretaries of Agriculture, 
Education, Finance, Labour, Justice, Public Works, Transportation and Communication, 
Social Welfare and Development, Trade and Industry, Local Government, Health, 
Environment and Natural Resources. The Chief-of-Staff and Executive Secretary supported 
as council members as well.242 On the local/community level, the highest-ranking officer of 
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the AFP is a member of the local disaster risk reduction and management council 
(LDRRMC).243  The LDRRMC performs the important functions of integrating disaster risk 
reduction and climate change adaptation into the local development plans and programmes. 
The MOU on the International Humanitarian Assistance Network of 2007 had assigned the 
DND major responsibilities to facilitate international assistance. The MOU signed with the 
Departments of Health, Transportation and Communication, Justice, and Finance designed 
specific roles for each department. The DND performs rapid needs and damage assessments 
which form the basis of requesting international assistance, facilitate entry of international 
teams through Immigration and Customs, accredit the disaster relief teams and provide 
logistical support to allow for operations and air transport to disaster areas.244 Table 5.19 
indicates the major roles of the military services.245  
 
With the approval of the National Disaster Response Plan by the NDRRMC Council in June 
2014, the DND through the AFP has been appointed as the lead cluster for search, rescue, and 
retrieval (SSR) cluster with the support of DSWD, DILG, PNP, Bureau of Fire Department 
(BFP), OCD, PCG, DFA, Mines and Geosciences Bureau (MGB), PAGASA, DPWH, DOH, 
Metro Manila Development Authority (MMDA), telecommunication corporations, and other 
organisations acknowledged by the NDRRMC (see Table 5.18 for AFP roles).246 Clustering 
is an approach promoted by the United Nations (UN) as a response to the international 
humanitarian coordination system set by General Assembly Resolution 46/182 in December 
1991.247 Clusters are groups of humanitarian organisations (UN and non-UN) working in the 
main sectors of humanitarian action, e.g. shelter, food security, health, and emergency 
telecommunication.248 Clusters are formed when clear humanitarian needs exist within a 
sector, when there are a number of organisations that volunteer to help within sectors, and 
when national authorities require coordination support from local and foreign actos.249 Good 
coordination is critical in emergencies because it lessens the gaps and overlaps in 
humanitarian organizations’ work, making it viable for a more coherent and complementary 
response. More importantly, clusters provide a venue for stakeholders and partners such as 
international humanitarian actors, national and local authorities, and civil society to work 
together.  
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Table 5.18: Roles of the AFP During Natural Disasters 
Service Roles 
Philippine Army  Engineering Brigades of the Philippine Army coordinate with 
the Department of Public Works and Highways to support the 
restoration of destroyed public works infrastructure such as 
flood control, waterworks, roads, bridges, power facilities and 
other public structures and utilities. 
Philippine Air Force The Philippine Air Force coordinates with the Department of 
Transportation and Communications Air Transport Office and 
carries out the following responsibilities:  
1. Aerial search and rescue operations  
2. Directs immediate repair of damaged airports, runways, and 
facilities  
3. Attends to inter-agency contingency planning and execution 
of plans for air crashes outside of airport facilities  
4. Prepares daily outlooks with the Philippine Atmospheric. 
Philippine Navy The Philippine Navy collaborates with the Philippine Coast 
Guard (under Department of Transportation and 
Communication) to conduct rescue and emergency operations. 
The Navy assists in transporting relief goods and personnel 
via sea lanes. 
Source: Data gathered during field work at the Department of National Defence in July 2015. Information 
provided by the Centre for Excellence in Disaster Management and Humanitarian Assistance.   
 
The AFP, as a structured agency, is the most robust first responder during natural disasters. 
Aside from the lead agency in the search, rescue, and retrieval operations, the AFP also 
assisted the NDRRMC and its various levels in the regional, provincial, and municipal in the 
conduct of disaster response operations in order to save lives, protect properties and minimise 
damages caused by natural and man-made calamities. The AFP typically serves as the ‘boots 
on the ground’ in major catastrophes, providing manpower, logistics support, and relief in 
coordination with civil actors.250 The military additionally supports reconstruction and 
recovery through its engineering corps.  
 
According to MGen Jet Velarmino, the AFP adopts doctrinally the force provider and force 
employer concept in the conduct of disaster response operations. The major force providers 
are the Philippine Army, Philippine Air Force and the Philippine Navy. MGen Velarmino 
said that these major military services each organises, trains, and equips their respective 
disaster response unit, which will be deployed in humanitarian affairs and disaster response 
(HADR) operations through the unified command. On the other hand, the unified command 
provides command, control and direction of all disaster response operations at the operational 
and tactical levels, where they deploy assets from different infantry divisions to disaster 
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response units nationwide. Furthermore, MGen Velarmino shared that the role of the military 
in HADR includes but are not limited to: (i) during prevention and mitigation, engineering 
units could be tasked to construct dikes and other flood control structures; (ii) as part of 
preparedness, prepositioning of food and non-food items in disaster prone areas; and (iii) to 
disseminate early warnings and advisories in isolated areas. He emphasised that in the 
aftermath of any disasters, AFP troops are ready to conduct search, rescue, and relief 
operations. During rehabilitation and recovery, AFP engineering units may be tasked to 
rebuild communities and infrastructures such as houses, roads, and bridges. As mandated in 
the Constitution as the protector of the people, the Filipino public expects the presence of the 
military when disaster strikes. MGen Velarmino, the military sees this as an opportunity to 
help and exercise civil-military cooperation and coordination. Both cases reveal the 
efficiency of the military despite being poorly equipped for these types of operations (not 
surprising, given the institution’s counter-insurgency thrust).  
 
 
5.5.5 Combating Transnational Crime  
 
The incidences of various transnational crimes within the Philippines have created a 
significant impact on its political, economic, and sociocultural stability and security. The 
country addresses a number of illegal activities at sea such as smuggling of goods, trafficking 
of people, trade of illicit drugs, illegal trafficking of arms, piracy and armed robbery, and 
maritime terrorism.251 The activities may occur within Philippine national jurisdiction or 
conducted by Filipino nationals but nevertheless have an impact on the region.252 
 
Trafficking in People: Smuggling and trafficking of people, mostly women and children, is a 
component of illegal migration of Filipinos overseas.  The Philippines is a major source of 
people trafficked to other countries, particularly to the United States, Singapore, Canada, 
Japan, Italy, United Kingdom, Jordan, Malaysia, South Korea, and Saudi Arabia.253 
Philippine authorities report that the number of victims of trafficking in people increased 
from 220 in 2004 to 359 in 2007.254  The foremost arrangements of trafficking in people to 
these countries are through illegal immigration, mail-order bride scheme, family tours, 
cultural exchange, and adoption.255 As the Philippines witnesses an increasing number of 
Filipino women migrating to other countries, the trafficking of these women in the hands of 
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illegal recruiters, slavers, and prostitution rings has also increased.256 Some of these Filipinos 
become subject to domestic violence, as well as to labour and human rights abuses.  
 
The degree of illegal human trafficking by sea involving Filipinos to neighbouring states is 
not known.  However, incidents have been cited by the Philippine government of women 
trafficked in cargo vessels, and in freezer vans and drums, and some of these women do not 
survive the journey.257 A more common problem associated with the illegal transport of 
people is the illegal migration of refugees to the Philippines.  Under the human rights code of 
the Philippines, the movement of asylum seekers and refugees is not illegal.258 However, 
according to the research of Feliciano and de la Cerna, there are boats transporting people 
through western and southern seas that are not spotted by border patrols.259 This indicates 
that maritime borders are porous and they do not have proper monitoring and surveillance 
system, and thus susceptible to illegal activities such as the trafficking of people, and perhaps 
illegal arms and drugs.260  Table 5.19 shows the number of convictions from 2005 to 2015.  
 
Table 5.19: Total Number of Convictions 2005-2015 
Year Number of 
Convictions 
Number of Persons 
Convicted 
2005 7 6 
2006 0 0 
2007 3 4 
2008 6 5 
2009 10 11 
2010 18 16 
2011 25 32 
2012 27 32 
2013 27 37 
2014 55 57 
2015  29 46 
   
Total 223 246 
Source: Inter-Agency Council Against Trafficking, Office of the President, 2015. Data obtained during 
fieldwork visit at the office of the Philippine Centre for Transnational Crime in Manila in July 2015.  
  
Reflected in Table 5.19 are an increasing number of convictions since 2005.  The Philippine 
government increased its funding for the Inter-Agency Council against Trafficking (IACAT) 
to $2.4 million in 2013 and continued efforts to implement anti-trafficking laws at the 
national, regional, and provincial levels.261 IACAT was established to enforce the Anti-
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Trafficking in Persons Act of 2003 (Republic Act 9208). The Council undertook notable 
efforts to prevent the trafficking of overseas through training and awareness campaigns for 
government officials, prospective overseas workers, and members of the public and to 
proactively identify and rescue victims exploited within the country. The government 
obtained 27 trafficking convictions in 2013, which doubled to 55 in 2014.  
 
Illegal Drug Trafficking: The Philippines is geographically at the crossroads of drug 
trafficking in the Asia-Pacific region. Known as a producer, exporter, importer, and consumer 
of synthetic drugs, the country is in a strategic location for the transit and market of these 
drugs.262 Drug syndicates consider the Philippines as an investment haven for drugs and 
money laundering, and a recreation place.263 In a global review on drug consumption and 
production, the Philippines has been cited to have reported an increasing trend in cannabis 
consumption and methamphetamine production, and is identified as source of synthetic drug 
precursors to various destinations in the world.264 The same with the issue on trafficking in 
persons, it has not been determined as to how much illegal drugs that originate in certain 
areas of Asia, such as China, have successfully entered the Philippines undetected through 
the country’s small ports.265 Table 5.20 shows the accomplishments of the Philippine 
government against illicit drug trafficking from 2011 to 2014.  
 
Table 5.20: Anti-Drug Activities 
Accomplishments 
 
2011 2012 2013 2014 
Anti-drug operations 12,269 9,885 11,474 16,939 
Arrests 10,636 10,159 9,162 13,792 
Neutralization of 
drug groups  
259 236 18 5 
 
Drug cases filed 12,627 12,534 10,502 17,619 
Dismantling of drug 
labs and dens 
6 81 92 118 
Source: Philippine Drug Enforcement Agency (PDEA) Annual Reports 2011, 2012, 2013, and 2014. Data 
obtained during fieldwork visit at the office of the Philippine Centre for Transnational Crime in Manila in July 
2014. 
 
It was in the mid-1990s when the illicit manufacture of crystalline methamphetamine and the 
first industrial-scale clandestine manufacturing facility was discovered.266 Since 2004, the 
Philippines has the highest estimated methamphetamine prevalence rate globally, and since 
then the number has been stable or slightly declining.267 Still, the manufacture of crystalline 
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methamphetamine continues in the Philippines, with 118 manufacturing laboratories detected 
and dismantled in 2014, an increase from 92 in 2013. (see Table 5.20).268 Physical sizes of 
these clandestine drug laboratories can range from small ‘kitchen-type’ to large and medium-
sized facilities; and can be located in both rural and urban areas.269 It is estimated that about 
14 per cent of the total number of local municipalities is drug infested.270  About 5 per cent of 
the total population are dependent on illicit drug, including 7 per cent of the total youth 
population.271 The illegal drug trade in the Philippines is a multibillion dollar industry 
involving prominent individuals (e.g. politicians, law enforcers) and foreign nationals (e.g. 
Chinese), who not only focus their activities in major cities like Metro Manila and Cebu,272 
but has expanded to provinces and municipalities.273  
 
A number of factors contribute to the increase in drug trafficking in the Philippines. 
Economic difficulties and poverty may be identified as the main reasons for people resorting 
to drug trade as an alternative source of income. There has been an influx of members of 
transnational criminal organisations masquerading as legitimate investors and tourists in the 
country. Liberalization and deregulation have also been cited as reasons for the movement of 
illegal goods, including illicit drugs.274   For these reasons, law enforcement agencies regard 
drug trafficking as a national security threat.  
 
Apart from contributing to the increasing level of crime in the Philippines, it is surmised that 
drugs can finance activities of insurgent and secessionist groups. Local authorities have 
discovered marijuana plantations in some areas in the Philippines with high incidence of 
insurgency activities.275  Likewise, the amount of illegal drugs transported by sea, land, or air 
remains unclear; however, some areas have been identified as coastal trafficking points 
around the archipelago.276 Seizures of illegal drugs can enable them to be traced from their 
origin in certain parts of Asia to their point of entry into the country through small ports 
along the extensive coastline. In 2012, for example, illicit drugs perceived to have originated 
in South America have been seized in the Philippines, possibly intended for onward 
trafficking to mainland China and Hong Kong.277  
 
Piracy and Armed Robbery at Sea: Piracy in the Philippines sees a decreasing trend based on 
Table 5.21. The table shows that there have only been 52 incidents of piracy in the Philippine 
waters from 2006 to 2015, compared to a total of 1,046 incidents in the region. However, the 
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problem is far from over, especially with the porous borders surrounding southern 
Philippines. Mindanao has had a long history of peaceful trade with Malaysia and Indonesia. 
But what is concerning is the presence of pirates that attack coastal communities and 
vessels278 and make the Sulu archipelago a base for them to resupply, rest, and plan their next 
raiding expeditions.279  Compared with the Strait of Malacca, which recorded 55 attacks in 
2015, the problem of piracy and armed robbery in southern Philippines is more rampant.280 
The insurgency and terrorism problem in the Philippines have added to the security 
challenges confronted by the security forces in Mindanao. Secessionist groups such as the 
Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF) and the Abu Sayyaf Group (ASG) have ethnic affinity 
with seafaring families and contribute to the prevalence of piracy in Southern Philippines.281  
 
 
Illegal Trafficking of Arms: There are about 630,000 licensed firearms in the Philippines, 
with an average increase of 65,802 registered firearms each year.282  Most of these firearms 
are sourced locally through licensed defence firms such as Armscor and UDMC; or imported 
legally from the U.S., China, Israel and Europe.283  However, based on the information 
gathered by the intelligence agencies it was revealed that there are more than 300,000 loose 
firearms in the country, which are owned by gun enthusiasts, hobbyists, political warlords, or 
criminal groups.284  Smuggling of firearms is conducted through air and seaports through the 
delivery of packages, big equipment, appliances, and international aid. But it is through the 
seaports where these smuggling of loose firearms most commonly occur. According to the 
interview with an official of Philippine Centre on Transnational Crime (PCTC), the ports of 
Manila, Cebu, Leyte, Negros provinces, and Mindanao have been used to smuggle guns to be 
sold to armed threat groups and criminal gangs.285 Local guns, usually of less firearm power, 
are manufactured in the Philippines and shipped to both local and foreign markets on board 
passenger vessels and fishing boats. More sophisticated and high-powered firearms are 
smuggled into the country.286 
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Table 5.21: Number of Piracy Attacks by Location, 2006 - mid-2015 
 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 
 AC AT AC AT AC AT AC AT AC AT AC AT AC AT AC AT AC AT AC AT 
Philippines 3 2 5 1 6 2 4 1 5 0 4 2 3 0 5 0 5 0 3 1 
Indonesia 39 10 33 7 24 1 14 5 35 10 46 2 65 6 83 7 41 5 10 0 
Malaysia 10 1 7 1 12 0 12 3 20 0 14 3 11 0 6 0 4 1 2 0 
Myanmar 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Vietnam 3 0 5 0 11 1 8 0 13 0 8 0 3 1 8 1 6 0 13 0 
Gulf of Thailand 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
South China Sea 3 0 1 5 4 2 11 2 17 8 12 6 7 0 10 1 40 2 10 1 
Straits of 
Malacca & 
Singapore 
6 7 3 4 6 4 6 3 4 3 24 2 12 1 12 0 44 4 55 5 
Thailand 1 0 1 0 0 0 1 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 
Singapore 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 2 0 3 0 2 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
TOTAL 65 20 55 18 63 10 57 15 98 21 112 15 103 8 124 9 140 12 94 7 
* AC-Actual; AT-Attempted 
 
Source: ReCAAP Annual Reports, 2006-2015. Data obtained during fieldwork at the Philippine Centre on Transnational Crime in Manila on 14 July 2014 and at the 
Philippine Coast Guard in  July 2015.     
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A number of factors have contributed to the proliferation of illegal trafficking of arms in the 
Philippines. The high marketability of firearms and the involvement of unscrupulous officials 
in arms smuggling for use in private arms are the two main reasons that this problem remains 
unabated in the Philippines.287 The lack of control of gun dealership and manufacturing in the 
Philippines, as well as the pilferage of arms from the military and police, also lead to arms 
smuggling.288 
 
 
5.5.6 Military and Law Enforcement Coordination 
 
Similar to global trends, the Philippines has associated some of the maritime security threats 
with a wider context of transnational crime.  Illegal trafficking in drugs, goods and persons, 
piracy and terrorism all have land and sea components and are linked to transnational 
criminal groups. The Philippines estimates that the profit from drug trafficking is almost half 
the country’s national budget, whilst terrorist groups have used laundered money to support 
their activities and expand their facilities.289 Some activities of terrorist groups also include 
kidnapping or hostage for profit, such as the kidnapping by the ASG of 21 people at the 
Sipadan Beach Resort, Malaysia in 2000 and 20 people at Dos Palmas Beach, Palawan, in 
2001, the victims of whom were brought to Southern Mindanao.290  Although the economic 
benefits from conducting these illegal activities at sea have yet to be accurately determined, a 
holistic approach in addressing these concerns not just from a maritime security perspective 
but also from a national security perspective is warranted.  
 
There are more than 40 individual and inter-agency institutions governing the marine and 
maritime sectors in the Philippines, which involve some functions related to maintaining 
good order at sea.  Each of these government institutions has a number of priorities set out in 
their mandates, annual plans and programmes. For example, the Maritime Industry Authority 
has adopted a ten-point programme that institutionalises an advocacy campaign for the safety 
travel and protection of the environment. Law enforcement agencies have mandates to protect 
the territorial integrity of the Philippines, promote maritime safety and security, protect the 
marine environment and provide services such as search and rescue, and vessel traffic 
management. Enforcement agencies cooperate in order to carry out more effective 
mechanisms against illegal activities at sea, such as the joint manning of vessel traffic 
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monitoring centres by the Philippine Ports Authority and the Philippine Coast Guard (PCG), 
and port state control by these agencies along with the Bureau of Customs, the Bureau of 
Immigration and Deportation, the Bureau of Quarantine and Inspection Services and the 
Philippine National Police. A number of other initiatives have been established by the 
Philippines, such as the deployment of sea marshals or counter-terrorist teams on board 
vessels in the aftermath of the SuperFerry 14 incident. Each sea marshal team is composed of 
officers from the PCG, the AFP, the Philippine National Police (PNP) and private ship 
security agencies. In support of the sea marshal operations, coast guard K-9 units are also 
used to search for bombs, firearms and illegal drugs in cargo containers as a pre-departure 
port security measure.  
 
The issues addressed through inter-agency cooperation also demonstrate the maritime 
priorities of the Philippines. Some of the existing collaborative mechanisms established by 
various government institutions include the Anti-Terrorism Council (ATC), the Inter-Agency 
Counter-Narcotics Operations Network – Philippine Drug Enforcement Agency (ICON-
PDEA), the Inter-Agency Philippine Border Management Network (IPBMN), the National 
Committee on Illegal Entrants (NCIE), the National Intelligence Coordinating Agency 
(NICA), the National Law Enforcement Coordinating Committee (NALECC), and the 
Presidential Anti-Smuggling Group (PASG).291  Law enforcement agencies, particularly the 
PCG, are also cooperating with the Land Transportation Office to inspect documents of 
vehicles being transported by ferry and to monitor the illegal transport of smuggled and 
stolen vehicles. Similarly, a Joint Coastal Coordination Desk was formed by the PCG and the 
Bureau of Customs to identify coastal ports where no customs official or employee is 
regularly stationed. The Joint Coastal Coordination Desk is also tasked to receive confidential 
information related to smuggling operations; take testimony, receive evidence, administer 
oaths, summon witnesses and require the submission of documents by subpoena; and assist in 
the prosecution of smuggling cases.292 
 
Furthermore, President Aquino signed Executive Order 57 in September 2011 to establish a 
National Coast Watch System (NCWS),293 harmonising diverse policies and programmes that 
cut across multiple agencies including the Philippine Navy, the Philippine Coast Guard and 
the Philippine National Police-Maritime Group.294 Under this initiative, which establishes a 
National Coast Watch Council charged to develop strategic direction and policies, the 
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agencies are mandated to work together to enhance maritime domain awareness across the 
country. Whilst there are overlaps in terms of duties and functions, minimal cooperation had 
been observed between agencies prior to the creation of the NCWC. In the context of a 
changing security landscape, it is essential that a common operating picture be shared across 
this group of diverse stakeholders.  The NCWS is an initiative of the Philippines with critical 
support coming from its international partners. The U.S government, through the Defence 
Threat Reduction Agency, has provided US$20 million to cover the costs of data integration 
from various agencies to the facility, as well as installation, training, and radio 
communications.295  Discussions with other international partners are on-going as the 
Philippines looks for new opportunities to cooperate on capacity-building programmes. 
 
 
5.6 Summary of Findings  
 
This chapter has analysed the policy formulation, strategy, and implementation of defence 
and development policies in the Philippines. The Philippine government has been 
instrumental in enacting policies that give credence to the role of the AFP not only in 
defence, but also in development. Considering the internal and external factors that have 
influenced Philippine security policies, the AFP has managed to engage the public and 
private sectors through partnerships and collaborations, in such activities as defence 
industrialisation, counterterrorism/counter-insurgency, and non-traditional security. These 
engagements have managed to create innovation, skills and jobs, promote development 
projects, as well as enhance coordination and response. However, the extent of the impact on 
these performances has been limited. Table 5.22 provides a snapshot of how the policies were 
implemented based on the case studies specified.  
 
The study has focused on three areas as main themes to evaluate the four policies, namely, 
the AFP Modernisation Act of 1995 and 2010, the IPSP 2011-2016, and the NSP 2011-2016. 
The three main focal points of the study are the defence industry, internal security, and non-
traditional security. Four defence companies were surveyed and 17 experts were interviewed 
to talk about the Philippine defence industry. On the internal security situation in the Negros 
Occidental and Maguindanao, 16 individuals coming from the armed forces, other 
government agencies, non-government organisations, academe, church, and a former rebel 
were interviewed. Meanwhile, 38 individuals were interviewed about non-traditional security, 
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which focused on transnational crime and the AFP’s response during Typhoon Bopha in 2012 
and Typhoon Haiyan in 2013.  
 
 
Table 5.22: Snapshot of the Implementation and Evaluation of Policies  
 
Metrics 
Practice 
Defence Industry Internal Security Non-Traditional 
Security 
Strengthened defence 
capability 
N Capabilities 
significantly 
low a 
P Reprioritization 
from external to 
internal security b 
P Collaboration 
between Coast 
Guard and AFP c 
Increased privatisation 
and efficiency 
N Weak 
procurement 
law d 
    
Increased employment 
and skill generation 
N More foreign 
contracts e  
    
Increased supply chain 
and infrastructure 
development 
N Will take 
another 10-15 
years f 
    
Increased intelligence 
successes 
  P Increased number 
of rebel returnees, 
decreased support 
of the mass base, 
and reduced number 
of clashes g 
P Collaboration 
between Coast 
Guard and AFP h 
Greater civil-military 
relations 
  P Church, NGOs, 
academe are 
involved i  
P Command posts j 
Increased development 
projects 
P Defence 
economic zone 
P Infrastructures and 
livelihood k 
 Clearing of roads 
and rebuilding 
houses l 
Enhanced coordination   P Collaboration 
between AFP, 
government and 
public m 
P AFP first 
partners in 
rescue n 
Enhanced maritime 
security 
P Purchase of 
naval and air 
assets o  
  P Procurement of 
multi-use 
equipment p 
Improved response 
time 
    P Early warning 
system q 
Effectiveness of 
response 
P ISO capabilities 
for HADR r 
  N 
 
 
 
 
P 
 
 
* High in 
personnel 
capability but 
low in 
equipment s 
* DND-AFP-
OCD-LGU 
coordination t 
Prosecution and 
punishment of 
    P Establishment of 
the National 
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traffickers Coast Watch 
System u 
*P – positive; N – negative 
Sources of primary data: 
 Attended the presentation by Brigadier General Guillermo Molina, AFP Deputy Chief of Staff for Plans, J5 at 
the House of Representatives in July 2015, Quezon City, Philippines; Interview with Brigadier General Jon 
Aying, Deputy Chief of Staff for Plans of the Armed Forces of the Philippines; Interview with Dr Rommel 
Banlaoi, Executive Director of the Philippine Institute for Peace, Violence and Terrorism Research. 
b Attended the presentation by Brigadier General Guillermo Molina, AFP Deputy Chief of Staff for Plans, J5 at 
the House of Representatives in July 2015, Quezon City, Philippines 
c Attended the presentation of Admiral Rodolfo Isorena, former Commandant of the Philippine Coast Guard in 
July 2015. 
d Interview with Brigadier General Jon Aying, Deputy Chief of Staff for Plans of the Armed Forces of the 
Philippines; Attended presentation of Assistant Secretary Patrick Velez of the Finance, Acquisitions, 
Installations, Logistics Office of the Department of National Defence 
e Interview with Dr Peter Paul Galvez, Chief of Staff of the Secretary of the Department of National Defence; 
Attended presentation of Assistant Secretary Patrick Velez of the Finance, Acquisitions, Installations, Logistics 
Office of the Department of National Defence 
f Interview with Brigadier General Jon Aying, Deputy Chief of Staff for Plans of the Armed Forces of the 
Philippines; Interview with Dr Peter Paul Galvez, Chief of Staff of the Secretary of the Department of National 
Defence. 
g Interview with Brigadier General Jon Aying, former Brigade Commander of the 302nd Infantry Brigade in 
Negros Occidental; Interview with Jennie Macalipsay, Social Worker, Provincial Social Welfare and 
Development Office in February 2014; Interview with Brigadier General Arnel dela Vega, former Commander 
of the 603rd Infantry Brigade based in Maguindanao 
h Attended the presentation of Admiral Rodolfo Isorena, former Commandant of the Philippine Coast Guard in 
July 2015.; Interview with Lt Col Llewellyn Binasoy, former Commander of the Civil Military Operations at 
the 10th Infantry Division, Davao City in September 2014. 
i Interview with Harry Pineda and Edwin Lopez, Executive Director and Advocacy Officer of Alter Trade 
Foundation based in Bacolod City in February 2014; Interview with Brigadier General Arnel dela Vega, 
former Commander of the 603rd Infantry Brigade based in Maguindanao; Interview with Captain Gregorio 
Jose of the 603rd Infantry Brigade based in Maguindanao 
j Interview with Arceli Timogtimog, Head of the Provincial General Services Office in Compostela Valley 
k Interview with Sharon Juance, Project Development Officer, Technology and Livelihood Development Centre 
in Bacolod City in February 2014; Interview with Brigadier General Jon Aying, former Brigade Commander 
of the 302nd Infantry Brigade in Negros Occidental; Interview with Nellen Gomonit, Technical Staff at the 
Negros Occidental Provincial Capitol in February 2014 
l Interview with Arceli Timogtimog, Head of the Provincial General Services Office in Compostela Valley in 
October 2014; Interview with Colonel Neddy Espulgar, Commander of the 19th Infantry Battalion based in 
Tanauan in Leyte province in September 2014 
m Interview with Brigadier General Jon Aying, former Brigade Commander of the 302nd Infantry Brigade in 
Negros Occidental; Interview with Nellen Gomonit, Technical Staff at the Negros Occidental Provincial 
Capitol in February 2014; Interview with Jennie Macalipsay, Social Worker, Provincial Social Welfare and 
Development Office in February 2014; Interview with Dr Peter Paul Galvez, Chief of Staff of the Secretary of 
the Department of National Defence in July 2015 
n Interview with Arceli Timogtimog, Head of the Provincial General Services Office in Compostela Valley; 
Interview with Dr Blanche Gobenchiong, Regional Director of the Office of Civil Defence Region VIII based in 
Tacloban City; Interview with Lt Col Mike Aquino, Executive Officer of the 1001st Infantry Brigade in Maco, 
Compostela Valley in October 2014 
o Interview with Dr Peter Paul Galvez, Chief of Staff of the Secretary of the Department of National Defence. 
p Interview with Dr Peter Paul Galvez, Chief of Staff of the Secretary of the Department of National Defence 
q Interview with Lt Col Mike Logico, 66th Infantry Battalion Commander, Compostela Valley; Attended the 
presentation by Brigadier General Guillermo Molina, AFP Deputy Chief of Staff for Plans, J5 at the House of 
Representatives in July 2015, Quezon City, Philippines; Interview with Undersecretary Jose Luis Alano, 
Executive Director of the National Coast Watch Council; Interview with MGen Jet Velarmino, Commander of 
8th Infantry Division and Commander Task Force Haiyan on 20 September 2014 in Tacloban City 
r Attended the presentation by Brigadier General Guillermo Molina, AFP Deputy Chief of Staff for Plans, J5 at 
the House of Representatives in July 2015, Quezon City, Philippines 
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s Interview with Colonel Neddy Espulgar, Commander of the 19th Infantry Battalion based in Tanauan in Leyte 
province in September 2014. 
t Interview with Dr Peter Paul Galvez, Chief of Staff of the Secretary of the Department of National Defence; 
Interview with MGen Jet Velarmino, Commander of 8th Infantry Division and Commander Task Force Haiyan 
on 20 September 2014 in Tacloban City 
u Interview with Police Inspector Donel Sungkip, Deputy Chief of the East Mindanao Field Office of the 
Philippine Centre on Transnational Crime in July 2014; Interview with Dr Rommel Banlaoi, Executive 
Director of the Philippine Institute for Peace, Violence and Terrorism Research in November2012; Interview 
with Undersecretary Jose Luis Alano, Executive Director of the National Coast Watch Council in April 2015. 
 
 
Table 5.22 notes that the implementation of policies has a low impact on the industrialisation 
of the defence sector. Despite the strong emphasis of the policies toward improving the 
arsenal of the Philippine armed forces, little has been done to materialise this goal. Mainly, 
the complaint of the private defence companies is the lack of support for local manufacturers. 
The willingness to participate in public bidding is visible, but the weak procurement law 
prevents smaller players to do so. Most of the time, it is the bigger foreign companies who 
acquire these government contracts. The private companies have invested in computer-
operated machines to increase their production but they need cooperation in terms of sales in 
order for their business to grow as well as generate employment. The potential of the defence 
economic zone, however, is a promising venture to realise this participation.  
 
Comparatively, the evaluation of AFP’s response to internal security and non-traditional 
security showed a more positive outlook. The AFP, especially the Army, has a lot of 
experience in internal security. The AFP has manpower strength of 125,000 of which 68 per 
cent or 85,000 soldiers are with the Philippine Army (PA) distributed in 11 major units 
throughout the country. During Martial Law, the PA had the reputation of being human rights 
abusers, but through security sector reforms, the outlook towards men in uniform is changing. 
In both Negros Occidental and Maguindanao provinces, the presence of the military still 
connotes the existence of insurgency and terrorism, but engagement with the local 
communities and NGOs has proven to be an effective intelligence strategy. The engineering 
unit of the AFP has also been called to build roads and bridges in hard to reach areas.  
 
The role of the AFP during natural disasters has also been positively evaluated by the 
interviewees. In the two typhoon tragedies, the armed forces based in the areas were the first 
responder, where their role in search and rescue has been crucial. Prior to the onslaught 
Typhoon Bopha and Typhoon Haiyan, military units have already been deployed to assist the 
residents in evacuation. However, the tragedies, especially during Typhoon Haiyan, also 
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revealed the deficiency of the AFP in response capability. Furthermore, the collaboration 
between the AFP and the PSG can be attributed to the response against transnational crime. 
The PSG’s capability to investigate and capture traffickers is limited due to the lack of boats, 
so they join forces with the Philippine Navy (PN) to strengthen their capacity.  The overall 
picture showed that implementation in some areas worked, and in other areas need more 
work.  
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Chapter 6 
Conclusions and Policy Recommendations 
 
 
6.1  Summary 
 
The purpose of this research project has been to evaluate the contribution of the Philippine 
defence sector to national development through the lenses of three areas: defence 
industrialisation, internal security, and non-traditional security. Whilst the conventional view 
is that defence is a burden on development, the question this study poses is whether, by 
contrast, in the Philippine context, there is a positive relationship between defence and 
development; that is, that defence expenditure contributes to development outputs such as 
employment, skill-generation and even infrastructural investment.  
 
The experience of the Philippines in the field of defence paints a dreary picture despite it 
being the envy of its neighbours in the immediate years after World War II.  Through the 
years, the country saw the deterioration of its military capabilities amidst the continuing 
threat of insurgency and terrorism.  In recent times, the Philippine government has viewed 
defence as a way to boost the economy.  It has followed the trend of incorporating the 
inclusion of socio-economic aspects in its defence utility mandate. However, there the Armed 
Forces of the Philippines (AFP) remain under-resourced.  The opportunity costs of defence 
are especially high for the poorer nations, and so a case study of the Philippines is 
particularly relevant, focusing on analysing the defence-development nexus from the 
perspective of a developing country. 
 
The enabling objectives of the study are as follows: (i) to evaluate the different defence 
frameworks, tools, processes and mechanisms by cross reference to defence strategies in 
selected developed and developing countries; (ii) to determine the factors that contribute 
towards an ‘effective’ defence and development strategy by using pre-determined metrics; 
(iii) to discuss and critically analyse the development of the Philippine defence policies and 
industry performance, and its contribution to national development; and (iv) to propose 
policy recommendations towards an effective development model enabling defence to play a 
more robust role in meeting Philippine security challenges.  
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The literature is abound with scholars addressing a more holistic approach to security that 
includes comprehensive, collective and cooperative measures that aim to ensure security for 
each person.  In particular, international cooperation has increased resulting in transnational 
policing to enhance global security against potential threats caused by terrorism and 
organised crime, and lately non-traditional challenges.  The importance of comprehensive 
security to both developed and developing countries has led to a wealth of literature on 
defence and development. More than just a trendy catchphrase, comprehensive security has 
expanded to include economic, health, and environmental concerns, as well as the physical 
security of the individual, of which all are intertwined.  The shift from traditional to 
comprehensive security is reflected in the changing global security landscape as evident in 
the physical and economic issues surrounding the state, economy and the individual. This 
study aims to peel off the comprehensive security layers revealing the essential role of 
defence and development, in this case, the Philippines. 
 
The different schools of thought and theories highlighted in Chapter 2 also showed two 
differing perspectives on the role of defence to development. On one hand, some scholars 
view that defence is a burden to growth and development as it massively shifts welfare-
enhancing resources to military expenditures. They argue that with these cutbacks 
development projects are sacrificed in order for defence programmes can be maintained. On 
the other hand, other scholars claim that the military plays a progressive role in nation 
building. Chapter 2 explores studies that have identified defence as a force that facilitates 
development. 
 
In attaining foreign policy objectives, defence and development strategies have long been 
utilized, eventually blurring the lines between them. Although their primary role is to defend 
the state from external aggression, Armed Forces across the world have performed duties 
beyond their defence responsibility. Militaries have taken on tasks related to economic 
development, nation-building, the preservation of political stability, managing public 
enterprises, providing disaster relief, enforcing public order and engaging efforts to conserve 
natural resources. The defence posture practiced by Singapore, China and Japan suggests the 
need to re-examine the validity of Benoit’s argument that defence contributes positively to 
development.  Countries like Singapore, China and Japan have taken advantage of new ideas 
about security espoused by contemporary scholars, policymakers and international 
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institutions.  Apart from state sovereignty and territorial integrity, these three Asian states 
have embarked on ways to address threats such as climate change, piracy, human/drug 
trafficking, pandemics, natural disasters, and transnational crime.  Most of these threats 
require a coordinated response as well as transnational cooperation among all stakeholders 
(such as the government, non-government organisations, local communities, and other non-
state actors). 
 
Whilst the Philippines may not enjoy the concept of ‘rich nation, strong army’ like Singapore, 
China and Japan, to some extent, the country has sought to link defence and development in 
its pursuit to create an integrated security strategy through especially the following three 
policies of the Internal Peace and Security Plan (2010), the Armed Forces of the Philippines 
Modernisation (1995 and 2010), and the Philippine Development Plan (2011-2016).  A 
country with both insurgency and terrorism threats, the Armed Forces of the Philippines have 
been at the forefront of a campaign to tackle some of these domestic challenges, and as part 
of its pursuit for political and economic stability, have embarked on ‘non-traditional’ 
missions. As part of the comprehensive security action plan, these non-traditional missions 
involve carrying out long-term projects aimed at contributing to the economic development 
of the country.   
 
Against this backdrop, Chapter 3 has sought to provide a clearer context of how defence 
industrialisation, internal security, and non-traditional security are defined in this study. The 
domains defence industry, internal security and non-traditional security remain strong areas 
for which the armed forces can enhance its strategic and operations capabilities. As defence 
industries around the world are expanding in terms of national security significance, its 
relevance in terms of economic importance and technological evolution is also increasing. 
Since the 9/11 attacks, interest in the study of terrorism has heightened especially today when 
terrorist tactics are becoming more lethal. In the Philippines, insurgency emerged from the 
combination of nationalism and anti-colonialism sentiment against the ruling elites.  
Employing counterterrorism and counter-insurgency responses require strategic thinking that 
involves the use of hard and soft approaches.  
 
The 1987 Constitution has made this mandate clear that whilst the AFP is tasked with both 
internal and external defence, the military must also be at the forefront of nation building. 
One of the questions asked in Chapter 4 was, ‘Does the Armed Forces of the Philippines 
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perform new roles?’ Based on the study, the AFP has participated in non-traditional activities 
since it was established, as part of its role as the ‘protector of the state and its people.’ In 
recent years, the AFP has been involved in humanitarian affairs and disaster response, as well 
as coordinating with the Coast Guard and police in tackling transnational crime. Furthermore, 
the AFP also participates in peacekeeping and humanitarian operations in countries such as 
East Timor and Haiti.  The various functions performed by the AFP result from legal and 
historical factors, as well as international cooperation.  Today, the AFP’s education and 
training programmes offered by the Department of National Defence, as well as the 
acquisition of equipment are likewise leaning more toward the building of capabilities that 
will allow the soldiers to respond to an array of non-traditional security concerns.  
 
 
6.2 Conclusions 
 
The mission thrusts of the AFP demonstrate the organisation’s multiple objectives that equip 
it as a whole to carry out a mandate to protect the state and the people.  In the process of 
evaluation, a number of questions have been addressed. Has defence contributed significantly 
to development? Has there been a genuine development of a Philippine defence industry? 
Has there been an effective internal security effort? Is the role of the armed forces in non-
traditional security relevant? Finally, this study has sought to analyse defence and 
development in the Philippines by reference to certain metrics held to reflect the breadth and 
depth of local security endeavour. Accordingly, based on the findings of the analysis in 
Chapter 5, this study offers the following conclusions:  
 
1. Philippines defence capability is insufficient.  
 
Minimum credible defence is a concept that has become popular in the public debate over the 
modernisation of the AFP. Unfortunately, the Philippine government has not articulated this 
concept very clearly.  Based on interviews, some government officials simply associate 
minimum credible defence with the acquisition of new military equipment and the 
improvement of military infrastructure.  Others believe strategic military training is a crucial 
component of this effort. Where the modernisation programmes are concerned, the 
assessment is gloomy. When President Benigno Aquino stepped down as president in June 
2016, the projects under the AFP Modernisation Act of 1995 (R.A. 7898) remain incomplete, 
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with several more projects still ongoing, while others have not even started. On the other 
hand, the revised AFP Modernisation Programme under Republic Act 10349 has only 2 of 33 
projects awarded, although President Benigno Aquino announced in his 2015 State of the 
Nation Address that it has signed 30 projects for implementation and funding by the 
Department of Budget Management (see Appendix for list)   
 
Notwithstanding, the AFP has benefited considerably under President Aquino’s 
administration, where multiple modernisation projects have either reached significant 
acquisition stages or have been completed entirely during his tenure. These included the 
acquisition of 12 FA-50 fighter jets for the Air Defence Wing of the Philippine Air Force, 
and two frigates and two anti-submarine helicopters for the Navy.  
 
2. Defence industrialisation in the Philippines is immature.   
 
The local defence industrial base plays a vital role in the quality, availability, and 
sustainability of the defence material solution. Section 5.3.2 in Chapter 5 indicates that the 
Philippines has a weak defence industrial base. In particular, there are no major players for 
capital equipment and primary defence assets. Defence acquisition relies on foreign military 
hardware to fill the shortfall in capability. In essence, the AFP and DND acquires capital 
assets from foreign vendors to answer current requirements. By way of contrast, with the 
presence of a strong industrial base, government and private players may enter into 
collaboration to produce cutting-edge technology to address not only the present needs, but 
also future technological requirements (Defence Economic Zone). 
 
It was examined in Chapter 3 what defines a defence industry. If these measures are applied 
to the Philippines, it can be concluded that defence industry is neglected despite the presence 
of local arms manufacturers. The Self-Reliant Defence Posture (SRDP) has been one of the 
government programmes that helped pushed competition among private defence firms. The 
promise of a robust defence industry in the Philippines was seen during the initial stage of the 
SRDP, however, due to factors such as corruption and too much dependence on the 
government as the buyer, the programme did not progress.   More than a decade later, the 
AFP Modernisation Act of 1995 and 2010, as policies, attempt to push for the modernisation 
of the military armaments, and along with it the defence industry, but challenges in the 
procurement law discourages local players to bid.  
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At the national level, the symbiotic relationship between SRDP and the wider national 
development policy should be fully emphasised. Specific time-bound project goals should be 
conceptualised in consultation with stakeholders. Initiating an industry-wide knowledge base 
involves sustaining research and monitoring process should be considered to periodically 
determine gaps between the policies. No doubt the country can produce small arms 
equipment and supplies, as ascertained in Chapter 5 however; the Philippines needs to 
concentrate on upgrading its arms production status in order for the economy to benefit from 
its external defence initiatives as well as any long range modernisation efforts. With the 
Defence Economic Zone now in the works (Section 5.3.3), it would be practical for the 
Philippines to embark on a long term plan involving R&D efforts to implement the 
programmes.  
 
3. Internal security related problems have decreased.  
 
Going by the number of rebel returnees in Negros Occidental (Table 5.13), decreasing 
insurgency and terrorism activities in the three Maguindanao municipalities (Section 5.4.3), 
internal security challenges in the Philippines have reduced. A big part of this outcome is 
derived from the local stakeholders taking ownership of the programmes of the government 
through the armed forces. Additionally, a strong support from the local government units 
gave the programme more leverage to reach the intended beneficiaries. Domestic conflicts in 
the Philippines, more often than not, occur in the poorest provinces of the country, where 
poverty incidence and unemployment rate are high, making its residents more vulnerable to 
recruitment by the communist rebels. With the support of the local populace, counter-
insurgency and counter-terrorism efforts in Negros Occidental and Maguindanao have been 
successful. 
 
The Internal Peace and Security Plan (IPSP) of the Aquino administration is a counter-
insurgency strategy that aimed at winning hearts and minds of the people rather than directly 
confronting the enemy. Since its inception in 2011, IPSP has been successful in so far as 
putting emphasis on the combat and non-combat dimension of the campaign. Whilst combat 
operations are deemed necessary, it is considered the ‘last resort,’ giving more importance in 
engaging the local community, such as what they have done in Negros Occidental (Section 
5.4.2) and in Maguindanao (Section 5.4.3). The IPSP promotes a “People-Centred Approach” 
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that is why one of the main activities of the 303rd Infantry Brigade is the Peace Caravan, 
where the armed forces accompany members of government agencies to far flung areas to 
deliver basic services. However, such a move sometimes poses a challenge because the 
soldiers wear their uniform and carry weapons, and people in those areas, having experienced 
the harshness of the Martial Law era, are suspicious of men in uniform. Nonetheless, the 
IPSP policy is working due to the emphasis of a ‘people engagement’ narrative.  
 
4. Counter-insurgency and counter-terrorism enabled a robust relationship between 
the AFP and stakeholders. 
 
What is unique about IPSP is that the policy was crafted not without the participation of non-
military entity such as civilian government agencies, the academe, and civil society groups, 
which allowed for the framing and broadening the definition of security that puts the welfare 
of the people at the core of its strategies and operations.  Having been under a Martial Law 
regime for 13 years, this interaction between the military and civil society is a commendable 
feat.  
 
The two case studies on internal security – Negros Occidental and Maguindanao – gave 
insight that the opinion of the local communities about the military is changing as 
demonstrated by an easier acceptance of government projects. Another healthy advantage 
established by this relationship is the sharing of intelligence between the local residents and 
the military deployed in the area (See Table 5.22 for sources of interviews).  
 
5. AFP’s response during natural disasters is valuable and strengthens civil-military 
relations.  
 
In the Philippines, the National Disaster Risk Reduction Management Council (NDRRMC) 
confers in the armed forces a legitimate role in disaster response and provides a framework 
for civil-military engagement.  The two disaster case studies – Typhoon Bopha and Typhoon 
Haiyan – afforded a platform for civil-military engagement to function and provided a more 
defined structure, where the armed forces take clear directives from civilian authority in 
terms of duties, procedures, and timetables without leadership confusion.  The case studies 
also showed that, whilst the primary role of the military is physical protection, their role in 
responding to non-traditional security challenges is equally significant. Furthermore, the case 
studies point to how self-sufficient combat units are despite being poorly equipped for these 
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types of operations (not surprising given the institution’s counter-insurgency and counter-
terrorism thrust). These are highlighted in Table 5.17.  
 
 
6. With the Philippine Coast Guard at the forefront against transnational crime, the 
AFP’s supporting role has been significant.  
 
Transnational crimes have existed and a consensus has emerged that these will be a growing 
challenge, especially with globalisation and radical advancement of technology. The 
Philippines, being an archipelagic country characterised by scattered islands and islets and a 
long and virtually unguarded coastline, posed a challenge to law enforcers, but an advantage 
to traffickers. Hence, collaboration between the Philippine Coast Guard and the AFP is 
crucial.  
 
Based on these conclusions, it can be recognised that defence has a positive role in the 
national development of the Philippines.  
 
 
6.3  Policy Recommendations 
 
This study has been concerned about the contribution of defence to development by looking 
at how the policies affected certain case studies. Policy recommendations will thus be at the 
strategic level, reflecting on how security and development can work well together. This 
suggests policy relevance to both AFP and the general public.  The policy recommendations, 
as derived from the principal conclusions (section 6.2), of this study, are as follows:   
 
• It is recommended the Philippine Congress amend the existing Government 
Procurement Reform Act (R.A. 9184).  Government agencies such as the DND and 
AFP have realised that the current Procurement Law does not support defence-related 
acquisitions.  Focusing on the least price among bidders, the present Procurement 
Law has allowed the Defence department to deviate from the necessary requirement 
of establishing capability as a reason for procurement. There is a competition between 
Best Value (affordability) vs Customer-Satisfaction (needs).  Furthermore, the 
procurement process has been observed to be lengthy and does not support streamline 
procedure. R.A. 7898 and R.A. 10349 state that only offers coming from the suppliers 
themselves will have to be entertained by the AFP.  This has not been the case, 
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however, because the Procurement Law allows agents and distributors to participate. 
The provision in the Procurement Law that requires the bidder’s largest single 
contract be at least 50% of the Approved Budget for the Contract (ABC) has to be 
revisited because it has resulted to the lack of participation by indigenous companies 
and single-bidder contracts because only the players can participate in the larger 
contract. 
 
• It is recommended that the government support a local defence industry. 
Policymakers, who pull the budget strings, have always viewed defence spending as a 
cost centre, making it a challenge for the defence department to obtain needed funds 
for capability. The goal is to link defence spending as a percentage of the annual 
Gross Domestic Product (GDP) of the country, as most developed countries do. One 
way to achieve this is to pursue the plans to build a Defence Economic Zone, which 
can be pursued under the Private-Public Partnership (PPP) mechanism to help 
improve the national economy. As it promotes local manufacturing, resulting to job 
generation, the Defence Economic Zone shows in concrete terms the linkage between 
development and security in a manner. Not only is this sustainable, it can also help 
achieve the self-reliance in defence posture the Philippines is aiming for. 
 
• It is recommended that the Philippine President appoints a civilian Defence Secretary 
with a strategic depth on security rather than a newly retired General. As a ‘partner’ in 
development during the Martial Law era, President Marcos appointed retired military 
generals to key civilian posts. This gave the military a free reign over civilian matters, 
resulting to human rights abuses.  The idea of democratic control has the civilian 
leaders develop the defence policy with the military implementing the decisions of 
civilian authorities. This has been highlighted in the 2003 Joint Defence Assessment 
conducted by Philippine and U.S. defence and military officials, which include among 
others the implementation of a strategy-driven multi-year defence planning system 
and improvement of personnel management systems. However, this is not the case in 
the current economic and political condition of the Philippines, where the military is 
encouraged to intervene in the affairs of civil society. Democratic control of the 
armed forces must always be observed as emphasised in the 1987 Constitution. Such 
action empowers civilian institutions and promotes security sector reform nationwide, 
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and this involves installing a civilian defence secretary. This reform upholds the 
principle of accountable and transparent management of national security institutions. 
 
 
• It is recommended that the appointment of the Chief-of-Staff of the AFP be rotated 
among the main branches of the armed forces. The Philippines is an archipelagic 
country, however, since the AFP was established most chiefs came from the 
Philippine Army. There were five from the Air Force and one from the Philippine 
Marines, but none from the Navy.  Of the 125,000 AFP membership, 85,000 of the 
personnel are with the Army, and with it goes the bulk of the military budget.  The 
rotation of AFP chiefs-of-staff among the branches of the armed forces enhances the 
jointness in the military and could contribute significantly to supplementing the 
defence-development process. Each main branch could offer new ideas and 
perspectives for strategic security capability, and avoid the AFP to be construed as too 
army-centric. 
 
•  It is recommended that a new National Defence Act (NDA) be drafted and passed 
into law. In 2006, the DND and AFP submitted to Congress a draft of a proposed 
NDA. A product of several consultations across the country, the draft intended to 
update the Commonwealth Act No. 1, otherwise known as the National Defence Act 
of 1935. So much has happened in the last eight decades and the original defence 
charter has become outdated and does not suit the needs and conditions of the 21st 
century security environment.   However, the 2006 proposal was never enacted into 
law.  
 
Some of the suggestions in the 2006 NDA draft proposal include the redefining of 
security principles and concepts, restructuring of the promotion and advancement 
schemes of the armed forces, as well as the enforcement of discipline and 
professionalism in the military.  These issues remain relevant until today. With the 
current emphasis on security and development, it is vital for the government to revisit 
the 2006 draft and craft a new or an updated one that will include the role of the AFP 
in non-traditional security such as in disaster response and transnational crime. This 
can help ensure the continued implementation of the reform agenda and bring about a 
stronger defence institution.  
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6.4  Suggestions for Further Research  
 
From the conclusions and policy recommendations stated above, here are four research ideas 
that can be further explored.  
 
1. There is limited literature pertaining to Philippine security despite its broad 
experience in terms of internal security and non-traditional security. This study is an 
attempt to contribute to fill that gap in the literature. For future research, an in-depth 
study on the Philippine defence industrialisation shall be conducted to further discuss 
its political, economic, and socio-economic implications. 
 
2. As this research has only focused on the Philippines, further research on defence and 
development should be employed, this time, comparatively looking at other Southeast 
Asian countries with its unique culture, composition, and varied military priorities.  
 
3. The existence of a ‘source country’ and a ‘receiving country’ allows transnational 
crime to prosper if not properly addressed. For future research, a study on the security 
collaboration in the tri-border area between the Philippines, Malaysia, and Indonesia 
is suggested.   
 
4. As this study has only concentrated on the role of the Armed Forces of the Philippines 
in disaster response, for future research, it is also important to look at the cooperation 
angle between the Philippine military and the foreign troops during humanitarian 
affairs engagement. It is suggested that interviews with foreign military participants 
should be explored. 
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To Whom It May Concern 
 
 
PhD Research to Evaluate the Contribution of Defence to National Development in the 
Philippines 
 
I am a researcher at Nanyang Technological University, Singapore.  I presently work as a 
researcher for the National Institute of Education, but previously spent almost four years at 
the S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies (RSIS) as a researcher in defence and 
counterterrorism studies.  
 
During my time at RSIS, I applied and was accepted as a student to enter a PhD Programme 
at Cranfield University, UK Defence Academy. The focus of my research is the contribution 
that defence makes to development, broadly defined. For my case study, I wish to research 
the experience of the Philippines in forging a cross-over relation between defence ‘and’ 
development. My study framework is anchored to the following policies: the AFP 
Modernisation Act of 1995 and its subsequent revision in 2110, the Internal Peace and 
Security Plan of 2010, and the National Security Policy (2011-2016) to highlight the 
important security goals of economic development, disaster management/prevention, piracy 
suppression, internal security, and international commitments.   
 
This is an interesting and policy-relevant research endeavour. Although it is clearly a field 
ripe for research, none to my knowledge has been undertaken in the Philippines. Accordingly, 
my doctoral research programme aims to fill this gap, but I do need your help to pursue my 
planned empirical research.  
 
I wish to seek your participation in the research programme. Specifically, I would like to 
interview you, and where feasible and convenient to follow-up by interviewing colleagues in 
the field. The questions will not be sensitive or intrusive and the answers will in any case be 
treated as confidential. The purpose of the research is to push the boundaries of knowledge, 
taking as the departure point, the under-reported positive spin-offs the Philippine defence 
economy makes to broader economic, industrial and technological development. 
 
Thanking you in anticipation.  
 
Yours sincerely 
 
 
Ava Patricia C. Avila 
PhD Student 
Cranfield University, UK 
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Appendix B 
 
 
Questionnaire – Defence Industry 
 
DEFENCE ‘AND’ DEVELOPMENT: A CASE STUDY OF THE PHILIPPINES 
 
Aim of the Questionnaire 
 
This questionnaire is designed to gather evidence to evaluate the contribution of the Philippine 
defence sector to national development.  The questionnaire is part of a PhD research programme.  The 
outcomes of this research will be utilized to further assist the Philippine government in enhancing its 
defence policy and strategy in developing a comprehensive security framework. 
 
This questionnaire is directed to Philippine-owned defence industries, whose businesses are involved 
in manufacturing defence materials for the Armed Forces of the Philippines, Philippine National 
Police and other related government agencies.  Your participation and expert opinion is essential in 
assessing the contribution of the defence sector in promoting Philippine national development. 
 
Thank you for completing this questionnaire.  Your cooperation is appreciated. Rest assured that we 
will keep your responses confidential and only my supervisor and I will have access to it.   
 
Instruction 
 
Many of the responses in this questionnaire sample require a tick in a box.  However, some questions 
will ask for your written comments, detailing your insights into a particular topic. 
 
Sections covered in this questionnaire 
 
PART A : Company Profile 
PART B : Company Operation, Strategy and Human Resource Development 
PART C :  Company Technology Development Capability 
PART D : Impact of Defence ‘and’ Development 
PART E : Final Suggestions 
 
Please complete all questions according to the guidelines provided. 
 
A. COMPANY PROFILE 
 
1.01 Company Name: 
 
1.02 Address: 
 
1.03 Contact Person: 
 
1.04 Position/Designation:  
 
1.05 Year Started: 
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1.06 Type of Business (please tick one):  ☒ 
 
a. Individual proprietorship     ☐  
b. Public limited company    ☐  
c. Private company     ☐ 
d. Co-operative     ☐ 
 
1.07 Paid-Up Capital: 
 
1.08 Annual Turnover (for the last five years): 
 
2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 
 
 
    
 
1.09 Ownership of the Business in terms of paid-up capital (should add up to 
100%) 
 
Group Ownership 
Local Privately-owned Amount Percentage 
100% 
Government-
owned 
Foreign    
Total    
 
 
B. COMPANY OPERATION, STRATEGY AND HUMAN RESOURCE 
DEVELOPMENT 
 
Please note that all questions in this section are about your firm (including your branch or 
subsidiary) 
 
2.01  Which of the following best describes your company? (Tick all that apply)   ☒ 
 
a. Plant production      ☐ 
b. Maintenance, Repair and Overhaul (MRO)   ☐ 
c. Upgrade/Retrofit      ☐ 
d. Manufacturing      ☐ 
e. Accounting       ☐ 
f. Sales Office      ☐ 
g. Others, please specify ________________________  ☐ 
 
2.02 Number of Employees in your company: (Please tick the appropriate box) ☒  
   
   Under 250       ☐ 
   250-500      ☐ 
   500-1000      ☐  
   More than 1000      ☐ 
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2.03 Please estimate the proportions of your company’s workforce according to level of 
education attained. Please include all levels of workers: 
 
Level of Education Attained % 
Less than elementary school  
Elementary level  
Elementary Graduate  
High school level  
High school Graduate  
Vocational School Graduate  
University Degree  
Graduate Studies  
Total   
 
 
 2.04 Approximate percentage of employees in your company involved in: 
 
 % 
Management  
Operation  
Maintenance  
Research and Development  
Others  
Total   
 
2.05 Your company’s annual expenditure on management training and skill development 
as percentage of revenues (please tick the appropriate box). 
 
 Less than 10%   ☐  21-30% ☐ 41-50% ☐ 
 
 11-20%   ☐ 31-40%  ☐ Above 51% ☐ 
 
 
 
2.06 For each of the following categories, please identify the defence industrial factors that 
exist in your company.  
 
  Exports and 
Destination 
Value Products/Nature 
of Process 
Year 
Manufacturing 
Process 
    
Assembly     
MRO process     
Services offered     
Export potential     
R & D     
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2.07 What is the competitive strategy of your company’s principal business (choose the 
most applicable answer) 
  
 Based on natural resources availability     ☐ 
 Based on favourable costs of skilled workers    ☐ 
 Based on product or process technology     ☐  
Based on marketing strategy      ☐ 
Based on the infrastructure support     ☐ 
 
2.08 Your company’s broad industry category: 
 
 Aerospace        ☐ 
Maritime        ☐ 
 Weapon        ☐ 
 ICT         ☐  
 Automotive        ☐ 
Others, please specify ☐ 
 
2.09 Does the company manufacture civil/commercial products? 
 
 Yes ☐  No ☐   
  
If yes, please specify.  
 
 _______________________________________________________________
_______________________________________________________________
_______________________________________________________________ 
 
 
2.10 Who are the company’s clients and the percentage of the total revenue? (Please tick 
all that is applicable) 
 
  Client/s Percentage % 
Government (please specify agency) 
 
 
  
Private 
 
  
Individuals 
 
  
Foreign Company (please specify) 
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C: COMPANY TECHNOLOGY DEVELOPMENT CAPABILITY 
 
3.01 Your company’s annual expenditure on developing new technology as a percentage 
of revenue 
 
 Less than10%  ☐   21-30% ☐ 41-50% ☐ 
 
 11-20%  ☐  31-40%  ☐ Above 51% ☐ 
 
  
3.02 Your company’s annual R&D expenditure as a percentage of revenue 
 
 Less than 10%   ☐  21-30% ☐ 41-50% ☐ 
 
 11-20%   ☐  31-40%  ☐ Above 51% ☐ 
 
 
3.03  Does your company have R&D facilities? 
 
 Yes  ☐  No ☐ 
 
 If no, please indicate the reasons 
 
 ____________________________________________________________________
____________________________________________________________________
____________________________________________________________________ 
 
 
3.04 Does your company collaborate with other institutions (such as Department of 
Defence, universities/colleges, and others)? 
 
 Yes ☐  No ☐ 
 
 If yes, please specify which organization and details of collaboration: 
  
Organization 
 
Details of the project 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
3.05 Does your company receive R&D assistance from the government? 
 
 Yes ☐  No ☐ 
 
 If yes, please provide details of the assistance: 
 
 _______________________________________________________________
_______________________________________________________________ 
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3.06 Does your company source the following? (tick the appropriate box): 
  
 Local Foreign Subcontract Specify  
Technology     
Components 
and Parts 
    
Machinery     
Specialised 
Research and 
Training 
Services 
    
Consultancy 
services 
    
Raw materials 
for maintenance 
    
 
 
 
3.07 Does your company have any patent registrations? 
  
 Yes  ☐  No  ☐ 
 
 If yes, please give details and indicate when required, where the registration is lodged 
and the nature of the technology patented. 
 
 
Source of patent When acquired Where registration 
was lodged 
Nature of 
technology 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
   
 
 
3.08 In the last five years, did your company introduce a new product, service or 
production method? 
  
  Yes  ☐  No  ☐ 
 
 
3.09 If yes, this innovation originated from: 
 
  Within the firm      ☐ 
  Another source in your country    ☐ 
  Another country      ☐ 
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3.10 If a technology has come from another country, how was it transferred? (Please tick 
all applicable boxes) 
 
 Bilateral agreement      ☐ 
 Technical Cooperation     ☐ 
 Offsets        ☐ 
 Joint Venture       ☐ 
 Turnkey contracts      ☐ 
 Foreign Direct Investment     ☐ 
 Others, please specify _____________________  ☐ 
 
3.11 Please specify the country engaged with (please tick): 
 
  
Country Joint 
Venture 
Co-
production 
Sub-
contract 
Collaboration Other 
USA      
UK      
France      
Italy      
Germany      
Korea      
Japan      
Other, please 
specify 
     
 
 
D.  IMPACT OF DEFENCE ‘AND’ DEVELOPMENT  
  
4.01 Have the changes/developments in policies (e.g. AFP Modernization, National 
Security Policy and Internal Peace and Security Plan) been good for the business? 
   
  Yes  ☐  No ☐ 
 
  If yes, in what ways have they been beneficial? 
 
  __________________________________________________________________ 
  __________________________________________________________________ 
  __________________________________________________________________ 
 
 
4.02 Have your products/services helped in the development of the country in any way? 
 
  Yes  ☐  No ☐ 
 
  If yes, in what way? 
 
 __________________________________________________________________ 
 __________________________________________________________________ 
 __________________________________________________________________ 
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4.03 Has there been an increase in the creation of jobs over the past five years? 
 
  Yes  ☐  No  ☐ 
 
 
  If yes, what type of jobs and numbers over the past five years? 
   
Type of Work Numbers 
2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 
 
 
 
 
 
     
  
 
 E. FINAL SUGGESTIONS 
 
Please suggest possible improvements to the effectiveness of the defence industry as it 
contributes to the development of the Philippines. 
 
 
_____________________________________________________________________ 
_____________________________________________________________________ 
_____________________________________________________________________ 
_____________________________________________________________________ 
_____________________________________________________________________ 
 
Thank you for your cooperation. 
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Appendix C 
 
 
Questionnaire – Counterterrorism and Counter-insurgency 
 
DEFENCE ‘AND’ DEVELOPMENT: A CASE STUDY OF THE PHILIPPINES 
 
Aim of the Questionnaire 
 
This questionnaire is designed to gather evidence to evaluate the contribution of defence to national 
development.  The questionnaire is part of a PhD research programme.  The outcomes of this research 
will be utilized to further assist the Philippine government in enhancing its defence policy and 
strategy in developing a comprehensive security framework. 
 
This questionnaire is directed to counter-terrorism and counter-insurgency agencies and sectors in the 
Philippines.  Your participation and expert opinion is essential in assessing the contribution of the 
defence sector in promoting Philippine national development. 
 
Thank you for completing this questionnaire.  Your cooperation is appreciated. Rest assured that we 
will keep your responses confidential and only my supervisor and I will have access to it.   
 
Instruction 
 
Many of the responses in this questionnaire sample require a tick in a box.  However, some questions 
will ask for your written comments, detailing your insights into a particular topic. 
 
Sections covered in this questionnaire 
 
PART A : Personal Profile 
PART B : Organization Profile 
PART C :  Terrorism and Insurgency 
PART D : Counter-terrorism and Counter-insurgency 
PART E : Impact of Defence ‘and’ Development 
PART F : Final Suggestions 
 
Please complete all questions according to the guidelines provided. 
 
C. PERSONAL PROFILE 
 
1.10 Name: 
1.11 Position/Designation:  
1.12 Organization:  
1.13 Years in the Organization: 
1.14 Job/Research Scope 
____________________________________________________________________
____________________________________________________________________
____________________________________________________________________ 
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D. ORGANIZATION PROFILE 
 
2.01       Type of Organization (please tick one):  ☒ 
 
e. Government      ☐ 
f. Non-Government Organization   ☐  
g. Academe/Think Tank     ☐ 
h. Others, please specify     ☐ 
 
2.02 Objectives of the Organization: 
 __________________________________________________________________ 
 __________________________________________________________________ 
 __________________________________________________________________ 
 
2.03  Focus of the Organization. Please tick all that applies 
 
a. Counter-terrorism     ☐  
b. Counter-insurgency     ☐    
c. Civil Military Integration    ☐ 
d. Disaster Management      ☐   
e. Piracy research      ☐ 
f. Anti-piracy operation     ☐ 
g. Human Trafficking research    ☐ 
h. Anti-human trafficking operation   ☐ 
i. Drug trafficking research    ☐ 
j. Anti-drug trafficking operation    ☐ 
k. Economic development     ☐ 
l. Governance      ☐ 
m. Others       ☐ 
Please specify _________________ 
 
2.04  Does your organization collaborate with another organization to counter 
terrorism/insurgency?  
 
  Yes ☐  No ☐  
 
 If yes, please specify way/s of collaboration. 
________________________________________________________________________ 
________________________________________________________________________ 
________________________________________________________________________ 
 
 
E. TERRORISM AND INSURGENCY 
 
3.01 Number of terrorist attacks in the last 15 years 
 
1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 
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3.02 Number of insurgencies in the last 15 years 
 
1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 
               
 
3.03 Perpetrators 
 
Abu Sayyaf 
1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 
               
 
MILF 
1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 
               
 
MNLF 
1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 
               
 
NPA 
1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 
               
 
 
F. COUNTER TERRORISM AND COUNTER INSURGENCY 
 
4.01  What are the counter-terrorism measures that have been put in place? 
   
Hard approach Soft approach Others 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
4.02 What are the counter-insurgency measures that have been put in place? 
   
Hard approach Soft approach Others 
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4.03  Number of terrorists/rebels apprehended 
Captured Killed Indicted Integrated back 
into the society 
Others 
     
 
 
4.04 Do you think there is a need to improve the counter-terrorism/counter-insurgency efforts?  
 
 Yes  ☐  No ☐ 
 
 If yes, how (cite some ways) 
 ________________________________________________________________________ 
 ________________________________________________________________________ 
 ________________________________________________________________________ 
 
4.05 Do you collaborate with the local community? 
  
 Yes ☐  No ☐   
 
 If yes, please specify how. 
 
 _______________________________________________________________________ 
 _______________________________________________________________________ 
 _______________________________________________________________________ 
 
 
 How is your relationship with the local community? 
  
 _______________________________________________________________________ 
 _______________________________________________________________________ 
  
 
4.06 Do you engage in development projects? 
 
 Yes ☐  No ☐  
 
 If yes, 
 
Already put in place In the process of 
implementation 
Proposed Others 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
   
 
 
4.07 Are the projects in consultation with the local community? 
 
  Yes ☐  No ☐  
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E.  IMPACT OF DEFENCE ‘AND’ DEVELOPMENT  
  
5.01 Have the changes/developments in policies (e.g. AFP Modernization, National Security 
Policy and Internal Peace and Security Plan) benefitted the organization? 
   
  Yes  ☐  No ☐ 
 
 
 If yes, in what ways have they been beneficial? 
 __________________________________________________________________ 
 __________________________________________________________________ 
 __________________________________________________________________ 
 
 
 
 
5.02 Have the changes/developments in policies (e.g. AFP Modernization, National Security 
Policy and Internal Peace and Security Plan) benefitted the local community? 
 
  Yes  ☐  No ☐ 
 
 If yes, in what way? 
 __________________________________________________________________ 
 __________________________________________________________________ 
 __________________________________________________________________ 
 
5.03. Do you think what the government is doing is enough to mitigate the threats? 
 
 Yes  ☐              No         ☐ 
 
 Why? 
______________________________________________________________________ 
______________________________________________________________________ 
______________________________________________________________________ 
 
 
F. FINAL SUGGESTIONS 
 
Please suggest possible improvements to the effectiveness of the security sector as it 
contributes to the development of the Philippines. 
 
 
_______________________________________________________________________ 
 
_______________________________________________________________________ 
 
_______________________________________________________________________ 
 
_______________________________________________________________________ 
 
_______________________________________________________________________ 
 
Thank you for your cooperation. 
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Appendix D 
 
 
Questionnaire – Non-Traditional Security (Disaster Response) 
 
DEFENCE ‘AND’ DEVELOPMENT: A CASE STUDY OF THE PHILIPPINES 
 
 
Aim of the Questionnaire 
 
 
This questionnaire is designed to gather evidence to evaluate the contribution of the Philippine 
defence sector to national development.  The questionnaire is part of a PhD research programme.  The 
outcome of this research will be utilised to further assist the Philippine government in enhancing its 
defence policy and strategy in developing a comprehensive security.  
 
The questionnaire is directed to personnel and officers of the Armed Forces of the Philippines, 
Department of National Defence and other related government agencies, policymakers, defence 
industries, scholars, and non-government organizations who have been involved in either defence or 
development.  Your expert opinion is essential in assessing the contribution of the defence sector in 
promoting Philippine national development.   
 
Thank you for completing this questionnaire. Your cooperation is appreciated. This survey 
questionnaire is confidential and only I and my supervisor will have access.  
 
Instruction 
 
Many of the responses in this questionnaire sample require a tick in a box    ☒ 
 
However, some questions will ask for your written comments, detailing your insight into a particular 
topic.  
 
Please complete all questions according to the guideline provided.  
 
A. PERSONAL PROFILE 
 
1.01   Name:  
1.02   Position/Designation: 
1.03   Company/Organization: 
1.04   Years of Employment in the Company/Organization: 
1.05   Job Scope: 
 
B. ORGANISATION 
 
Please note that all questions in this section are about your organization.  
 
2.01 Type of Organization 
 
a. Government     ☐     
b. Non-Government     ☐ 
c. Academic/Think Tank    ☐ 
d. Private company     ☐ 
e. Others 
Please specify __________________ 
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2.02 Objectives of the Company/Organization: 
 
 
 
2.03 Focus of the Company/Organization: 
 
 Please tick all that applies 
 
n. Counter terrorism studies    ☐     
o. Civil Military Integration    ☐ 
p. Disaster Management     ☐     
q. Piracy research     ☐ 
r. Anti-piracy operation    ☐ 
s. Human Trafficking research    ☐ 
t. Anti-human trafficking operation   ☐ 
u. Drug trafficking research    ☐ 
v. Anti-drug trafficking operation   ☐ 
w. Economic development    ☐ 
x. Governance     ☐ 
y. Others      ☐ 
Please specify _________________ 
 
 
2.04  When were you deployed to the area? 
 
 
2.05  Did you play a civil-military coordination role for your organization? 
 
Yes  ☐  No  ☐ 
 
 
2.06 Which geographical areas did you work in? 
 
 
 
C. DISASTER PREPAREDNESS 
 
This section includes questions that focus on pre-disaster training including institutional policy and 
guidelines for engaging with non-military actors.  
 
3.01 Have you personally participated in civil-military training?  
 
Yes  ☐  No  ☐ Uncertain  ☐   
 
 
3.02 What training course/s have you participated in? 
 
 
 
3.03  What documents or reference materials does your organisation use for civil-military 
engagement?  
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3.04  Does your organisation have staff specifically assigned to coordinate civilian and military 
actors?  
 
Yes  ☐  No  ☐ Uncertain  ☐   
 
D: EXPERINCES DURING DISASTER RESPONSE 
 
4.01 What were the organisation’s channels of communication with the military and non-military 
actors? 
 
4.02 Did your organisation able to request information from military actors in a timely manner? 
Yes  ☐  No  ☐ Uncertain  ☐   
 
4.03 What do you believe is the most critical information needed to effectively coordinate with 
military or non-military actors?  
 
 
 
4.04 Which cluster did your organisation participate in? 
 
a. Emergency Telecommunications   ☐ 
b. Logistics      ☐ 
c. Health       ☐ 
d. Protection      ☐ 
e. Shelter       ☐ 
f. Food Security/Nutrition     ☐ 
g. Water, Sanitation and Hygiene    ☐ 
h. Camp Coordination and Camp Management  ☐ 
i. Other:        ☐ 
 
 
4.04 Coordination between military and humanitarian actors was effective.  
 
 Strongly Agree   ☐    
 Somewhat Agree  ☐ 
 Uncertain   ☐ 
 Somewhat Disagree  ☐ 
 Strongly Disagree  ☐ 
 Not Applicable    ☐ 
 
 
4.05 Were population needs assessed? 
 
Yes  ☐  No  ☐ Uncertain  ☐  
 
 
276 
 
 
4.06 Were the local community members included in the development of the assessment? 
 
Yes  ☐  No  ☐ Uncertain  ☐  
 
 
4.07 Were local community members included in the data collection phase of the assessment? 
 
Yes  ☐  No  ☐ Uncertain   ☐  
 
 
4.08  Needs assessment findings were shared. 
 
 On a daily basis    ☐  
 On a weekly basis   ☐  
 As data were required   ☐  
 When requested only   ☐  
 Not applicable    ☐  
 Other     ☐  
 
 
4.09 Did your organisation utilise military assets or support to assist in the delivery of humanitarian 
assistance?  
 
Yes  ☐  No  ☐ Uncertain   ☐  
 
 
4.10 What kinds of assets/support? 
 
 Use of military convoys   ☐  
 Logistics    ☐  
 Communications   ☐  
 Transport of supplies   ☐  
 Transport of people    ☐  
 Engineering    ☐  
 Other:     ☐    
 
 
4.11 Requested military assets were made available in a timely manner.     
 
Yes  ☐  No  ☐ Uncertain   ☐  
 
 
4.12 Were these military assets used effectively?  
 
Yes  ☐  No  ☐ Uncertain   ☐  
 
 
4.12 Why was the use of military assets requested?  
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4.13 Civil-military coordination during the response to the typhoon functioned well.  
 
Yes  ☐  No  ☐ Uncertain   ☐  
 
 
4.14  The involvement of the AFP in humanitarian assistance and disaster response had a positive 
outcome for disaster affected communities.  
 
Yes  ☐  No  ☐ Uncertain   ☐  
 
 
4.15 Regardless of training, military knowledge of the humanitarian mission is limited.  
 
Strongly Agree   ☐    
 Somewhat Agree  ☐ 
 Uncertain   ☐ 
 Somewhat Disagree  ☐ 
 Strongly Disagree  ☐ 
 Not Applicable    ☐ 
 
4.16 Which of the following areas of engagement between military and civilian actors in disaster 
response works most? 
 
 Conducting needs assessment    ☐    
 Communications between actors   ☐ 
 Overall coordination     ☐ 
 Joint training      ☐ 
 Provision of military assets to your organisation  ☐ 
 Other        ☐ 
 
 
 
E. FINAL SUGGESTIONS 
 
Please suggest possible improvements to the effectiveness of the AFP as it contributes to 
disaster response. 
 
_____________________________________________________________________ 
_____________________________________________________________________ 
_____________________________________________________________________ 
_____________________________________________________________________ 
_____________________________________________________________________ 
 
 
Thank you for your cooperation. 
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Appendix E 
 
Questionnaire – Non-Traditional Security (Transnational Crime) 
 
DEFENCE ‘AND’ DEVELOPMENT: A CASE STUDY OF THE PHILIPPINES 
 
Aim of the Questionnaire 
 
This questionnaire is designed to gather evidence to evaluate the contribution of defence to national 
development.  The questionnaire is part of a PhD research programme.  The outcomes of this research 
will be utilized to further assist the Philippine government in enhancing its defence policy and 
strategy in developing a comprehensive security framework. 
 
This questionnaire is directed to sectors focusing on issues related to piracy and criminal trafficking in 
the tri-border area between Philippines Malaysia and Indonesia.  Your participation and expert 
opinion is essential in assessing the contribution of the defence sector in promoting Philippine 
national development. 
 
Thank you for completing this questionnaire.  Your cooperation is appreciated. Rest assured that we 
will keep your responses confidential and only my supervisor and I will have access to it.   
 
Instruction 
 
Many of the responses in this questionnaire sample require a tick in a box.  However, some questions 
will ask for your written comments, detailing your insights into a particular topic. 
 
Sections covered in this questionnaire 
 
PART A : Personal Profile 
PART B : Organization Profile 
PART C :  Piracy and Criminal Trafficking 
PART D : Counter Measures 
PART E : Impact of Defence ‘and’ Development 
PART F : Final Suggestions 
 
Please complete all questions according to the guidelines provided. 
 
G. PERSONAL PROFILE 
 
1.15 Name: 
1.16 Position/Designation:  
1.17 Organization:  
1.18 Years in the Organization: 
1.19 Job/Research Scope 
 
 
H. ORGANIZATION PROFILE 
 
2.02       Type of Organization (please tick one):  ☒ 
 
i. Government      ☐ 
j. Non-Government Organization   ☐  
k. Academe/Think Tank     ☐ 
l. Others, please specify ________________ ☐ 
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2.02 Objectives of the Organization: 
 __________________________________________________________________ 
 __________________________________________________________________ 
 __________________________________________________________________ 
 
2.03  Focus of the Organization. Please tick all that applies 
 
a. Counterterrorism     ☐  
b. Counter-insurgency     ☐    
c. Civil Military Integration    ☐ 
d. Disaster Management      ☐    
e. Piracy research     ☐ 
f. Anti-piracy operation     ☐ 
g. Human Trafficking research    ☐ 
h. Anti-human trafficking operation   ☐ 
i. Drug trafficking research    ☐ 
j. Anti-drug trafficking operation   ☐ 
k. Economic development    ☐ 
l. Governance      ☐ 
m. Others       ☐ 
Please specify _________________ 
 
2.04  Does your organization collaborate with another organization to counter the issues of piracy 
and criminal drug trafficking in the tri-border area? 
 
  Yes ☐  No ☐  
 
 If yes, please specify the local organization/s. 
 _______________________________________________________________________ 
 _______________________________________________________________________ 
If yes, please specify the international organization/s. 
 _______________________________________________________________________ 
_______________________________________________________________________ 
 
 
Please specify way/s of collaboration. 
________________________________________________________________________ 
________________________________________________________________________ 
________________________________________________________________________ 
 
 
I. PIRACY AND CRIMINAL TRAFFICKING ACTIVITIES 
 
3.01 Number of piracy incidents in the last 15 years 
 
1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 
               
 
3.02 Number of drug trafficking in the tri-border area in the last 15 years 
 
1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 
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3.03 Number of trafficking of firearms in the tri-border area in the last 15 years 
 
1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 
               
 
3.04 Number of trafficking of persons in the tri-border area in the last 15 years 
 
1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 
               
 
 
3.05 Who are the perpetrators of these piracy and criminal trafficking activities in the tri-border 
area? 
_____________________________________________________________________ 
_____________________________________________________________________ 
_____________________________________________________________________ 
 
3.06 What geographic areas in the Philippines are vulnerable to threats of piracy and criminal 
trafficking?  
  
 _____________________________________________________________________ 
 _____________________________________________________________________ 
 _____________________________________________________________________ 
 
 
3.07 What are the reasons people engage in these activities? 
 
_____________________________________________________________________ 
_____________________________________________________________________ 
 
 
J. COUNTER MEASURES 
 
4.01  What are the counter measures that have been put in place against piracy and criminal 
trafficking activities in the tri-border area? 
   
Hard approach Soft approach Others 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
4.02  Number of individuals apprehended. Include the name of groups they belong to.  
Captured Killed Indicted Integrated back 
into the society 
Others 
 
 
 
 
    
281 
 
 
 
4.03 Do you think there is a need to improve the counter measures against piracy and criminal 
trafficking in the tri-border area?  
 
 Yes  ☐  No ☐ 
 
 If yes, suggest some ways to improve the situation. 
 ________________________________________________________________________ 
 ________________________________________________________________________ 
 ________________________________________________________________________ 
 
 
 
 
4.05 What are the some of the government policies that have been put in place to combat these 
threats?   
 _______________________________________________________________________ 
 _______________________________________________________________________ 
 _______________________________________________________________________ 
 
4.06 Are there collaborations between the Philippines, Indonesia and Malaysia regarding these 
issues? 
 Yes  ☐  No ☐ 
 
4.06 Are these enough? 
 
 Yes  ☐  No ☐ 
 
 If no, what more should be done?  
 _______________________________________________________________________ 
 _______________________________________________________________________ 
 _______________________________________________________________________ 
  
4.07  Are there collaborations between the military, intelligence and law enforcement agencies in 
the Philippines? 
  
Yes  ☐  No ☐ 
 
 If yes, please specify these collaborations 
_______________________________________________________________________ 
 _______________________________________________________________________ 
 _______________________________________________________________________  
 
 
 
E.  IMPACT OF DEFENCE ‘AND’ DEVELOPMENT  
  
5.01 Have the changes/developments in policies (e.g. AFP Modernization, National Security 
Policy and Internal Peace and Security Plan) benefitted the organization? 
   
  Yes  ☐  No ☐ 
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 If yes, in what ways have they been beneficial? 
 __________________________________________________________________ 
 __________________________________________________________________ 
 __________________________________________________________________ 
 
 
5.02 Have the changes/developments in policies (e.g. AFP Modernisation, National Security 
Policy and Internal Peace and Security Plan) benefitted the actions towards combating piracy and 
criminal trafficking in the tri-border area? 
 
  Yes  ☐  No ☐ 
 
 If yes, in what way? 
 __________________________________________________________________ 
 __________________________________________________________________ 
 __________________________________________________________________ 
 
5.03. Do you think what the government is doing is enough to mitigate the threats? 
 
 Yes  ☐              No         ☐ 
 
 Why? 
______________________________________________________________________ 
______________________________________________________________________ 
______________________________________________________________________ 
 
 
F. FINAL SUGGESTIONS 
 
Please suggest possible improvements to the effectiveness of the security sector as it 
contributes to the development of the Philippines. 
 
 
_______________________________________________________________________ 
 
_______________________________________________________________________ 
 
_______________________________________________________________________ 
 
_______________________________________________________________________ 
 
_______________________________________________________________________ 
 
 
 
Thank you for your cooperation. 
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Appendix F   
 
List Defence Industry Interviewees 
Company Name Title 
Arms Corporation (Armscor) Mr Demetrio R Tuason Chair Emeritus 
Armed Forces of the Philippines Brigade General Jon Aying Deputy Chief of Staff 
for Plans  
Civil Service Relations, Armed 
Forces of the Philippines  
Maj Edgardo Vilchez Jr Chief, Strategic 
Alignment Office, 
AFP Transformation 
Roadmap 
Department of National Defence Mr Danulo Augusti B Francia Assistant Secretary for 
Plans and Programmes 
Department of National Defence Mr Raymund Quilop Assistant Secretary for 
Strategic Assessments 
Department of National Defence Mr Peter Paul Reuben Galvez Chief of Staff 
De La Salle University Prof Renato de Castro  International Studies 
Department 
Ferfrans Specialities Mr Francis Sy Co-owner  
Government Arsenal Maj Gen Jonathan Martir (Ret) Director 
Government Arsenal CDR Roger Gamban PN (Ret) Chief Strategic 
Management Officer 
National Defence College of the 
Philippines 
Ms Charithie B Joaquin Chief, Academic 
Affairs Division 
Office of the Presidential 
Adviser on the Peace Process 
Dr Jennifer Santiago Oreta Assistant Secretary 
Philippine Air Force Ret Gen Benjamin Defensor Former Commanding 
General, Philippine Air 
Force 
Philippine Institute for Peace, 
Violence and Terrorism 
Research 
Mr Rommel C. Banlaoi Executive Director & 
Chair of the Board of 
Trustees 
Rappler Ms Maria A Ressa CEO & Executive 
Editor 
Rappler Ms Carmela Fonbuena Reporter 
Royal Australian Navy Mr Max Montero Defence consultant 
Security Reform Initiative Ms Kathline Tolosa Convenor 
United Defence Manufacturing 
Corporation 
Mr Gene Cariño Chair & CEO 
University of the Philippines Prof Aileen SP Baviera Asian Centre 
University of the Philippines Dr Rosalie Arcala Hall Faculty, Political 
Science 
 Ms Criselda Yabes Author (Boys from the 
Barracks: The 
Philippine Military 
After Edsa 
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Appendix G  
List of Internal Security Interviewees 
Company Case Study Name Title 
Alter Trade Foundation, 
Inc. 
Negros 
Occidental 
Mr Harry Pineda Executive Director 
Alter Trade Foundation, 
Inc.  
Negros 
Occidental 
Mr Edwin Lopez Advocacy Officer 
Armed Forces of the 
Philippines 
Negros 
Occidental 
Brigade General Jon 
Aying 
Deputy Chief of Staff 
for Plans and Former 
303rd Brigade 
Commander, 
Philippine Army 
Armed Forces of the 
Philippines 
Negros 
Occidental 
Captain Jimrhic 
Obias 
303rd Civil Military 
Officer, Philippine 
Army 
Armed Forces of the 
Philippines 
Negros 
Occidental 
Col Ariel Reyes 47th Battalion 
Commander,  
Philippine Army 
Armed Forces of the 
Philippines 
Maguindanao Col Arnel dela Vega 603rd Brigade 
Commander, 
Philippine Army 
Armed Forces of the 
Philippines 
Maguindanao Captain Gregorio 
Jose 
303rd Civil Military 
Officer, Philippine 
Army 
Armed Forces of the 
Philippines 
Maguindanao Lt Col Diosdado 
Carreon 
Defence Attaché  
Mindanews Maguindanao Mr Ferdhinand 
Cabrera 
Journalist 
Mindanao Coalition of 
Development Networks  
Maguindanao  Patricia Sarenas Former Chair of the 
Board 
Negros Occidental 
Provincial Government 
Negros 
Occidental 
Ms Nellen Marie 
Gomonit 
Technical Staff  
Office of the Presidential 
Adviser on the Peace 
Process and Paghiliusa sa 
Paghidaet-Negros 
Negros 
Occidental 
Ms Maria Lourdes 
Tison 
Peace Panel Member 
and Executive 
Director 
PaxChristi Philippines Negros 
Occidental 
Mr Jack Panime Executive Officer 
Provincial Social 
Welfare and 
Development Office 
Negros 
Occidental 
Ms Jenie 
Macalipsay 
Social worker 
Technology & 
Livelihood Development 
Centre 
Negros 
Occidental 
Ms Sharon Juance Project Development 
Officer 
 Negros 
Occidental 
Tatay Eduardo Former communist 
rebel 
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Appendix H  
 
List of Natural Disaster Case Studies Interviewees 
Company Case Study Name  Title 
Armed Forces of the 
Philippines 
Typhoon Haiyan Maj Rey Leonardo 
Guerrero 
Commander, 3rd 
Infantry Division, 
Philippine Army 
Armed Forces of the 
Philippines 
Typhoon Haiyan Lt Col Nedy 
Espulgar 
Commander, 19th 
Infantry Battalion, 
Philippine Army 
Armed Forces of the 
Philippines 
Typhoon Haiyan Lt Col Rodrigo 
Ilustrisimo 
Civil Military 
Officer, 8th Infantry 
Division, Philippine 
Army 
Armed Forces of the 
Philippines 
Typhoon Haiyan 1Lt Alex Orina Civil Military 
Officer, 14th Infantry 
Battalion, Philippine 
Army 
Armed Forces of the 
Philippines 
Typhoon Haiyan 2Lt Prolen Bobacua Ex-O Alpha 
Company, 19th 
Infantry Battalion, 
Philippine Army 
Armed Forces of the 
Philippines 
Typhoon Bopha Lt Col Llewellyn 
Binasoy 
 
Civil Military 
Officer, 10th Infantry 
Division, Philippine 
Army 
Armed Forces of the 
Philippines 
Typhoon Bopha Lt Col Michael 
Logico 
Commander, 66th 
Infantry Battalion, 
Philippine Army 
Armed Forces of the 
Philippines 
Typhoon Bopha 1Lt Mike Aquino Officer, 1001st 
Brigade 
Compostela Valley 
Province 
Government 
Typhoon Bopha Ms Arceli Timog-
Timog,  
Head, General 
Services Office 
Energy Development 
Corporation 
Typhoon Haiyan Mr Arthur Veloso Jr Security Supervisor 
International 
Organisation for 
Migration 
Typhoon Haiyan Ms Connie Tangara Camp Coordination 
and Camp 
Management 
Operations 
Coordinator 
Mindanao Coalition 
of Development 
NGO Networks 
Typhoon Bopha Ms Patricia Sarenas Chairperson 
New Bataan 
Municipal Social 
Welfare & 
Development Office 
Typhoon Bopha Ms Beverly Jane dela 
Pena 
Staff 
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New Bataan 
Municipal Social 
Welfare & 
Development Office 
Typhoon Bopha Ms Liana Erika 
Salinas 
Social Worker 
National Disaster 
Risk Reduction and 
Management Council 
Typhoon Bopha Maj Gen Eduardo del 
Rosario (Ret) 
Former Executive 
Director 
National Disaster 
Risk Reduction and 
Management Council 
Typhoon Haiyan Usec Alexander 
Pama 
Executive Director 
Office for the 
Coordination of 
Humanitarian Affairs 
Typhoon Haiyan Mr Kumudu 
Sanjeewa 
Information 
Management Officer 
Office for the 
Coordination of 
Humanitarian Affairs 
Typhoon Haiyan Mr Dan Carlo 
Samoza 
Civil Military 
Coordination Officer 
Office of Civil 
Defence 
Typhoon Haiyan Dr Blanche 
Gobenchiong 
Regional Director, 
Region VIII 
Office of Civil 
Defence 
Typhoon Bopha Mr Mc Adrian 
Nouve Cobero,  
 
Operations Staff, 
Region XI 
Office of Civil 
Defence 
Typhoon Bopha Ms Riezel Chatto 
 
Operations Staff, 
Region XI 
Tacloban City 
Government 
Typhoon Haiyan Hon Raissa Villasin City Councillor  
United Nations 
Development 
Programme  
Typhoon Haiyan Mr Errol Merquita Project Officer 
 Typhoon Haiyan Ms Zhandra Dy Typhoon Survivor 
 Typhoon Haiyan Ms Venus Anido Typhoon Survivor 
 Typhoon Bopha Ms Weng Casagda Typhoon Survivor 
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Appendix I  
 
List of Transnational Crime Interviewees 
Company Name Title 
Armed Forces of the 
Philippines 
Lt Col Harold Cabunoc Public Affairs Chief 
Department of National 
Defence 
Mr Peter Paul Reuben 
Galvez 
Chief of Staff 
International Justice Mission Mr Ralph Morales Manager for Community 
Mobilisation 
National Coast Watch 
Council Secretariat 
Usec Jose Luis Alano Executive Director 
National Disaster Risk 
Reduction and Management 
Council 
Usec Alexander Pama Executive Director 
Philippine Centre on 
Transnational Crime 
P Dir Felizardo M Serapio Jr 
(Ret) 
Executive Director 
Philippine Centre on 
Transnational Crime 
P Supt Raul C Siriban Director for Research 
Philippine Centre on 
Transnational Crime 
P Supt Joel D Casupanan Deputy Director for Research 
Philippine Coast Guard Admiral Rodolfo Diwata 
Isorena 
Commandant  
Philippine Coast Guard CDR Allen J Dalangin Deputy Chief of Coast Guard 
Staff for Intelligence, 
Security, and Law 
Enforcement 
Philippine Coast Guard Capt Teotimo R Borja Deputy Chief of Coast Guard 
Staff for Plans & 
Programmes and 
International Affairs 
Philippine Coast Guard Ms Vivien Cay Coast Guard Officer 
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Appendix J 
 
In Progress Projects under RA7898  
 
Service/Units Programme  Contract Country 
Navy  AW-109E Power 
helicopters 
Delivered and accepted AgustaWestland 
Upgrades for the 
Gregorio del Pilar-class 
frigates 
Being done but at a 
piecemeal-basis. There 
were already proposals 
provided to the PN for 
the upgrades of its 
sensors and combat 
suite and weapons 
systems, but it seems 
that the PN has not yet 
fully decided on the 
final system 
composition 
 
Strategic Sealift    PT PAL (Indonesia) 
Air Force 8 AW-109E power 
armed helicopters 
P3.44 billion  AgustaWestland (Italy) 
2 C-295 medium 
tactical transport 
aircraft 
 Spain 
2 CN-212i light tactical 
transport aircraft 
 Indonesia 
Army Falcon RF-7800V 
Combat Net Radio 
integrated into the RF-
7800I Intercom 
systems 
$18 million Harris Corp (USA) 
Upgrade of 28 M-113 
armoured personnel 
carriers 
Php882 million Elbit Systems Ltd 
(Israel) 
400 light rocket 
launcher –Airtronic 
RPG-7 40mm 
 USA 
12 14mm towed 
Howitzer systems 
Php438,620,000 Awaiting for the NOA, 
after Elbit systems 
Land and C41 passed 
the post-qualification  
requirements of the 
DND. 
44,080 pieces of Force 
Protection Equipment  
Php1.7 billion Joint venture between 
Israel’s Achidatex 
Nazareth Elite and 
Philippine shipbuilder 
Colorado Shipyard 
Corp. Deadline was 15 
March 2015, but they 
have yet to deliver 
Source: Interview with MGen Fernando Manalo (Ret), Undersecretary, Finance, Munitions, Installations & 
Materiel, Department of National Defence on 30 July 2015.   
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Appendix K 
 
Projects under the Revised AFP Modernization (RA10349) 
 
Service/Units Programme Contract Country 
Navy Frigate (AW159 
wildcat) 
Projects have already 
completed Stage 1 of 
its 2-Stage bidding 
It is still to be 
determined if the final 
offer from 
AgustaWestland will 
be responseive to the 
final specifications and 
budget provided for the 
bidding’s 2nd stage 
Anti-Submarine 
Helicopter (ASH) 
Projects have already 
completed Stage 1 of 
its 2-Stage bidding 
Acquisition project has 
stalled since it would 
be dependent on the 
winning frigate’s 
design and components 
Multi-Purpose Attack 
Craft (MPAC) Mk. 3 
(Typhoon 12.7mm 
RWS and Spike-ER 
missiles) 
Divided into 2 parts: 
Bidding for the 1st part 
which covers the actual 
boat and standard 
subsystems has already 
been announced. The 
2nd lot will involve the 
acquisition and 
installation of remote 
weapons systems 
(RWS) and short-range 
surface-to-surface 
missile systems that 
will be awarded via 
Government-to-
Government (G2G) 
deal with Israel. 
 
Jacinto-class Patrol 
Vessel (JCPV) Combat 
Systems Upgrade 
Bidding failed as none 
of the 9 potential 
bidders submitted a 
bid. 
Several of the bidders 
requested to increase 
the Approved budget 
of the Contract (ABC) 
as the amount was not 
enough to do what the 
PN specified. The PN 
and DND is now 
reviewing the details 
and is yet to decide if 
they would increase the 
budget, or reduce the 
amount of work to be 
made to fit in the 
budget allocated.  
Amphibious Assault 
Vehicle (AAV) (Korea 
Amphibious Assault 
Post-bid qualification 
has been completed 
and awaiting for a 
Samsung Techwin 
(South Korea) will 
only start the 
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Vehicle KAAV) NOA to be provided to 
the winning  bidder 
production of the 
actual product after the 
DND issues the 
Contract and necessary 
notices 
Marine Force Imagery   
Targeting Support 
System (MITSS) 
  
Air Force Combat Utility 
Helicopter (CUH) – 
8Bell 412EP  
 Canada 
Surface Attack 
Aircraft/lean-in Fighter 
Trainer (SAA/LIFT) – 
12FA-50 fighting 
Eagle  
 Korea 
Air Defence & 
Surveillance Radar – 3 
IAI-Elta  
Delayed due to the late 
approval by the 
president. Originally 
the plan involves the 
donation of a feeder 
radar system to the 
PAF in time for the 
APEC conference in 
November 2015 while 
the 3 new radars are 
being made. With the 
delays, it is uncertain if 
the Israeli government 
can provide the said 
radar before the 
conference. The NOA 
for this project is also 
pending, and further 
delays would mean the 
new radars would only 
arrive in 2017 
following the delivery 
time frame. While the 
radars are still pending 
award, the construction 
of facilities to house 
these radars are also 
awaiting awarding.   
Israel 
Close Air Support 
(CAS) 
Bidding has been 
pending for almost 2 
years now, with several 
changes made on the 
submission of bids. No 
time frame has been 
made yet on when the 
bid submission will 
take place, although 
this was said to be 
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among the most urgent 
requirement as the 
PAF’s OV-10s are 
rapidly deteriorating 
due to age and airframe 
stress.  
Long Range Patrol 
Aircraft (LRPA) 
In 2014, bidding failed 
in its first attempt, and 
no new announcement 
has been made by the 
DND on when they 
intend to restart the 
tendering process.  
 
Full Motion flight 
Simulator  
Underwent tender in 
2014 but failed to 
move forward until 
now. 
 
C-130T – 2 ex-US 
Marine Corps C-130T 
Hercules aircraft 
$20 million – US 
Php1.6 billion 
(Philippines) 
USA 
Ammunition for the 
FA-50 
Still undetermined if a 
bidding will be the 
acquisition mode to use 
 
Army Vehicle-mounted and 
handheld radios 
Government-to-
government 
Harris Corp (USA) 
Rocket Launcher Light  Airtronic (USA) 
RPG-7USA  Airtronic (USA) 
60 filed ambulances 
(Humvee-based M1152 
combat ambulance) 
Government-to-
government 
AM General 
Refurbishing and repair 
of 114 ex-US Army 
M113A2 armoured 
personnel carriers 
Has not yet gained 
traction 
 
Shore-Based Missile 
System 
Not in the original 
projects that was 
approved by the 
president 
 
AFP’s General HQ and 
Service Support Units 
680 Kia KM-450 
trucks 
Government-to-
government 
 
Civil Engineering 
Equipment 
Tendering has not yet 
started 
 
C41STAR System Tendering has not yet 
started 
 
Sources: Table based on interviews and secondary sources searches done by author.  
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Appendix L 
 
Timeline of AFP Deployment to Haiyan Affected Areas from 8-16 November 2013 
Date Performance 
8 November 
(Friday) 
• Power, communications, and transportation were paralyzed because 
of the 300KPH winds. 
• 3 Enlisted Personnel were killed, 12 are missing, and 31 were 
wounded including three officers. 
• Philippine Army’s 8th Infantry Division Commander Brg. Gen. Jet 
Belarmino, with the headquarters beside the Tacloban Airport had 
to bore a hole in the ceiling of his headquarters to survive the rising 
waters. 
• Lt. Col. Fermin Carangan an Air Force officer assigned in Tacloban 
who was supposed to lead a rescue mission in the area along with 
his men was swept out of the sea for six hours. He managed to 
survive, and save a 7-year-old boy in the process. 
• The AFP’s first priority was to establish communication so that 
assets and manpower can be transported and redirected. 
9 November 
(Saturday) 
• Tacloban City Airport was opened for military-grade aircraft. The 
first flight/sortie of C-130 transported Secretary of Social Welfare 
and Development Dinky Soliman, NDRRMC Director Eduardo Del 
Rosario; an AFP medical team and members of GHQ Crisis Action 
Team; Medical Team & members of GHQ Crisis Action Team; 2 
generator sets; 7,000lbs relief goods from DSWD; other food 
packs. An incident command post and radio contact centre was 
established immediately upon arrival of equipment to monitor 
movement of relief operations. 
• Another C-130 from Zamboanga also transported 50 drums of jet 
fuel to Tacloban City needed for on-going aerial survey, rescue, and 
transport with SOKOL and Huey helicopters of the Philippine Air 
Force. 
• Two major supply/logistics hubs were identified and established by 
the Army’s 3rd Infantry Division in Iloilo City and Roxas City to 
serve as staging area of relief efforts going to accessible barangays, 
while clearing operations are also on-going in isolated areas. In 
Panay Island, 845 personnel from said unit were deployed to 
conduct relief. Additionally, 250 reservists from the Army, Air 
Force, and Navy volunteered their time to assist in the ongoing 
operations in Panay. 
• AFP helicopters were also brought to transport relief goods into 
Roxas City from Iloilo City; when the roads were cleared the Army 
used their trucks to keep the flow of goods and relief to barangays 
with open roads. 
• Two Navy ships delivered aid and relief goods to the islands of 
Carles and Estancia in Northern Iloilo to address requirements in the 
area. 
10 November 
(Sunday) 
• To improve existing make-shift communications centre, 
communications van from the AFP, personnel from Office of Civil 
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Defence, cadaver bags, and one generator set (Smart 
Communications) were transported to Tacloban City. 
• Two vessels of the Philippine Navy departed for Palawan and 
Tacloban containing more than 300,000 lbs of relief goods and other 
relief items. The AFP transported the PNP Special Action Force to 
conduct law enforcement because there was already lawlessness and 
looting incidents particularly in Tacloban. 
• We also transported the Mammoth Medical Mission Team capable 
of orthopaedic, surgical, and anaesthetic medicine via another flight 
of C-130. 
• In Panay, communication centres were quickly established at 
Estancia in northern Iloilo, Roxas City in Capiz, Kalibo airport in 
Aklan, and San Jose in Antique utilizing military radio to widen the 
scope of monitoring. 
11 November 
(Monday) 
• To assist in ongoing relief and road clearing efforts and address 
shortages in communication facilities, the AFP transported via C-
130 aircraft Department of Energy personnel, additional PNP SAF, 
Smart Communications personnel and equipment, and cadaver bags. 
• Transport of relief goods via Navy Vessels continue from Masbate 
City to Burias Island and Tacloban City. 
• To further assess the damages caused by Typhoon Yolanda, the 
AFP conducted aerial surveillance in Calicaoan and Manicani 
Islands, and Guiuan Eastern Samar, Northern Panay, Northern 
Palawan including Coron, Negros Island, Masbate Province, and 
Cebu City. 
• Aside from Tacloban, the AFP deployed troops, land, and aerial 
assets to other severely damaged areas in Panay Island to deliver 
relief goods. 
12 November 
(Tuesday) 
• To augment existing military and police forces conducting road 
clearing and humanitarian assistance and disaster response in 
Tacloban, the AFP deployed two battalions of Military Engineers 
and a battalion from the Army’s Special Forces. 
13 November 
(Wednesday) 
• Military Engineers along with the Army’s 1st Special Forces 
Battalion begun road clearing to open up major supply routes and 
allow for the faster delivery of goods and aid in Tacloban. 
•  We also sent 11 trucks from the Army to assist in the transport 
requirements from the two current major supply drop-off points in 
Tacloban and Guiuan. 
14 November 
(Thursday) 
• Relief operations of the Philippine Navy are on-going in Tacloban, 
Ormoc, Isabel, Leyte, Bantayan Island, and Panay Island. 
• Three C-130 aircraft delivered relief goods from Cebu to Tacloban 
and Guiuan. 
• As part of the Bayanihan Express project of the AFP, various relief 
centres were established in different headquarters in Metro Manila. 
They will be loaded on military trucks from the Army to be sent to 
Tacloban from Manila. These self-sustaining troops composed of 
security elements, maintenance personnel, and communication 
personnel with equipment will mass in Tacloban and will be 
redeployed from there to continue ground relief operations in Iloilo, 
Antique, and Capiz. 
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• Four Huey helicopters were also deployed to deliver relief goods to 
Carles and Estancia in Iloilo. 
15 November 
(Friday) 
• As of November 15, the AFP has about 12,000 troops on the ground 
under the command of Central Command conducting Humanitarian 
Assistance and Disaster Response (HADR) operations in typhoon-
affected areas in Visayas. It also has about 3,400 external 
troops including follow on forces augmenting said troops. 
• The AFP also deployed troops to assist the DSWD in repacking 
relief goods. Aside from troops deployed in DSWD Repacking 
Centres, the AFP has also established its own Repacking Centres in 
various headquarters in Metro Manila in coordination with said 
department: four in the Navy headquarters, one in Villamor Airbase, 
two in the Army headquarters, and one in the General Headquarters 
in Camp Aguinaldo. 
• Since day one, the AFP facilitated the transport of displaced 
civilians and their processing and turnover to DSWD officials from 
Tacloban to Manila and Cebu on board different air and naval 
assets. 
• Also since day one, four out of 8 SOKOL choppers while 10 out of 
the 22 huey helicopters are currently conducting HADR operations 
in Visayas. 
• For our land assets, 81 trucks are continuing transport of relief 
goods in affected areas. 
• Fifteen Navy vessels were also deployed to conduct HADR in all 
three incident areas. 
• The AFP’s strategic deployment of its land, air, and naval assets to 
assist in ongoing Humanitarian Assistance and Disaster Response 
operations shows that we prioritize on-going relief efforts while 
maintaining sufficient equipment and support to Internal Security 
Operations. 
16 November 
(Saturday) 
• As of this morning, the 2nd Serial Bayanihan Express which 
comprises 140 Army soldiers and 24 military trucks are preparing to 
depart after re-fuelling from Legaspi City towards Tacloban City. 
• The 3rd Serial Bayanihan Express consisting 53 combined Army, 
Air Force and Navy soldiers with 28 military and civilian 
trucks/vehicles on the other hand is set to depart Batangas Port to 
Tacloban City via RORO vessel along with personnel from 
1st Special Forces Battalion en route to Tacloban. 
• The Philippine Navy vessel AT296 departed Cavite City today en 
route to Matnog, Sorsogon. The logistics ship which has a bow 
ramp will prioritize the transport of military vehicles carrying 
equipment and personnel who will conduct HADR operations in 
Tacloban City. The vessel which has a capacity to carry 8 military 
vehicles is expected to arrive in Sorsogon tomorrow night. 
• Also today, five C-130 flights by the Australian and New Zealand 
government will be conducted from Mactan Air Port in Cebu to 
Tacloban, Guian, and Ormoc to transport teams and equipment to 
augment in ongoing HADR operations in the area. 
• Meanwhile, troops from the 3rd Infantry Division, Philippine Army 
together with a group of Canadian Army soldiers arrived at Roxas 
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City, Capiz on board a Ceres bus and five M35 trucks loaded with 
logistics supplies for relief and rehabilitation operations yesterday. 
A command post was established thereat to monitor movement of 
relief operations. 
Source: Data gathered during field work in Tacloban City and Ormoc City in September 2014.  
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Appendix M 
 
Timeline of AFP Deployment to Bopha Affected Areas from 2 – 25 December 2012 
Timeline AFP Performance 
2 Dec  • NDRRMC Operations Centre was raised to Red Alert Status 
• NDRRMC conducted an Emergency Preparedness Meeting re 
Typhoon "PABLO" on December 2, 2012 at 2:00 PM at the 
NDRRMC Operations Centre to discuss the preparedness measures of 
concerned agencies and regional offices. It was attended by 
representatives from PAGASA, DILG, DOH, DSWD, AFP, PNP, 
PIA, BFP, PCG, PRC and MMDA 
• The AFP Alerted its operational units to assist local DRRMCs and 
LGUs and prepositioned SAR equipment 
3 Dec • Alerted its operational units to assist local DRRMCs and LGUs and 
prepositioned search and rescue (SAR) equipment 
4 Dec • AFP prepositioned a PAF Aircraft for the use of OCD5 for disaster 
response and assessment operation in Bicol, particularly in Masbate 
province and Ticao Island. 
5 Dec • The 65IB and 51IB of the Phil Army were dispatched to assist the 
population affected by flooding in Kapai, Tagoloan and Bubong in 
Lanao Del Sur. 
6 Dec  • DRG/WASAR Teams on standby and ready for dispatch upon signal: 
• Two teams aboard Headquarters Coast Guard District Southeastern 
Mindanao (HCGDSEM) with rubber boat and out-bound motor – Sasa 
Wharf, Davao City 
• One team aboard Coast Guard Station Davao with rubber boat and 
out-bound motor – Sta. Ana, Davao City 
• One Special Operations Group (SOG) Team aboard Coast Guard 
Station Davao equipped with diving gears 
• One team aboard Coast Guard Station Mati with motor banca – Mati 
City, Davao Oriental 
• Coastal barangays under Mati City were alerted by PCG as well as 
with their respective PDRRMCs, MDRRMCs, and LGUs 
• CGS Davao has cancelled all voyages from Sta. Ana Pier Davao City 
bound to Kaputian and Talicud Island, Island Garden City of Samal 
7 – 9 Dec  • Alerted its operational units to assist local DRRMCs and LGUs and 
prepositioned SAR equipment. 
• 8th Infantry Division, TOG8-PAF, PCG, PNP, and PN response teams 
are on standby for possible deployment. 
• AFP prepositioned a PAF Aircraft for the use of OCD5 for disaster 
response and assessment operation in Bicol, particularly in Masbate 
province and Ticao Island. 
• The 65IB and 51IB of the Phil Army were dispatched to assist the 
population affect. 
• 671B and 701Bde conducted search and rescue and retrieval 
operations at Municipality of Boston, Davao Oriental. 
10 – 12 Dec • DRG/WASAR teams on standby and ready for dispatch upon signal: 
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• Two teams aboard HCGDSEM with RB and OBM – Sasa Wharf, 
Davao City 
• One team aboard CG station Davao with RB and OBM – Sta. Ana, 
Davao City 
• One SOG team aboard CSG Davao equipped with diving gears 
• One team aboard CG station Mati with MBCA – Mati City, Davao 
Oriental 
• Coastal barangays under Mati City alerted by PCG as well as advised 
to form their own response team  
13 Dec • EastMinCom provided trucks and assisted the transportation of Non-
Food Items to Municipality of New Bataan, ComVal Province. 
• 6718 and 701st BOE conducted search and rescue and retrieval 
operations at Municipality of Boston, Davao Oriental. 
20 Dec  • Troops from 66IB DRU, 72IB DRU and TG 1002nd conducted their 
search and retrieval operations and 525ECBn conducted clearing 
operation at New Bataan, Compostela Valley. 
25 Dec • SAR operations were concerted efforts of PCG, AFP (NOLCOM, 
WESTCOM, CENTCOM, WESTMINCOM, EASTMINCOM, PAF 
and NAVFORSOL), BFP and PNP with a total of 164,331 
families/702,746 persons evacuated to the designated evacuation 
centres established in various affected areas and outside evacuation 
areas (relatives and friends) and with 134 persons rescued 
• Task Force Maritime Search and Rescue SarGen is continuously 
conducting search and rescue operations for the remaining missing 
fishermen • PCG-manned BFAR Patrol Boat MCS-3005 rescued four 
(4) survivors and recovered one (1) dead body; BFAR Patrol Boat 
(MCS-3009) scoured the waters of Surigao and Mati City, Davao 
Oriental. • PCG K-9 Search and Rescue dogs with handlers were 
deployed for SAR and retrieval operations in New Bataan, 
Compostela Valley, under the operational control of 10th Infantry 
Division of the Philippine Army 
• AFP (67IB and 701st BDE) conducted SAR and retrieval operations at 
Boston, Davao Oriental. • Phil. Navy stationed in Surigao del Norte 
retrieved three (3) fishermen from General Santos City in the custody 
of foreign vessel Reefer Calya Portese on the way to Tokyo, Japan. 
The said fishermen were confined in CARAGA Regional Hospital. 
Source: Situation reports by the National Disaster Risk Reduction and Management Council (NDRRMC) taken 
during fieldwork at the Office of Civil Defence Region XI in Davao City in September to October 2014. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
